This book contains the papers presented at the second biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, held in Boston in Fall, 1970. We have added the paper by Jaakko Hintikka which he was unable to present due to illness, and we have unfortunately not received the paper of Michael Scriven. Otherwise, these proceedings are complete so far as formal presentations. The meeting itself was dedicated to the memory of Rudolf Carnap. This great man and distinguished philosopher had died shortly before. The five talks from the session devoted to recollections of Professor Carnap are printed at the beginning of this book, and they are followed by eight other tributes and memories. We are particularly grateful to Wolfgang Stegmiiller for permitting us to include a translation of his eloge which was broadcast in Germany. The photographs were kindly contributed by Hannah Thost-Carnap. ROGER C. BUCK Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University ROBER T S. COHEN Boston Center for the Philosophy of Science, Boston University Photograph by Francis Schmidt, 1935 Photograph by Adya, 1962 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v HOMAGE TO RUDOLF CARNAP XI Herbert Feigl, Carl G. Hempel, Richard C. Jeffrey, W. V. Quine, A. Shimony, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Herbert G. Bohnert, Robert S. Cohen, Charles Hartshorne, David Kaplan, Charles Morris, Maria Reichenbach, Wolfgang Stegmiiller SYMPOSIUM: THEORETICAL ENTITIES IN STATISTICAL EXPLANATION JAMES G. GREENO / Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation 3 WESLEY C. SALMON / Explanation and Relevance: Comments on James G.
Reihe
Auflage
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Zielgruppe
Für Beruf und Forschung
Research
Produkt-Hinweis
Fadenheftung
Gewebe-Einband
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Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-90-277-0187-9 (9789027701879)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Symposium: Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation.- Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation.- Explanation and Relevance: Comments on James G. Greeno's 'Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation'.- Remarks on Explanatory Power.- Symposium: Capacities and Natures.- Capacities and Natures.- Capacities and Natures: An Exercise in Ontology.- Fisk on Capacities and Natures.- Symposium: History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction.- History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions.- Notes on Lakatos.- Research Programmes and Induction.- Can We Use the History of Science to Decide Between Competing Methodologies?.- Inter-Theoretic Criticism and the Growth of Science.- Replies to Critics.- Contributed Papers.- I. Observation.- Observation.- Feyerabend's Pragmatic Theory of Observation and the Comparability of Alternative Theories.- Observations as the Building Blocks of Science in 20th-Century Scientific Thought.- II. Philosophical Problems of Biology.- Functionalism and the Negative Feedback Model in Biology.- Some Problems with the Concept of 'Feedback'.- Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational Search for Them.- III. Equivalence, Analyticity, and In-Principle Confirmability.- Theoretical Realism and Theoretical Equivalence.- Theoretical Analyticity.- The Confirmation Machine.- IV. Probability, Statistics and Acceptance.- Unknown Probabilities, Bayesianism, and de Finetti's Representation Theorem.- New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory II: The Structure of Uncertainty.- Cost-Benefit vs Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.- Material Conditions on Tests of Statistical Hypotheses.- V. Problems in Quantum Physics; Genetic Epistemology.- Tachyons, Backwards Causation, and Freedom.- The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen ParadoxReexamined.- The Significance of Piaget's Researches on the Psychogenesis of Atomism.- VI. Theoretical Pluralism; Understanding; Methodological Agreement.- Method and Factual Agreement in Science.- VII. Induction and Reduction.- Dispositional Probabilities.- On the Relation of Neurological and Psychological Theories: A Critique of the Hardware Thesis.- 'Self-supporting' Inductive Arguments.- VIII. Scientific Theories: Comparison and Change.- Ontological and Terminological Commitment and the Methodological Commensurability of Theories.- Objectivity, Scientific Change, and Self-Reference.- A Logical Empiricist Theory of Scientific Change?.- IX. The Future of Philosophy of Science; Theory in the Social Sciences.- The Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Science.- From Logical Systems to Conceptual Populations.- Two Kinds of Theory in the Social Sciences.- X. Relativity and Congruence.- Einstein and the Lorentz-Poincaré Theory of Relativity.- Competing Radical Translations: Examples, Limitations and Implications.- Is 'Congruence' A Peculiar Predicate?.
