
Information Security: Cyberattacks, Data Breaches and Security Controls
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Inhalt
- Intro
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1
- Cybersecurity: Federal Agencies Met Legislative Requirements for Protecting Privacy When Sharing Threat Information(
- Background
- Designated Federal Agencies Met Requirements to Develop Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines for Removal of Personal Information
- Agency Comments
- Chapter 2
- Information Security: IRS Needs to Rectify Control Deficiencies That Limit Its Effectiveness in Protecting Sensitive Financial and Taxpayer Data(
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Federal Law and Guidance Provide a Framework for Protecting Federal Information and Systems
- IRS Made Progress in Addressing Previously Reported Control Deficiencies, but Sensitive Financial and Taxpayer Data Continue to Be at Risk
- IRS Improved Access Controls, but Deficiencies Remained
- Deficiencies in IRS's Network Boundary Protection Continued to Exist
- IRS Inconsistently Implemented Identification and Authentication Controls for Financial Systems
- IRS Did Not Always Limit Authorization of User Access Rights and Privileges to Only Personnel Who Required It to Perform Their Jobs
- IRS Made Limited Progress in Correcting Control Deficiencies for Encryption of Sensitive Information
- IRS Has Made Limited Progress Enhancing the Audit and Monitoring Controls of Its Financial Systems
- IRS Improved Physical Security Controls, but Prior Deficiencies Remain
- IRS Improved Configuration Management Controls, but Deficiencies Remained
- IRS Had Not Documented Authorizations and Approvals of Changes To Mainframe Data and Processing
- IRS Had Not Applied Critical Security Patches and Used Unsupported Software on Multiple Devices
- Segregation of Duties and Contingency Planning Control Deficiencies Remained
- IRS Had Not Corrected a Prior Segregation of Duties Deficiency for One Financial System
- IRS Developed, Documented, Tested, and Updated Contingency Plans with Results from Testing for All But One Plan
- IRS Did Not Consistently Implement Certain Components of Its Information Security Program
- IRS Assessed Risk and Identified Some Threats and Vulnerabilities for Selected Systems, but Did Not Correct a Prior Deficiency Affecting Certain Systems
- IRS Had Not Yet Corrected Weaknesses in Procedures That Support Components of the Agency-Wide Information Security Program
- IRS Developed and Documented Security Plans, but Did Not Always Update Them to Reflect System or Operating Environment Changes
- Weaknesses Remained in Testing and Evaluating Controls
- Deficiencies in IRS's Remediation Process Remained
- Conclusion
- Recommendations for Executive Action
- Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
- Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service
- Chapter 3
- Information Security: Supply Chain Risks Affecting Federal Agencies(
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Federal Laws and Guidelines Require the Establishment of Information Security Programs and Provide for Managing Supply Chain Risk
- IT Supply Chains Introduce Numerous Information Security Risks to Federal Agencies
- Four National Security-Related Agencies Have Acted to Better Address IT Supply Chain Risks for Their Information Systems
- Chapter 4
- Information Security: OPM Has Implemented Many of GAO's 80 Recommendations, but Over One-Third Remain Open*
- Agency Comments
- Background
- Objective
- Scope and Methodology
- Results in Brief
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations - GAO-16-501
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations - GAO-16-687SU
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations - GAO-17-459SU
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations - GAO-17-614
- Prior Findings and Current Status of Recommendations
- GAO Summary
- Agency Comments
- Chapter 5
- Information Security: Significant Progress Made, but CDC Needs to Take Further Action to Resolve Control Deficiencies and Improve Its Program(
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Found
- Background
- CDC Relies on Information Systems to Help Achieve Its Mission
- CDC Has Defined Organizational Security Roles and Responsibilities
- Federal Laws and Guidance Establish Security Requirements to Protect Federal Information and Systems
- Security Control Deficiencies Placed Selected CDC Systems at Risk
- CDC Had Identified Risk and Developed Policies and Plans, but Shortcomings Existed
- CDC Did Not Appropriately Categorize at Least One Key System, but Assessed Risk to Some Extent at System and Entity-Wide Levels
- CDC Categorized Systems Based on Potential Impact of Compromise, but Did Not Appropriately Categorize a Key General Support System
