This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book concludes with a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
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From the reviews:
"According to Hans Peters, 'the best introduction to game theory is by means of examples' and, consequently, the book starts with a set of well-chosen examples illustrating various game theoretic questions from different subfields, which are likely to generate interest . . Summarizing, the book is a perfectly well-presented textbook on classical game theory, written by an expert in the field with high pedagogical skills. It is recommendable for both mathematics and business administration or economic students." (Walter Kern, Operations Research Letters, Vol. 38, 2010)
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ISBN-13
978-3-540-69291-1 (9783540692911)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-69291-1
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Thinking Strategically.- Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.- Finite Two-Person Games.- Finite Extensive Form Games.- Finite Games with Incomplete Information.- Noncooperative Games: Extensions.- Repeated Games.- An Introduction to Evolutionary Games.- Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility.- Cooperative Game Theory Models.- Social Choice.- Noncooperative Games.- Matrix Games.- Finite Games.- Extensive Form Games.- Evolutionary Games.- Cooperative Games.- TU-Games: Domination, Stable Sets, and the Core.- The Shapley Value.- Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Set.- The Nucleolus.- Special Transferable Utility Games.- Bargaining Problems.- Tools.- Tools.
