Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution

Name: Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution | Lessons from the Law of the Sea
Brand: Wolters Kluwer
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Lessons from the Law of the Sea

Rachna Matabudul(Autor*in)

Wolters Kluwer (Verlag)

Erschienen am 7. November 2023

272 Seiten

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Beschreibung

Stakeholders in the international taxation community agree that existing dispute resolution processes are in serious need of improvement, and a global consensus must be achieved. This book offers a potential restructuring of the tax treaty dispute resolution system based on a comparative analysis of the dispute resolution mechanisms under tax treaties, as prescribed in the OECD and UN models, on the one hand, and the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) on the other. This comparative study is the first of its kind and is premised on certain key geopolitical similarities that underpin the international tax regime (ITR) and the law of the sea regime while taking into consideration the differences in the institutional context of both regimes. The author proposes a new tax treaty dispute resolution system based on the LOSC system for resolving multilateral tax disputes, focusing on the following: mapping of the institutional arrangements that make up the dispute resolution mechanisms to understand how each system works;comparative analysis of the patterns of interaction and outcomes generated across the two dispute resolution systems to identify relevant aspects of the LOSC system that may be adapted in the ITR to improve tax treaty dispute resolution; andanalysis of the inclusivity levels across the decision-making structures under each system to identify specific consensus-building techniques that may facilitate the implementation of the new proposed tax treaty dispute resolution system and also enhance international cooperation across the ITR. The proposed restructuring of the tax treaty dispute resolution system expands the existing mutual agreement procedure and forms a comprehensive legal framework that aims to achieve a more effective, predictable and equitable resolution of multilateral tax disputes in the 21st-century ITR by striking a balance between countries' right to tax sovereignty and the rule of law. Just as the design of the dispute resolution system under the LOSC paved the way for universal consensus of the Convention among almost 160 countries, the author's new tax treaty dispute resolution system also offers a solid foundation for consensus-building towards a universal treaty in the ITR. Everyone concerned with international tax dispute resolution - whether policymaker, in-house counsel, national tax authority official, judge, tax lawyer or academic - will find the truly valuable analysis here, not elsewhere.

