An Introduction to the Economics of Information

Name: An Introduction to the Economics of Information | Incentives and Contracts
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Incentives and Contracts

Inés Macho-Stadler J. David Pérez-Castrillo(Autor*in)

OUP eBook (Verlag)

2. Auflage

Erschienen am 3. Oktober 1996

304 Seiten

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978-0-19-151207-0 (ISBN)

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Inhalt

Cover
Half-Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
PREFACE
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction
1.2. The Elements of the Problem
1.3. The Intertemporal Development of the Relationship and the Reference Framework
1.4. Types of Asymmetric Information Problems
1.4.1. Moral hazard
1.4.2. Adverse selection
1.4.3. Signalling
2. The Base Model
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Description of the Model
2.3. Symmetric Information Contracts
2.3.1. The optimal payment mechanism
2.3.2. The optimal level of effort
Exercises
3. The Moral Hazard Problem
3.1. Introduction
3.2. The Moral Hazard Problem
3.3. The Agent Chooses between Two Effort Levels
3.4. Solution Using the First-Order Approach
3.5. A Simple Case with Continuous Effort
3.6. Moral Hazard with Hidden Information
3.7. Some Comments on the Simple Moral Hazard Models
3.7.1. The value of information
3.7.2. Mechanisms based on severe punishments
3.7.3. The strategic effects of contracts
3.7.4. What happens when it is the agent who offers the contract?
3A. Complementary Material
3A.1. A geometric illustration of the moral hazard problem
3A.2. The problem that may be found when applying the first-order approach
3A.3. The risk neutral agent case
3B. Applications
3B.1. Incentives for managers
3B.2. Fishing contracts between countries
3B.3. Moral hazard and rationing in the credit market
3B.4. Introduction of know-how in technology transfer contracts
Exercises
3C. Advanced Themes
3C.1. Optimal payment mechanisms in situations of moral hazard with several agents
3C.2. Organizational design in relationships with several agents
3C.3. Moral hazard with several tasks
3C.4. Repeated moral hazard
3C.5. Relationships between several principals and one agent
4. The Adverse Selection Problem
4.1. Introduction
4.2. A Model of Adverse Selection
4.3. When Principals Compete for Agents
4.3.1. The benchmark: Symmetric information
4.3.2. Principals cannot distinguish agent type
4.4. Adverse Selection with a Continuum of Possible Types
4.5. Comments
4A. Complementary Material
4A.1. Implementable mechanisms
4A.2. Moral hazard with private information (ex ante contract acceptance)
4B. Applications
4B.1. Competition between insurance companies
4B.2. An analysis of optimal licensing contracts
4B.3. Regulation in asymmetric information contexts
4B.4. Decision of monopoly product quality
Exercises
4C. Advanced Themes
4C.1. Relationship with several agents: Auctions
4C.2. Organization design
4C.3. Repeated adverse selection
4C.4. Models of moral hazard and adverse selection
4C.5. Several principals
5. Signalling
5.1. Introduction
5.2. The Value of Private Information and of Signalling
5.3. Education as a Signal
5.4. The Agents Signal their Characteristic
5.4.1. Separating equilibrium
5.4.2. Pooling equilibrium
5.4.3. Conclusion
5.5. The Informational Power of Contracts
5.5.1. Symmetric information
5.5.2. The agent is uninformed as to difficulty of the job
5.5.3. Separating equilibra
5.6. Comments
5A. Complementary Material
5A.1. The intuitive criterium
5B. Applications
5B.1. Pricesthatsignalquality
5B.2. Optimal licensing contracts when the seller has private information
5B.3. Debt level as a signal of the value of a firm
Exercises
5C. Advanced Themes
5C.1. Equilibrium refinements
5C.2. Cheap-talk games
5C.3. Optimal design of mechanisms in signalling models
Mathematical Appendix: Concavity and Optimization
References
Solution to the Exercises
Index
Additional Exercises

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