This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics.
During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.
Rezensionen / Stimmen
James Lebovic's The False Promise of Superiority is a real breath of fresh air that makes a vital contribution to ongoing debates about nuclear strategy, especially the nature, meaning and significance of nuclear 'superiority.' Challenging approaches to nuclear strategy that rely on capabilities rather than intentions and real-world decision-making dynamics, Lebovic makes a compelling case that nuclear strategists and policy makers should focus on what potential adversaries are likely to do as opposed to what they can do. No one interested in the future of nuclear deterrence and strategy can afford to ignore this provocative and important book. * Keith Shimko, Purdue University * James Lebovic provides an unsparing examination of lessons learned and unlearned from debates about nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. More importantly, he demonstrates why these debates are relevant today as the United States struggles to deal with the nuclear challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. At a time when most analyses of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability focus on the impact of emerging technologies, Lebovic focuses on the underlying logic of how deterrence works and makes a strong case that capabilities matter much less than commonly supposed. His analysis is a useful antidote to the current fascination with how artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and cyber weapons will revolutionize deterrence. * Gregory Koblentz, Associate Professor and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, George Mason University * The False Promise of Superiority is an important book that reminds readers how the faulty logics and irrationalities of the Cold War era continue to haunt the present. * Choice * This book remains extremely relevant in today's times. A significant segment of today's US nuclear strategists continues to recommend strategies similar to those of the Cold War era. * Peter Nazarechuk, H-Net *
Sprache
Verlagsort
Zielgruppe
Illustrationen
9 b/w line drawings; 2 tables
Maße
Höhe: 235 mm
Breite: 156 mm
Dicke: 20 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-19-768086-5 (9780197680865)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
Autor*in
Professor of Political Science and International AffairsProfessor of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University
Concepts and Arguments
Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War
SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages
Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry
Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War
SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"
Chapter 4: Commitment
Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation
Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation
SECTION III: Case Studies
Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis
Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions
Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence
Notes
Index
