This book analyzes the link between economic and political inequalities and investigates the mechanisms that lead to economically rooted inequalities in the political representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and evaluating data from the post-electoral survey, Selects 2007, the author demonstrates that the policy preferences of members of the Federal Assembly best reflect those of rich citizens. This pattern is explained by differential levels of political participation and knowledge across income groups, party finance, the fact that representatives tend to come from higher economic strata, and the failure of the party-system structure to reflect the complexity of policy preferences among citizens.
Reihe
Auflage
Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2016
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Springer International Publishing
Zielgruppe
Illustrationen
3
3 s/w Abbildungen
IX, 149 p. 3 illus.
Maße
Höhe: 235 mm
Breite: 155 mm
Dicke: 9 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-3-319-80078-3 (9783319800783)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-27117-0
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Jan Rosset is a post-doctoral researcher at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, with a fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation. Prior to that, he has worked as senior researcher at FORS, the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences, and as lecturer at the University of Lausanne. He received his PhD in political science from this latter institution in 2013. His research interests include comparative politics, political representation and the link between economic and political inequality.
Introduction.- Electoral Democratic Representation and the Market Economy: Irreconcilable Assumptions, Driving Forces and Outcomes.- Explaining Unequal Representation.- Empirical Study of Unequal Representation in Switzerland: Towards an Analytical Framework.- Unequal Representation in Switzerland.- Unequal Representation by Parties: Explanations Based on the Elites' Side of the Representation Process.- The Structure of Party Competition and Electoral Choice: Explanations Based on the Electoral Behavior of Citizens.- The Moderating Effect of Party Finance Regulations.- Conclusion.
