This book seeks to enrich and, in some cases, reverse current ideas on corruption and its prevention. It is a long held belief that sanctions are the best guard against corrupt practice. This innovative work argues that in some cases sanctions paradoxically increase corruption and that controls provide opportunities for corrupt transactions. Instead it suggests that better regulation and responsive enforcement, not sanctions, offer the most effective response to corruption. Taking both a theoretical and applied approach, it examines the question from a global perspective, drawing on in particular a regulatory perspective, to provide a model for tackling corrupt practices.
Rezensionen / Stimmen
The book is clear and easy to follow ... this is an insightful and inspiring book that makes us think and enriches us. -- Professor Manuel Villoria, King Juan Carlos University * Public Integrity * A welcome addition to the growing body of academic research in this area. -- David Gomez * Association of Regulatory and Disciplinary Lawyers Quarterly Bulletin * Professor de Benedetto's comprehensive and inclusive analysis of the regulatory anticorruption approach and all it implies is both readable and comprehensible. That's a feat in itself. I would recommend it to anyone involved in anti-corruption, especially those working in policy and advocacy roles. * Ruth Steinholtz, AreteWork * The book is particularly interesting, and not only for its analysis of the basic equation: to limit corruption, one must make good rules and monitor them well. For, beneath this basic equation, in fact, lie various aspects of complexity, which the book encounters on its way ... While keeping the strong line of the regulatory perspective, Maria de Benedetto is aware of all this complexity, and this makes her book all the more penetrating and effective. -- Jean-Bernard Auby * Ius Publicum * This is a broad and deep analysis of corruption. It explores with great insight all aspects of corruption from an administrative law perspective, thus filling a gap in current bibliography. The book is an invaluable source of information for academics and practitioners alike. * Professor Helen Xanthaki, Faculty of Laws UCL * Maria De Benedetto has produced a path-breaking study of the relationship between corruption and controls. It is a must-read for those who would seek to use rules, regulations and enforcement to address corrupt practices. It advances the literature on both corruption and regulation. * Rob Baldwin, Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics and Political Science, Director, LSE Executive Course on Regulation * The book has many merits. First, it is a remarkable contribution to research on anticorruption law and policy ... The inquiry carried out in this book contributes to such literature by providing a sophisticated and well developed regulatory toolkit to tackle corruption ... A second merit of the book is its attempt to go beyond the technocratic dimension of regulatory anticorruption ... Finally, the book is an interesting (and successful) methodological experiment. The Author puts her disciplinary background in administrative law at the service of an inquiry in law and regulation. The dividend is rich. -- Edoardo Chiti * Italian Journal of Public Law *
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Maße
Höhe: 234 mm
Breite: 156 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-1-5099-2921-4 (9781509929214)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Maria De Benedetto is Professor of Administrative Law at Roma Tre University, Italy.