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Inhalt

Intro
Half-Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Abbreviations
Preface
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Defining the Research Questions
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Why Does the Current Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution System Need Reform?
2.2.1 Capacity Issues Within MAP
2.2.2 Failure to Provide Tax Certainty
2.2.2.1 Absence of Obligation to Resolve MAP Cases in a Timely Manner
2.2.2.2 Indeterminacy in Interpreting International Tax Regulations
2.2.2.3 Lack of Transparency and Accountability
2.2.3 Inequitable Dispute Resolution Processes and Outcomes Across the ITR
2.2.3.1 Limitations of a Bilateral MAP
2.2.3.2 Uneven Application of MAP Across the DTT Network
2.2.4 Implications in This Study
2.3 Identifying the Right Type of Reform Within Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution
2.3.1 Review of Existing Proposals for Reforming Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution
2.3.1.1 Proposals to Improve Existing Mechanisms
2.3.1.2 In-Depth Institutional Studies Advocating New Tax Dispute Resolution Structures
2.3.1.3 The OECD's Dispute Resolution Mechanism Proposed under Pillar One
2.3.2 Need for More Relevant Institutional Analysis of Dispute Resolution in the ITR
2.4 Comparing Dispute Resolution in the ITR and the Law of the Sea Regime
2.4.1 Similarities in the Geopolitical Context
2.4.1.1 Consensus-Based Decision-Making
2.4.1.2 Distributive Rules over Scarce Resources to Manage Conflict
2.4.1.3 Addressing Collective Action Issues
2.4.1.4 The Role of Customary International Law
2.4.1.5 Dispute Resolution: Emphasis on Diplomacy
2.4.2 Institutional Differences to Take into Account
2.4.2.1 Frequency of Disputes
2.4.2.2 Institutional Actors
2.4.3 Other International Dispute Settlement Systems under Consideration
2.4.3.1 The WTO DSU
2.4.3.2 The Investor-State Dispute Settlement
2.5 Defining the Research Questions
2.6 Conclusions
Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Overview of the pIAD Framework
3.2.1 The Action Situation
3.2.2 Five Sets of Contextual Variables
3.2.2.1 Working Rules
3.2.2.2 Community Attributes
3.2.2.3 Physical Conditions
3.2.2.4 Politico-economic Context
3.2.2.5 Discourses
3.2.3 Patterns of Interaction and Related Outcomes
3.2.4 Evaluation Criteria
3.2.5 The Multi-level Rules Structure
3.3 The Research Design: A Three-Step Analytical Approach
3.3.1 Step A: Mapping out Institutional Arrangements
3.3.1.1 Working Rules
3.3.1.2 Community Attributes
3.3.1.3 Physical Conditions
3.3.1.4 Politico-economic Context
3.3.1.5 Discourses
3.3.2 Step B: Comparing Patterns of Interaction and Inclusivity Levels
3.3.3 Step C: Restructuring the Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution System
3.4 Why Is the pIAD Analysis Relevant to This Research?
3.4.1 Applying a Comparative Institutional Approach
3.4.2 Breaking up Complex Policy Situations into Components
3.4.3 Analysing Multi-level Governance Structures
3.5 Scope and Limitations of the Research Method
3.5.1 Excluding Analysis of EU Mechanisms
3.5.2 Excluding Analysis of Domestic Legal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
3.6 Conclusions
Chapter 4 Mapping out Institutional Arrangements in the ITR
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Identifying Action Situations
4.3 Analysing Contextual Variables
4.3.1 Action Situation 1: MAP
4.3.1.1 Working Rules
4.3.1.1.1 Boundary Rules
4.3.1.1.2 Position Rules
4.3.1.1.3 Information Rules
4.3.1.1.4 Authority Rules
