First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Zielgruppe
Maße
Höhe: 229 mm
Breite: 152 mm
Dicke: 16 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-7450-0233-0 (9780745002330)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)
Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
DEMOCRACY
Interest Groups and Collective Action
Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
BUREAUCRACY
Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
The Bureau-Shaping Model
Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
