Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. The hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings, which was developed using a decision model, is experimentally confirmed. Moreover, the author analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.
Auflage
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH
Zielgruppe
Für Beruf und Forschung
Research
Illustrationen
35
35 s/w Abbildungen
XVII, 191 p. 35 illus.
Maße
Höhe: 210 mm
Breite: 148 mm
Dicke: 12 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-3-658-02818-3 (9783658028183)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-658-02819-0
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.
InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem.- Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing.- Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision.- Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.
