Two-Sided Matching
A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
1. Auflage
Erschienen am 14. Februar 2014
978-1-107-77659-3 (ISBN)
Beschreibung
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Rezensionen / Stimmen
"This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets....The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature." From the Foreword by Robert Aumann "An expertly guided tour through an unfamiliar and beautiful region of equilibrium theory would be quite enough incentive for most economic theorists to buy and read this book. But perhaps the greatest treat offred is Roth's discovery of a happy coincidence between theory and practical affairs." Journal of Economic LiteratureWeitere Details
Reihe
Sprache
Englisch
Verlagsort
Cambridge
Großbritannien
Zielgruppe
Für Beruf und Forschung
Illustrationen
3 Tables, unspecified; 5 Line drawings, unspecified
Dateigröße
26,57 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-107-77659-3 (9781107776593)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Weitere Ausgaben
Personen
Inhalt
Foreword Robert Auman; Acknowledgment; 1. Introduction; Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings; 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings; 4. Strategic questions; Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns; 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences; Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers; 8. The assignment game; 9. The generalization of the assignment model; Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions; Bibliography; Indexes.