4.3.1.1.5 Aggregation Rules
4.3.1.1.5.1 Applicable Law
4.3.1.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
4.3.1.1.6 Scope Rules
4.3.1.1.6.1 Jurisdiction of MAP
4.3.1.1.6.2 Finality of Outcomes
4.3.1.1.7 Payoff Rules
4.3.1.2 Community Attributes
4.3.1.2.1 Aligned Objectives for a Simple MAP with Clear Guidelines
4.3.1.2.2 Misaligned/Conflicted Interests
4.3.1.2.2.1 Transparency Within MAP
4.3.1.2.2.2 Taxpayer Participation Levels and Information Disclosure
4.3.1.2.2.3 Intergovernmental Conflict: Short-Term Versus Long-Term Revenue Objectives
4.3.1.3 Physical Conditions
4.3.1.3.1 Dispute Resolution Function
4.3.1.3.2 Administering the MAP System
4.3.1.3.3 Compliance Monitoring under BEPS Action 14
4.3.2 Action Situation 2: Voluntary Arbitration under the UN Model
4.3.2.1 Working Rules
4.3.2.1.1 Boundary Rules
4.3.2.1.2 Position Rules
4.3.2.1.3 Information Rules
4.3.2.1.4 Authority Rules
4.3.2.1.5 Aggregation Rules
4.3.2.1.5.1 Applicable Law
4.3.2.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
4.3.2.1.6 Scope Rules
4.3.2.1.6.1 Jurisdiction of UN Arbitration
4.3.2.1.6.2 Finality of Arbitration Decision
4.3.2.1.7 Payoff Rules
4.3.2.2 Community Attributes
4.3.2.2.1 Lack of Experience and Familiarity
4.3.2.2.2 Issues of Even-Handedness
4.3.2.2.3 Lack of Resources
4.3.2.2.4 Need for Transparency
4.3.2.2.5 Concerns on Finality of Arbitral Awards
4.3.2.3 Physical Conditions
4.3.2.3.1 Dispute Resolution
4.3.2.3.2 Administering the UN Arbitration Mechanism
4.3.3 Action Situation 3: Mandatory Arbitration under the OECD Model
4.3.3.1 Working Rules
4.3.3.1.1 Boundary Rules
4.3.3.1.2 Position Rules
4.3.3.1.3 Information Rules
4.3.3.1.4 Authority Rules
4.3.3.1.5 Aggregation Rules
4.3.3.1.5.1 Applicable Law
4.3.3.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
4.3.3.1.6 Scope Rules
4.3.3.1.6.1 Jurisdiction of OECD Arbitration
4.3.3.1.6.2 Finality of Outcomes
4.3.3.1.7 Payoff Rules
4.3.3.2 Community Attributes
4.3.3.2.1 Common Benefits of Prophylactic Effect of Mandatory Mechanism
4.3.3.2.2 Preference for Arbitration over Domestic Remedies
4.3.3.3 Physical Conditions
4.3.3.3.1 Dispute Resolution Function
4.3.3.3.2 Administering the OECD Arbitration Mechanism
4.3.4 Politico-economic Context
4.3.4.1 Rapid Expansion of China's Global Tax Treaty Network to Promote Trade and Investment
4.3.4.2 Structural Shift to Align with OECD and Developed Country Frameworks
4.3.4.3 China's Norm-Setting Strategies in the ITR
4.3.5 Discourse
4.3.5.1 Identify Discursive Event for Study
4.3.5.2 Select the Texts for Study
4.3.5.3 Choose Specific Points in Time for Studying the Evolution of the Identified Texts
4.3.5.4 Analyse Content at Specific Points in Time to Uncover Patterns/Tensions
4.3.5.4.1 The 1927 League of Nations Report
4.3.5.4.1.1 Dispute Resolution Proposal and Group Composition
4.3.5.4.1.2 Dispute Resolution Text Adopted
4.3.5.4.2 The 1963 Draft OECD Model
4.3.5.4.2.1 Context of the Negotiations
4.3.5.4.2.2 Updated Text of MAP Provision
4.3.5.4.3 The 2008 OECD Model
4.3.5.4.3.1 Role of the OECD Leading up to the 2008 Model
4.3.5.4.3.2 Introduction of the Mandatory Arbitration Clause
4.3.5.4.4 Post-BEPS MAP Updates
4.3.5.5 Implications in This Study
4.4 Conclusions
Chapter 5 Mapping Institutional Arrangements in the LOSC
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Identifying Action Situations
5.3 Analysing Contextual Variables
5.3.1 Action Situation 1: Diplomatic Negotiations
5.3.1.1 Working Rules
5.3.1.1.1 Boundary Rules
5.3.1.1.2 Position Rules
5.3.1.1.3 Information Rules
5.3.1.1.4 Authority Rules
5.3.1.1.5 Aggregation Rules
