In this provocative work, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience. Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories, including those of Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz. They propose that conceptual confusions about how the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of research carried out by neuroscientists, in terms of the questions they choose to address, the description and interpretation of results and the conclusions they draw. The book forms both a critique of the practice of cognitive neuroscience and a conceptual handbook for students and researchers.
Rezensionen / Stimmen
"This remarkable book, the product of a collaboration between a philosopher and neuroscientist, shows that the claims made on behalf of cognitive science are ill-founded. The book will certainly arouse opposition... but if it causes controversy, it is controversy that is long overdue." Sir Anthony Kenny, President of the British Academy, 1989 - 93 "This book was simply waiting to be written." Denis Noble, Oxford University "Contemporary scientists and philosophers may not like Bennett and Hacker's conclusions, but they will hardly be able to ignore them. The work is a formidable achievement." John Cottingham, Professor of Philosophy, Reading University "Neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers will be challenged - and educated - by this sustained and well-informed critique." Paul Harris, Professor, Human Development and Psychology, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University "This book is a joy to read. It is the fruit of collaboration across disciplines and continents between a neurophysiologist and a philosopher. They have written a polemical work that is a model of clarity and directness. Distiniguished neurophysiologist M.R. Bennett of the University of Sydney, and eminent Oxford philosopher P.M.S. Hacker have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ... This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists, philosophers and general readers alike." Australian Book Review "Bennett and Hacker have identified [conceptual confusions] with clinical precision and relentless good sense.... rich with philosophical insights ... thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise ..." Philosophy "careful application in a host of cases ...is precisely what Bennett and Hacker provide in devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists such as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz; and they also raise equally disturbing questions for philosophers such as Dennett, the Churchlands, Chalmers, Nagel and Searle. Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life." Philosophy "The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is thorough and illuminating." Human Nature Review 1. '[It] will certainly, for a long time to come, be the most important contribution to the mind-body problem which there is.' G. H. von Wright 2. 'everyone who thinks about the mind and consciousness should study Philosophical Foundations of Neurtoscience. ... it will ultimately contribute to a far better understanding of mind and consciousness within scientific thought as well as a better understanding of the limits of empirical investigation', Arthur Collins, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 3. 'Sweeping, argumentative and brilliant, this book will provoke widespread discussion among philosophers and neuroscientists alike', Dennis Patterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2003 4. '...devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists ... Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life', Anthony O'Hear, Philosophy 2003 5. 'This book is a joy to read. ... a model of clarity and directedness... [Bennett and Hacker] have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ... This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists, philosophers and general readers alike.', Damian Grace, Australian Book Review, 2003 6. 'clinical precision and ... relentless good sense ... [a] thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise', Daniel N. Robinson, Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 7. 'mandatory reading for anybody interested in neuroscience and consciousness research. The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is thorough and illuminating.' Axel Kohler, Human Nature Review, 2003 8. 'a delicious cake of a book in which Bennett and Hacker guide the reader through a conceptual minefield of confusions repeatedly made by neuroscientists and philosophers alike.' Constantine Sandis, Metapsychology 2003 9. 'Anyone who has ever framed a theory or explained one should read this book - at the risk of forever falling silent.', The Rector, University of Sydney, Obiter Dicta 2003 10. '... impressively lucid ... Bennett and Hacker unquestionably succeed in making us challenge our own concepts, examine them for dross, and strive to home in on fundamentals.' Neil Spurway, Journal of the European Soc for Study of Science and Theology. 11. '...the fruit of a unique cooperation between a neuroscientist and a philosopher ... an excellent book that should be read by all philosophers of cognition and all researchers in the cognitive neurosciences.' Herman Philipse, ABG #2, De Academische Boekengids 2003 12. '...there are, I think, grounds for hope that this book will do an enormous amount of good, both in correcting philosophical confusion within neuroscience and in promoting a new style of dialogue between neuroscience and philosophy' David Cockburn, Philosophical Investigations, 2005
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Für Beruf und Forschung
students, researchers and professionals in cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology and philosophy of mind
Maße
Höhe: 246 mm
Breite: 171 mm
ISBN-13
978-1-4051-0855-3 (9781405108553)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
Max R. Bennett is Professor of Physiology and University Chair at the University of Sydney. He is a leading neurobiologist, specialising in research on the formation and function of the synapse. He is the author of many books and articles in neurobiology, including The Idea of Consciousness: Synapses and the Mind and A History of the Synapse. He is President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, the recipient of the Distinguished Achievement Medallion of the Australian Neuroscience Society, the Ramaciotti Medal and the Burnet Medal, and is an Officer of the Order of Australia. P. M. S. Hacker is a fellow of St John's College, Oxford. He is author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and a leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications on Wittgenstein is the monumental four volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations published by Blackwell, the first two volumes of which are co-authored with G. P. Baker.
Preface. Part I: Philosophical Problems In Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots: 1. The Early Growth Of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System. Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins Of The Ventricular Doctrine. Fernel and Descartes: The Demise Of The Ventricular Doctrine. The Cortical Doctrine Of Willis and Its Aftermath. The Conception Of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall. Localizing Function In The Cortex: Broca, Fritz and Hitzig. The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System: Sherrington. 2. The Cortex and The Mind In The Work Of Sherrington and His Proteges. Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact. Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism. John Eccles and The 'Liaison Brain'. Wilder Penfield and The 'Highest Brain Mechanism'. 3. The Mereological Fallacy and Its Manifestation In Contemporary Neuroscientific Thought. Mereological Confusions In Cognitive Neuroscience: (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird). Methodological Qualms: (Ullman, P. S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry). On The Grounds For Ascribing Psychological Predicates To A Being: (Crick, Baars). On The Grounds For Misascribing Psychological Predicates To An Inner Entity: (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick). The Inner: (Damasio). Introspection: (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz). Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect: (Blakemore). Privacy Or Subjectivity: (Searle). The Meaning Of Psychological Predicates and How They Are Learnt: (Searle). Of The Mind and Its Nature: (Gazzaniga, Doty). Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: an Analysis: Preliminaries. Brain-Body Dualism: (Kandel Schwartz and Jessell, Libet). The Project: (Gazzaniga). The Category Of The Psychological: (Nagel, P. M. Churchland and P. S. Churchland). 4. Sensation and Perception. Sensation: (Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick). Perception: (Ledoux, Crick). Perception As The Causation Of Sensations: Primary and Secondary Qualities: (Kandel Schwartz and Jessell, Rock). Perception As Hypothesis Formation: Helmholtz: (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young).