This volume consists of eight sections presenting debates on central issues in the general area of explanation and methodology in psychology. Each section includes a classic paper already published by a philosopher or cognitive scientist on a problem in the philosophy of psychology along with a response proposing a different view of the matter, followed by an original reply by the main contributor. The sections are forwarded by introductions written by the editors. Topics covered in the volume include: causal relevance, explanatory relevance, externalism and psychological explanation, biopsychology, connectionism and classical architecture, connectionism and eliminativism, tacit knowledge, and the unconscious and psychoanalytic explanation. Contributions to the volume include work by Fred Dretske, Ned Block, Ruth Garrett Millikan, Paul Smolensky, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, Stephen Stich, Martin Davies, Tyler Burge, and Jim Hopkins.
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Verlagsort
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Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Für Beruf und Forschung
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Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
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ISBN-13
978-0-631-18542-0 (9780631185420)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
PART I. 1. Causal Relevance. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Can the mind change the world?: N. Block (MIT). c. How to be psychologically relevant: C. & G. Macdonald. d. Reply: N. Block. 2. Explanatory Relevance. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Does meaning matter?: F. Dretske (Stanford). c. Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation: J.Kim (Brown University). d. Reply: F. Dretske. PART II. 3. Anti-Individualism and Psychological Explanation. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Individualism and psychology: T. Burge (University of California). c. A modal argument for narrow content: J. Fodor (Rutgers University). d. Reply: T. Burge. 4. Biopsychology. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Biosemantics: R. Millikan (University of Connecticut). c. Excerpt from 'A Study of Concepts': C. Peacocke (University of Oxford). d. Reply: R. Millikan. Part III. 5. Subdoxastic Explanation I: Connectionism and Classical Architecture. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. On the proper treatment of connectionism: P. Smolensky. c. Connectionism and cognitive architecture: J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn. d. Connectionism, constituency, and the language of thought: P. Smolensky. e. Connectionsim and the problem of systematicity: J. Fodor and B. McLaughlin. f. Reply: P. Smolensky 6. Subdoxastic Explanation II: Connectionism and Eliminativism. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology: W. Ramsey, S. Stich, and J. Garon. c. Connectionist minds: A. Clark (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee). d. Reply: S. Stich and T. Warfield. Part IV. 7. Tacit Knowledge, the Unconscious, and Psychological Explanation. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states: M. Davies (University of Oxford). c. Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science: J. Searle (University of California). d. Reply: M. Davies. 8. Psychoanalytic Explanation. a. Introduction: C. & G. Macdonald. b. On Freud: J. Hopkins. c. Self-deception and the nature of mind: M. Johnston (University of Princeton).