5.3.1.1.5.1 Applicable Law
5.3.1.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
5.3.1.1.6 Scope Rules
5.3.1.1.6.1 Jurisdiction
5.3.1.1.6.2 Finality of Negotiation Outcomes
5.3.1.1.7 Payoff Rules
5.3.1.2 Community Attributes
5.3.1.3 Physical Conditions
5.3.1.3.1 Dispute Resolution Function
5.3.1.3.2 Administration Function: International Relations Building
5.3.2 Action Situation 2: Compulsory/Voluntary Conciliation
5.3.2.1 Working Rules
5.3.2.1.1 Boundary Rules
5.3.2.1.2 Position Rules
5.3.2.1.3 Information Rules
5.3.2.1.4 Authority Rules
5.3.2.1.5 Aggregation Rules
5.3.2.1.5.1 Applicable Law
5.3.2.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
5.3.2.1.6 Scope Rules
5.3.2.1.6.1 Jurisdiction
5.3.2.1.6.2 Finality of Conciliation Outcome
5.3.2.1.7 Payoff Rules
5.3.2.2 Community Attributes
5.3.2.3 Physical Conditions
5.3.2.3.1 Dispute Resolution Function
5.3.2.3.2 Administering the Conciliation Procedure
5.3.3 Action Situation 3: Judicial Settlement and Arbitration Mechanisms
5.3.3.1 Working Rules
5.3.3.1.1 Boundary Rules
5.3.3.1.1.1 Disputant Parties
5.3.3.1.1.2 Members of Tribunal/Court/Arbitration Panel
5.3.3.1.2 Position Rules
5.3.3.1.2.1 Applicants/Respondents
5.3.3.1.2.2 Adjudicating Third Party
5.3.3.1.3 Information Rules
5.3.3.1.3.1 ITLOS/ICJ
5.3.3.1.3.2 Arbitration
5.3.3.1.4 Authority Rules
5.3.3.1.4.1 Disputing Parties
5.3.3.1.4.2 Adjudicating Third Party
5.3.3.1.5 Aggregation Rules
5.3.3.1.5.1 Applicable Law
5.3.3.1.5.2 Administrative Framework
5.3.3.1.6 Scope Rules
5.3.3.1.6.1 Jurisdiction
5.3.3.1.6.2 Finality of Outcomes
5.3.3.1.7 Payoff Rules
5.3.3.2 Community Attributes
5.3.3.3 Physical Conditions
5.3.3.3.1 Dispute Resolution Function
5.3.3.3.2 Administering the Adjudicative Forums under the LOSC
5.3.3.3.2.1 Clarifying Interpretations of Equity under the Law of the Sea
5.3.3.3.2.2 Contributing to Environmental and Marine Protection
5.3.4 Politico-economic Context
5.3.4.1 China's Implementation of the LOSC
5.3.4.2 Parallel Application of the LOSC and General International Law
5.3.4.3 LOSC's Dispute Resolution System in China
5.3.5 Discourse
5.3.5.1 Identify Discursive Event for Study
5.3.5.2 Select the Texts for Study
5.3.5.3 Choose Specific Points in Time for Studying the Evolution of the Identified Texts
5.3.5.4 Analyse Content at Specific Points in Time to Uncover Patterns/Tensions
5.3.5.4.1 Working Paper on Dispute Resolution Presented in 1974
5.3.5.4.1.1 Group Composition
5.3.5.4.1.2 Guiding Principles Underpinning Dispute Resolution System
5.3.5.4.2 Draft Dispute Resolution Provisions in the ISNT
5.3.5.4.3 Consolidation of Dispute Resolution Provisions under Part IV of ISNT
5.3.5.4.4 Integration of Dispute Resolution Provisions in the ICNT
5.3.5.5 Implications in This Study
5.4 Conclusions
Chapter 6 Comparing Patterns of Interaction and Inclusivity
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Integrating the Analysis of Institutional Arrangements
6.2.1 ITR
6.2.1.1 Rules
6.2.1.1.1 Lack of Effective Dispute Resolution under International Law
6.2.1.1.1.1 Indeterminacy Perpetuated Through Lack of Transparency and Relevant Case Law
6.2.1.1.1.2 Lack of Legally Binding Processes and Outcomes
6.2.1.1.1.3 Delayed Resolution Timelines for Transfer Pricing Cases
6.2.1.1.2 Excessive Control of Competent Authorities over Dispute Resolution Process
6.2.1.1.3 Fragmented Dispute Resolution Framework
6.2.1.2 Norms
6.2.1.2.1 Increasing Taxpayer Preference for MAP
6.2.1.2.2 Reluctance of Developing Countries Towards OECD's Mandatory and Binding Arbitration
6.2.1.3 Strategies
6.2.1.3.1 Public-Private Good Characteristics of Mechanisms