- CDC Assessed Risk at the System Level, but Did Not Assess Threats, Document Risk-based Decisions, or Reassess Risk When Needed
- CDC Had a Process in Place to Assess Risk to Systems from an Entity-Wide Perspective
- CDC Had Not Updated Facility Risk Assessments
- CDC Had Documented Controls in Policies, Procedures, and Standards, but Had Not Included Certain Technical Requirements
- CDC Had Identified and Updated Controls in System Security Plans Annually, but Had Not Developed Facility Security Plans
- CDC Had Implemented Controls Intended to Protect Its Systems, but Deficiencies Existed
- CDC Did Not Consistently Implement Effective Access Controls
- CDC Implemented Enterprise-Wide Identification and Authentication Controls, but Did Not Consistently and Securely Configure Password Controls for Certain Accounts on Devices and Systems
- CDC Authorized Users More Access than Needed to Perform Their Jobs
- CDC Did Not Effectively Implement Boundary Controls to Ensure Network Integrity
- CDC Physically Protected Information System Assets, but Did Not Consistently Ensure Access Remained Appropriate
- CDC Had Not Consistently Encrypted Sensitive Authentication Data
- CDC Had Not Consistently Configured Servers Securely or Applied Patches in a Timely Manner
- Staff Received Security Awareness Training, but at Least 15 Percent of Those with Significant Security Responsibilities Did Not Receive Role-Based Training
- CDC Had Not Effectively Implemented Controls Intended to Detect Incidents or Deficiencies
- CDC Had Implemented Limited Logging and Monitoring Capabilities
- CDC Did Not Effectively Test or Assess Controls to Detect Deficiencies
- CDC Had Implemented Processes for Responding to Incidents or Identified Deficiencies, but Did Not Always Take Timely Corrective Actions
- CDC Had Implemented Incident Response Capabilities, but Did Not Maintain Adequate Information
- CDC Had Remedial Action Plans to Address Identified Deficiencies for Selected Systems, but Did Not Always Take Timely Corrective Actions or Have Plans for Other Needed Corrective Actions
- CDC Had Developed and Tested Plans for System Recovery, but Had Not Assessed the Risk Associated with the Close Proximity of an Alternate Processing Site
- CDC Had Not Consistently or Effectively Implemented Elements of Its Information Security Program
- CDC Has Implemented Many of the Recommendations in Our June 2018 Report and Plans to Implement the Rest
- Agency Comments
- Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: The National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
- Appendix III: Comments from Department of Health and Human Services
- Appendix V: Accessible Data
- Data Tables
- Chapter 6
- Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Implementation of Federal Approach to Securing Systems and Protecting against Intrusions(
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Federal Law and Policy Prescribe the Federal Approach and Strategy for Securing Information Systems
- The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 Sets Requirements for Securing Federal Systems and Information
- The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 Articulates Requirements for Protecting Federal Networks through the Use of Federal Intrusion Prevention and Detection Capabilities
- The Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure Directs Agencies to Use the Cybersecurity Framework for Managing Risks
- GAO Has Reported on Challenges Related to Establishing a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Strategy
- DHS Offers Federal Agencies Capabilities Intended to Detect and Prevent Intrusions to Federal Information Systems
- DHS's National Cybersecurity Protection System Is Intended to Detect and Prevent Cyber Intrusions
- DHS's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Provides Agencies with Tools and Services Intended to Secure Agency Systems
- NIST Recommends That Federal Agencies Deploy Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities
- Selected Agencies Were Not Effectively Implementing the Federal Government's Approach and Strategy to Securing Information Systems
- Inspectors General Determined That Most Selected Agencies Did Not Have Effective Information Security Programs or Controls in Place as of Fiscal Year 2017
- Inspectors General Indicate That Few Agencies Had Effective Information Security Programs
- Inspectors General Continued to Identify Significant Security Control Deficiencies in Controls over Financial Reporting at Most Selected Agencies
- Most Agencies Reported Not Meeting All Targets for the Cybersecurity Cross-Agency Priority Goal in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017
- OMB Determined That 13 of the 23 Civilian CFO Act Agencies Were Managing Cybersecurity Risk
