Hybrid organizations, governmental entities that mix characteristics of private and public sector organizations, are increasingly popular mechanisms for implementing public policy. Koppell assesses the performance of the growing quasi-government in terms of accountability and control. Comparing hybrids to traditional government agencies in three policy domains - export promotion, housing and international development - Koppell argues that hybrid organizations are more difficult to control largely due to the fact that hybrids behave like regulated organizations rather than extensions of administrative agencies. Providing a rich conception of the bureaucratic control problem, Koppell also argues that hybrid organizations are intrinsically less responsive to the political preferences of their political masters and suggests that as policy tools they are inappropriate for some tasks. This book provides a timely study of an important administrative and political phenomenon.
Rezensionen / Stimmen
'There is much of interest in the issues explored by the book and there is a considerable amount of evidence about the cases presented.' Journal of Public Administration 'This book provides a timely study of an important administrative and political phenomenon.' International Institute of Administrative Sciences 'In bringing our attention to a significant but overlooked segment of the federal bureaucracy, Koppell brings a fresh perspective to the literature on democratic accountability of administrative institutions. Two findings in particular - that there is variation from one setting to the next in the fundamental agency control challenge faced by elected officials, and that agencies are strategically sophisticated actors in the policy arena - mark distinct advances in the literature on control of the bureaucracy.' David C. Nixon, Georgia State University
Reihe
Sprache
Verlagsort
Zielgruppe
Produkt-Hinweis
Illustrationen
14 Tables, unspecified; 4 Line drawings, unspecified
Maße
Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
Dicke: 15 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-521-52560-2 (9780521525602)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.
Autor*in
Yale University, Connecticut
List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; List of acronyms; 1. Introduction; 2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control; 3. Administration by regulation; 4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control; 5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests; 6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint; 7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control; 8. Conclusion; Appendix: background of organizations studied; Interview subjects; References; Index.