6.2.1.3.2 Implications
6.2.2 LOSC
6.2.2.1 Rules
6.2.2.1.1 Flexible Yet Mandatory Application of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms to Ensure Resolution
6.2.2.1.2 Balanced Allocation of Decision-Making Powers
6.2.2.1.3 Participation of States and Non-States Parties
6.2.2.2 Norms
6.2.2.2.1 Preference for Negotiations and ITLOS among Developing Countries
6.2.2.2.2 Limited Application of Conciliation
6.2.2.3 Strategies
6.2.2.3.1 Public-Private Good Characteristics of LOSC Mechanisms
6.2.2.3.2 Implications
6.3 Identifying Relevant Aspects of the LOSC to Address Issues in the ITR
6.3.1 Addressing Capacity Issues
6.3.1.1 Extend MAP System by Adapting the LOSC's Flexible Yet Mandatory Mechanisms
6.3.1.2 Focus on Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Mechanisms
6.3.2 Addressing Uncertainty
6.3.2.1 Develop International Tax Case Law Through International Tribunal and/or Arbitration
6.3.2.2 Reallocate Decision-Making Power Across the System
6.3.3 Addressing Inequitable Solutions
6.4 Assessing Inclusivity
6.4.1 Inclusivity at the Policymaking Level
6.4.1.1 ITR
6.4.1.1.1 Actors
6.4.1.1.2 Policymaking Rules
6.4.1.1.2.1 Standardised Text of MAP Provision Based on OECD and UN Models
6.4.1.1.2.2 Modifying MAP Provisions Through Competent Authority Agreements
6.4.1.2 LOSC
6.4.1.2.1 Actors
6.4.1.2.2 Policymaking Rules
6.4.1.2.2.1 Formalising the Consensus Principle
6.4.1.2.2.2 Building the Negotiating Text from Scratch
6.4.1.2.2.3 The Package Deal Concept
6.4.2 Inclusivity at the Constitutional Level
6.4.2.1 ITR
6.4.2.1.1 MAP under the OECD Model
6.4.2.1.2 MAP under the UN Model
6.4.2.2 LOSC
6.4.2.2.1 Formal Structure of UNCLOS III
6.4.2.2.2 Emergence of Informal Negotiating Group
6.4.3 Implications
6.5 Conclusions
Chapter 7 Proposed Restructuring of the Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution System
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Recommendations at the Operational Level
7.2.1 Key Elements of the Restructured Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution System
7.2.1.1 Giving Primacy to the MAP
7.2.1.2 Expanding Legalistic Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
7.2.1.2.1 Separate Arbitration Mechanisms for Addressing Non-transfer Pricing and Transfer Pricing Cases
7.2.1.2.2 An ITT That Addresses Unresolved MAP Cases and Issues Not Covered under the MAP
7.2.2 IF Arbitration Mechanism
7.2.2.1 Mandatory and Legally Binding Procedure
7.2.2.2 Constitution of Arbitration Panel
7.2.2.3 Applying the Independent Opinion Method
7.2.3 Special IF Arbitration Mechanism
7.2.3.1 Mandatory and Legally Binding 'Findings of Fact' and Non-binding Recommendations
7.2.3.2 Constitution of Fact-Finding Panel
7.2.3.3 Applying the Independent Opinion Method
7.2.4 ITT
7.2.4.1 Competence
7.2.4.2 Organisation of the ITT
7.2.4.3 Rules of Procedure and Finality of Outcomes
7.2.4.4 TPDC
7.3 Recommendations at the Policymaking Level
7.3.1 Incorporate Dispute Resolution Provisions in a Multilateral Treaty
7.3.2 Develop a Multilateral Treaty Without a Draft Model Text
7.4 Recommendations at the Constitutional Level
7.4.1 Build a Unified Decision-Making Structure: Creation of an IF Secretariat
7.4.2 Apply Clustering Strategies Across IF Meetings
7.5 Review of Proposed Restructuring in Light of Pillar One Dispute Resolution Mechanism
7.6 Conclusions
Chapter 8 Conclusion
APPENDIX I OECD MAP Statistics
Appendix II LOSC Article 287 Declarations
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Table of Treaties and Conventions
Index

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