- DHS and OMB Facilitated the Use of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities to Secure Federal Agency Systems, but Further Efforts Remain
- DHS Has Taken Actions to Facilitate the Use of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities and to Make Improvements to Those Capabilities
- DHS Has Worked to Improve NCPS, but Agencies Did Not Route All Traffic through Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities Offered by this System
- DHS Has Taken Steps to Provide Advanced Network Security Tools, but Has Not Met Planned Implementation Dates
- Agencies Indicated the Need for Additional Training and Guidance Related to NCPS and CDM
- OMB Took Actions to Oversee Agency Implementation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities and Report to Congress, but Did Not Fully Complete Required Actions
- OMB Did Not Submit the Intrusion Assessment Plan to Congress or Fully Describe the Plan's Implementation in Other Reports
- OMB Submitted Its Analysis of Agencies' Application of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities, but Did Not Include the Degree to Which the Capabilities Had Been Applied
- The Federal Chief Information Officer Reported on Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities, but Did Not Address All Elements Required by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015
- OMB Initiated Plans for Improving Agencies' Implementation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Capabilities, but Has Not Completed a Policy and Strategy
- Selected Agencies Had Not Consistently Implemented Capabilities to Detect and Prevent Intrusions
- Few Agencies Had Fully Implemented Required Email Protections
- Agencies Informed GAO That They Often Had Not Implemented Four Key Capabilities
- Less Than Half of the Selected Agencies That Used Cloud Services Monitored Their Cloud-Related Traffic
- Several Selected Agencies Had Not Fully Deployed Host-Based Capabilities
- Not All Selected Agencies Monitored External and Internal Traffic
- Most Agencies Reported Using a Security Information and Event Management Capability, but Did Not Always Use this Capability to Analyze Potential Threats
- Agencies Are in the Process of Implementing DHS' CDM Program, but Most Agencies Have Not Fully Implemented Any of the Program Phases
- Conclusion
- Recommendations for Executive Action
- Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
- Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: Cybersecurity Framework
- Appendix III: Reported Effectiveness of Agencies' Implementation of the Federal Approach for Securing Information Systems
- Appendix IV: Updated Cybersecurity-Focused Cross-Agency Priority Goal
- Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
- Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Commerce
- Appendix VII: Comments from the Social Security Administration
- Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
- Chapter 7
- Data Breaches: Range of Consumer Risks Highlights Limitations of Identity Theft Services(
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Harm from Exposure of Personal Information
- Consumers' Options to Address Risks or Harm
- Limited Information Is Available on Effectiveness of Options after Data Breaches, but Credit Freezes Can Prevent New-Account Fraud
- No Independent Research Assesses Effectiveness of Consumer Options to Address Risks after Data Breaches
- Views of Experts Varied, but Most Said Identity Theft Services Have Limitations and Would Not Address All Data Breach Risks
- Identity Theft Services
- Options to Prevent Fraud or Harm Unrelated To Credit Accounts
- Importance of Data Security
- Consumers Can Use Free Credit Freezes and Fraud Alerts to Effectively Prevent New-Account Fraud
- Factors Consumers Can Consider When Assessing Options after Data Breaches
- Federal Agencies Provide Assistance to Consumers Affected by Data Breaches and Identity Theft
- FTC Is Primary Provider of Federal Assistance to Consumers Affected by Data Breaches and Identity Theft
- Federal Trade Commission
- Online and Printed Resources
- Outreach
- Customized Assistance (IdentityTheft.gov)
- Other Federal Agency Resources
- CFPB
- Other Federal and State Agencies
- Few People Used Identity Theft Services OPM Provided, Very Few Made Insurance Claims, and Payouts Received Were Low
- OMB Has Not Revised Post-Data Breach Guidance to Agencies and Insurance Coverage Amount for Identity Theft Insurance Remains High
- Agency Comments
- Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: What Can Consumers Do After a Data Breach?
- Chapter 8
- What Legal Obligations Do Internet Companies Have to Prevent and Respond to a Data Breach?(
- Federal and State Law on Preventing Data Breaches
- Federal and State Law on Responding to Data Breaches
- Considerations for Congress
- Index
- Blank Page
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