Games and Information

Introduction ; PART I: GAME THEORY ; 1. The Rules of the Game, and the Equilibrium of Concept ; (1) Basic Definitions (2) Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma (3) Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (4) Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Pure Coordination (5) Focal Points ; 2. Information ; (1) Introduction (2) The Normal and Extensive Forms of a Game (3) Information Sets (4) Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information (5) Bayesian Games and the Harsanyi Transformation (6) Example: The Png Settlement Game ; 3. Continuous and Mixed Strategies ; (1) Introduction (2) Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game (3) "Chicken", "The War of Attrition", and Correlated Strategies (4) Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game ; 4. Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information ; (1) Introduction (2) Subgame Perfectness (3) An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I (4) Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox (5) Discounting (6) Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem (7) Reputation: The One-Sided Prisoner's Dilemma (8) Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game ; 5. Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information ; (1) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III (2) Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: "PhD Admissions." (3) The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V (4) Incomplete Information in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model (5) The Axelrod Tournament (6) Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game (7) Existence of Equilibrium ; Part II: Asymmetric Information ; 6. Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions ; (1) Categories of Asymmetric Information Models (2) A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game (3) The Self Selection, Participation, and Competition Constrains (4) State-Space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II (5) Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game (6) Institutions ; 7. Moral Hazard: Hidden Information and Remedies ; (1) Pooling vs Separating Equilibrium, and the Revelation Principle (2) An Example: The Salesman Game (3) Efficiency Wages (4) Tournaments (5) Monitoring (6) Alleviating the Agency Problem (7) Teams, and the Groves Mechanism ; 8. Adverse Selection ; (1) Introdution: Production Game V (2) Adverse Selection Under Certainty: Lemons I and II (3) Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV (4) Adverse Selection Under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III (5) Other Equilibrium Concepts: Wilson and Reactive Equilibrium (6) Applications ; 9. Signalling ; (1) Introduction (2) The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling (3) General comments on Signalling in Education (4) The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening (5) Two Signals: Underpricing of Stock ; Part III: Other Applications ; 10. Bargaining ; (1) The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie (2) The Nash Bargaining Solution (3) Alternating Offers Over Finite Time (4) Alternating Offers Over Infinite Time.