Autor*in
Roma Tre University, Italy
1. Rules, Corruption and Controls: Setting the Scene
1.1. Preliminary Remarks
1.2. Rules
1.2.1. Definition
1.2.2. Law is More than Legislation
1.2.3. Does Legislation Threaten the Law?
1.2.4. Regulation and Rules as Key Concepts
1.3. Rules and Behaviour
1.3.1. Decisions about Compliance with Rules as an Individual Problem
1.3.2. Generating Compliance with Rules as an Institutional Problem
1.3.3. Certifying Compliance with Rules as a Company's Interest (and Cost)
1.4. Functioning of Rules and their Dysfunction
1.4.1. How Rules Work
1.4.2. When Rules Do Not Work
1.4.3. Trust: The Intangible Factor of Rules' Effectiveness
1.5. Corruption
1.5.1. Definition
1.5.2. A Basic Definition for a Complex Issue: (Simple) Corruption
1.5.3. A Slightly Complex Definition: Corruption as a Regulatory Issue
1.6. Corruption and Conflict of Interest
1.6.1. Corruption as 'Actuality', Conflicts of Interest as 'Possibility'
1.6.2. Criticisms and Paradoxes in Overregulating Conflicts of Interest
1.7. Corruption and Corruptibility
1.7.1. Corruption as 'Actuality', Corruptibility as 'Probability'
1.7.2. Objective Corruption and Corruptibility: Type AP (Administrative Powers) and Type C (Controls)
1.8. Controls
1.8.1. Definition
1.8.2. The Notion of Control from an Anticorruption Perspective
1.8.3. Criticism, Paradoxes and Dilemmas of Controlling
1.9. Controlling Administrative Activities
1.9.1. External Controls
1.9.2. Internal Controls
1.9.3. Criticisms and Paradoxes in Controlling Administrative Activities
1.10. Controlling Private Activities
1.10.1. 'Desk-Based' Controls
1.10.2. 'Field-Based' Controls
1.10.3. Criticisms and Paradoxes in Controlling Private Activities
2. Anticorruption: Strategies and Risks
2.1. Preventing Corruption: A Contemporary Issue
2.1.1. The Great Temptation: Justifying
2.1.2. The Right Choice: Combating
2.2. Anticorruption between Global Stance and Domestic Strategies
2.2.1. Global Anticorruption Policies
2.2.2. Domestic Administrative Strategies
2.3. Anticorruption: Conventional, Behavioural and Beyond
2.3.1. Conventional Anticorruption
2.3.2. Behavioural Anticorruption
2.3.3. Towards Regulatory Anticorruption
2.4. Risks of Anticorruption
2.4.1. Backfire
2.4.2. Perception vs Reality
2.4.3. Metastatic Bureaucracy
2.4.4. Defensive Administration
2.4.5. Difficulty in Recruitment of Honest and Expert People
2.5. Feasible Objectives of Anticorruption
3. Anticorruption: Rules (Can Good Rules Reduce Opportunities for Corruption?)
3.1. As with Corruption, Anticorruption Starts from Rules
3.1.1. No Rules, No Corruption?
3.1.2. Rules, their Market and their Profit
3.2. Managing Rules, Combating Corruption
3.3. Regulatory Stock
3.3.1. Simplification
3.3.1.1. Simplification and Good Quality Regulation Per Se
3.3.1.2. Simplification and Anticorruption
3.3.2. Advocacy Powers
3.3.2.1. In Competition Law
3.3.2.2. In Anticorruption
3.4. Regulatory Flow
3.4.1. Anticorruption Assessment of Legislation
3.4.1.1. A First Step: Good Quality Regulation Per Se
3.4.1.2. A Second Step: Highly Focused Anticorruption Tools
3.4.2. Tracing Interests
3.4.2.1. Lobbying and Consultation
3.4.2.2. Collecting Interests: The Good and the Bad
3.4.2.3. Regulating Lobbying is not Necessarily the Solution
4. Anticorruption: Controls (Can Controls Help in Reducing Corruption?)
4.1. Controls from a Theoretical Perspective
4.1.1. The Mythology (and Threatening Practice) of Efficient Controls
4.1.2. Controls in Regulatory Theory
4.1.3. Controls and Theory of 'Policing'
4.1.4. Controlling is Governing, No More and No Less
4.2. Controls from a Practical Perspective: Warnings
4.2.1. Controls have a Hybrid Nature
4.2.2. Controlling Includes Administrative Tolerance
4.2.3. Controls are a Cost
4.2.4. Administrative Capacity of Control is Limited
4.2.5. Planning Controls is not a Simple Task
4.2.6. Sanctions Following Controls Must be Effective in Order to Deter
4.3. Controls from a Practical Perspective: Suggestions
4.3.1. Information
4.3.2. Regulation
4.3.3. Privacy and Data Protection
4.3.4. Planning
4.3.5. Enforcement
4.3.6. Communication
4.3.7. Reform
5. Combating Corruption via Regulation and Controls: Which Formula?
5.1. Corruption (and Anticorruption) from a Regulatory Perspective: A Recap
5.2. Combating Corruption: Why?
5.3. Combating Corruption: How?
5.3.1. Regulatory Anticorruption: From Alternative Theoretical Approaches to an Integrated Strategy
5.3.2. Regulatory Anticorruption Toolkit (Corruptibility Assessment)
5.3.2.1. Incentives or the Genetics of Corruption
5.3.2.2. A Protocol to Identify and Assess Corruptibility
5.3.2.3. Criminal Databases Should Talk Administrative Language
5.3.3. Regulatory Anticorruption in Practice
5.4. Combating Corruption: Who?
5.4.1. Legislators and Regulators
5.4.2. Public Agents and Enforcement Officers (in General)
5.4.3. Anticorruption Bodies (in Particular)
5.5. Trust vs Corruption: Governing the Intangible
