Introduction: the mind-body problem; two commonsense assumptions; the presumption in favour of mechanism; outline of the argument. Part 1 Prolegomena; substances and hierarchies; attributes, properties and relations - monadicity and basicness; events and states; causation; chance and epistemic probability. Part 2 Defining consciousness: a criterion of identity - phenomenological indiscernibility; the phenomenology of propositional attitudes; self-intimation; the monadicity of consciousness; the basicness of consciousness; the definiteness of consciousness; relation to the ordinary concept of consciousness. Part 3 Classifying mind-body theories: the physical; dependency and its degrees; a necessary digression - identity theories; the options broadly considered - first eliminations; mechanism and interactionism. Part 4 The rejection of functionalism: constraints on physicalist explanation of consciousness; functionalist theories; underspecification of the functional state; small-state functionalism; system-state functionalism. Part 5 basic physicalism; only brain-states are relevant; what are conscious correlates?; the problem of synthesis; what physical properties could be relevant?; empirical investigation of correlations; basic physicalism and other minds; all psychophysical mapping functions equiprobable. Part 6 The refutation of physicalism: paterns among propositional attitudes; labelling conscious states by functionality; other patterns within conscious states; the hypothesis of intentional causation; inverting probabilities; the data vanishingly improbable under physicalism and vice-versa. Part 7 The necessity of Interaction: idealism; the last mechanist theory, and its conscious analogue. Part 8 From interactionism to dualism: reduction; an example of reduction - the nature of "bridge laws"; supervenience; why we have scientific hierarchy; the doctrine of emergence; evidence for emergence; emergence no explanation; is emergence even possible? Part 9 The argument epitomized: the Humean world-view and its problems; the alternative - the dispositionalist theory; objections to dispositionalism; basic physicalism and emergence reviewed; the functionalism confusion - real systems and simulations specification of inner states, instantiation of characteristic laws; a dispositionalist theory of mind; prospective.
