During the 1970s and 1980s there has been an explosion of research in the economics of information. Problems of imperfect and asymmetric information have created new roles for incentives to influence the behaviour of economic agents, and this has led researchers to study many new and exciting issues of organizational decision-making and design. This collection of articles analyzes the consequences of incomplete information. The first part looks at various problems arising in markets and other organizations such as contracting and monitoring practices, moral hazard, public sector decision-making and market contexts. The second part focuses on incentive and information problems connected with workers and firms, considering human capital and labour contracting, profit-sharing and teams, unemployment insurance and wage discrimination.
Reihe
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Für Beruf und Forschung
Maße
Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-631-16424-1 (9780631164241)
Copyright in bibliographic data is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or its licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Part I: Information and Incentives: Organizations and Markets ; Baron & Besanko (Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defence Procurement) Riordan & Sappington (Commitment in Procurement Contracting) B Allen (Using Trembling-Hand Perfection to Alleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem) T M Andersen (Rules or Discretion in Public Sector Decision-Making Milgrom & J Roberts (Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production) Guesnerie & Oddou (Increasing Returns to Size and their Limits) Arnott & Stiglitz (The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard) Bester (Qualitative Uncertainty in a Market with Bilateral Trading) Laffont & Rochet (Stock Market Portfolios and Segmentation of the Insurance Market) Gjesdal (Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes) ; Part II Information and Incentives Labour, Wages and Contracts ; Lindbeck & Snower (Labour Turnover as an Incentive Mechanism) Ulph & Ulph (Bargaining Structures and Delay in Innovation) Naslund (Dynamic Behaviour of a Labour-Managed Team) Ireland (Internal Labour Markets and Democratic Labour-Managed Firms) Azariadis (Human Capital and Self-Enforcing Contracts) Brown & Wolfstetter (Optimal Unemployment Insurance Systems and Experience Rating) R Wilson (Credentials and Wage Discrimination) L G Svensson (Fair Wages When Individual Information is Incomplete - An Application of a Model with Indivisibilities) Kahn (Separating and Pooling Equilibrium in Optimal Employment Contracts) Hoel & Moene (Profit-Sharing, Unions and Investment) Lyttkens (Incentives in Swedish Work Environment Regulation) Askildsen (Allocation of Capital and Labour in a Labour-Owned Firm Consisting of Heterogeneous Workers) ;
