Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.
Reihe
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Verlagsort
Produkt-Hinweis
Illustrationen
Worked examples or Exercises
Maße
Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
Dicke: 5 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-1-009-59799-9 (9781009597999)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
1. Introduction; 2. Understanding congressional attention to covert action; 3. Measuring congressional attention and effects on covert FIRCs; 4. Hamstrung in Angola and beyond: not just whether, but how and how much; 5. Afghanistan: an exception that proves the rule?; 6. Conclusion; Appendix A: modelling congressional attention; Appendix B: modelling Covert FIRCs; References.
