THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

VOLUME 1

PART I

THE BEGINNINGS

1. F. A. Hayek (1945), 'The Use of Knowledge in Society'
2. William Vickrey (1961), 'Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders'
3. Robert B. Wilson (1969), 'Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information'
4. George J. Stigler (1961), 'The Economics of Information'
5. Jack Hirshleifer (1973), 'Where Are We in the Theory of Information'

PART II

THE VALUE OF INFORMATION

6. Jack Hirshleifer (1971), 'The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity'
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), 'On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets'
8. Kevin F. McCardle (1985), 'Information Acquisition and the Adoption of New Technology'
9. Beth Allen (1990), 'Information as an Economic Commodity'

PART III

SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION

10. J. J. McCall (1970), 'Economics of Information and Job Search'
11. Steven A. Lippman and John J. McCall (1981), 'The Economics of Belated Information'
12. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), 'Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover'
13. Peter A. Diamond (1971), 'A Model of Price Adjustment'
14. Louis L. Wilde and Alan Schwartz (1979), 'Equilibrium Comparison Shopping'
15. Steven Salop and Joseph Stiglitz (1977), 'Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion'
16. Yves Balcer (1983), 'F.O.B. Pricing Versus Uniform Delivered Pricing: A Welfare Analysis in a Stochastic Environment'
17. Asher Wolinsky (1987), 'Matching, Search, and Bargaining'

PART IV

SPECULATION

18. J. Michael Harrison and David M. Kreps (1978), 'Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations'
19. J. Hirshleifer (1975), 'Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets'
20. Stephen W. Salant (1983), 'The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack'

PART V

INFORMATION AND THE LAW

A: Enforcement Issues

21. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), 'Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance'
22. Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel (1987), 'Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder'
23. A. Rubinstein (1979), 'An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident'

B: SETTLEMENT vs. TRIAL

24. I. P. L. P'ng (1983), 'Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial'
25. Gene M. Grossman and Michael L. Katz (1983), 'Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare'
26. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), 'The Selection of Disputes for Litigation'

VOLUME 2

PART I

SIGNALLING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

1. George A. Akerlof (1970), 'The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism'
2. Michael Spence (1973), 'Job Market Signaling'
3. Maxim Engers and Luis Fernandez (1987), 'Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection'
4. In-Koo and David M. Kreps (1987), 'Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria'
5. Charles Wilson (1980), 'The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection'

PART II

MECHANISM DESIGN, CONTRACTING AND MORAL HAZARD

6. Milton Harris and Robert M. Townsend (1981), 'Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information'
7. Bengt R. Holmstroem (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability'
8. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984), 'Monopoly with Incomplete Information'

PART III

AUCTIONS

9. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), 'Optimal Auctions'
10. Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Optimal Auction Design'
11. Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982), 'A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding'
12. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1987), 'Auctioning Incentive Contracts'

PART IV

REPUTATION MODELS

13. David M. Kreps ad Robert Wilson (1982), 'Reputation and Imperfect Information'
14. David Backus and John Driffil (1985), 'Inflation and Reputation'
15. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1989), 'Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player'

PART V

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

16. Roy Radner and Michael Rothschild (1975), 'On the Allocation of Effort'
17. S. A. Lippman and R. P. Rumelt (1982), 'Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency Under Competition'
18. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner (1985), 'Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation'
19. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis'