First Philosophy

Name: First Philosophy | Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925)
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Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925)

Edmund Husserl(Autor*in)

S. Luft Thane M. Naberhaus(Herausgeber*in)

Springer (Verlag)

Erschienen am 4. Januar 2019

LXXXV, 640 Seiten

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Inhalt

Intro
?Table of Contents
?Introduction to the Translation
?I. General Introduction to Husserl's Lecture Course on First Philosophy
?1. The Historical Context
?2. A Simple Definition of Phenomenology
?3. The Very Idea of Phenomenology as First Philosophy
?i. The idea of a first philosophy in the history of philosophy
?ii. Husserl's idea of first philosophy (sans phenomenology)
?iii. First Philosophy as grounding a fully justified life of ultimate self-responsibility. Becoming an honest philosopher
?iv. Phenomenology as the true philosophia perennis, asymptotically approached
?v. Phenomenology as first philosophy: as mathesis universalis, as universal science, as absolutely justified, as "ultimately grounding science"
?vi. First Philosophy as transcendental critique of cognition. Consciousness as the absolute
?vii. First Philosophy as Eidetic Phenomenology and Metaphysics as Second Philosophy
?viii. "First Phenomenology" as Self-Critique of Phenomenological Experience (Apodictic Critique).
?II. Overview over the Lecture & Survey of Main Themes
?1. Part I (Critical History of Ideas)
?i. Critical history of ideas as critical history of problems and the dialectics of the history of western philosophy
?ii. Husserl's Interpretation of the Main Figures in Western Philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Kant & the Neo-Kantians)
?2. Part II (Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction)
?i. Opening up the full scope of transcendental subjectivity
?ii. The phenomenology of the phenomenological attitude and the splitting of the ego
?iii. The novel presentation of the reduction and phenomenology as transcendental idealism (departure from Cartesianism?)
?3. Summary: Core Topics of the Main Text of the Volume
?i. The idea of a system of phenomenology and its systematic introduction
?ii. The place of phenomenology in the history of Western philosophy
?iii. The breadth of the phenomenological reduction and phenomenology as transcendental idealism
?III. Themes from the Supplemental Texts
?1. Discussions of figures in the history of modern philosophy: Descartes, Kant, others (e.g., the Neo-Kantians)
?2. Self-critical reflections
?3. Further ways into the reduction
?4. Metaphysical and metaphilosophical reflections
?IV. The Text in Light of the Early Reception
?V. Editorial Matters
?VI. Acknowledgments
?Bibliography
?Part One. Critical History of Ideas
?Section One. From Plato's Idea of Philosophy to the Beginnings of its Modern Realization in Descartes
?Chapter One. The Idea of Philosophy and its Historical Origin
?Lecture 1. On the Historical Task of Giving Phenomenology the Developmental Form of First Philosophy
?Lecture 2. Plato's Dialectic and the Idea of a Philosophical Science
?Chapter Two. The Grounding of Logic and the Limits of Formal-Apophantic Analytics
?Lecture 3. The Aristotelian-Stoic-Traditional Logic as a Logic of Consistency or Concordance
?Lecture 4. Excursus: On the Universal Logic of Consequence as Analytic Mathematics, the Correlative Treatment of Formal Ontology, and the Problem of a Logic of Truth
?Chapter Three. First Reflections On Cognizing Subjectivity, Motivated by Sophistic Skepticism
?Lecture 5. The Discovery of the Cognition of Ideas and the Greek Origins of the Philosophical, Rational Sciences
?Lecture 6. The Demand for a Theory of Knowledge Implied in the Platonic Idea of Dialectics
?Lecture 7. Systematic Sketch of the Full Idea of Logic-of a Logic of Truth-As a Science of Cognizing and in General Accomplishing Subjectivity
?Chapter Four. The Historical Beginnings of the Science of Subjectivity
?Lecture 8. Aristotle's Grounding of Psychology and the Basic Problem of a Psychology As Such
?Lecture 9. Skepticism. The Fundamental Significance of Its "Ineradicability" in the History of Philosophy. Descartes's Decisive Step
?Lecture 10. The Cartesian Meditations
?Lecture 11. First Real Overview of Transcendental Science. Transition from the Cartesian Meditations to Locke
?Section Two. The Elements of Locke's Attempt at an Egology and its Enduring Problematic
?Chapter One. The Fundamental Limitation of Locke's Sphere of Vision and its Reasons
?Lecture 12. The Naive Dogmatism of Objectivism
?Lecture 13. The Prejudices of Empiricism. Psychologism in Epistemology
?Lecture 14. The Paradigmatic Character of Modern Natural Science as a Restraining Force on the Development of a Genuine Intuitionistic Science of Consciousness
?Chapter Two. Critical Disclosure of the Genuine and Enduring Problematic Concealed in Locke's Investigations
?Lecture 15. The Problem of Immanence and of Synthetic Unity in Consciousness
?Lecture 16. The Irreality of the Immanent Contents of the Synthesis of Consciousness in its Ego-Object Polarization and the Problem of Intersubjectivity. Remarks on Berkeley's Critique of Locke
?Lecture 17. On the Question of the Constitution of "Exteriority": the Cartesian Self-Evidence of the Self-Givenness of Things in Perception
?Chapter Three. Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness
?Lecture 18. Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness
?Lecture 19. The Need to Broaden the Idea of Intuition
?Section Three. The Development of Skeptical Forerunners of Phenomenology in Berkeley and Hume, and Dogmatic Rationalism
?Chapter One. From Locke to the Radical Consequence of Berkeley's Purely Immanent Philosophy
?Lecture 20. The Positive Historical Significance of the Renewal of Skepticism through Locke and His Successors
?Lecture 21. Berkeley's Discovery, and his Naturalistic Misinterpretation of the Problem of the Constitution of the Real World
?Lecture 22. Berkeley's Monadological Approach
Comparison with Leibniz. Transition to Hume
?Chapter Two. Hume's Positivism: the Consummation of Skepticism and, Simultaneously, the Decisive Preparatory Step toward a Transcendental Foundational Science
?Lecture 23. Hume's Nominalistic Reduction of All Ideas to Impressions and the Countersense Inherent in This Principle
?Lecture 24. The Necessary Eidetics of the Science of Consciousness and Hume's Inductive-Empirical Objectivism
?Lecture 25. The Problem of Constitution in Hume-and its Termination in Unmitigated Skepticism
?Chapter Three. The Rationalism and Metaphysics of the Modern Period
?Lecture 26. The Main Features of the Positively Constructive Trajectory of Modern Rationalism and its Dogmatism
??a). Overview of the preparation for a future genuine metaphysics, hampered by the lack of a transcendental foundational science?
??b). Critical Remarks on the Regressive Procedure Employed in the Rationalist Systems Since Occasionalism. The Task of Progressive Research?
?Lecture 27. On Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Meaning of Leibniz's Monadology and Kant's Critique of Reason
?Part Two. Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction
?Section One. Preliminary Meditations on the Apodictic Beginning of Philosophy
?Chapter One. Introduction: The Motivation of the Beginning Philosopher in the Absolute Situation
?Lecture 28. The Idea of Philosophy in History, and the Motivational Setting of the Subject who is Beginning to Philosophize
?Lecture 29. On the Institution of the Emerging Philosopher's Habitual Form of Life
?Lecture 30. The Pure Cultural Attitude as Such and the Original Institution of a Philosophical Radicalism
?Chapter Two. The Idea of Apodictic Evidence and the Problematic of the Beginning
?Lecture 31. Natural and Transcendental, Apodictic and Adequate Evidence
?Lecture 32. The Possible Points of Departure: "I Am"-and "I as Beginning Philosopher"
"I Am"-"This World Is."
?Section Two. Critique of Mundane Experience First Path to the Transcendental Reduction
?Chapter One. World-Perception and World-Belief
?Lecture 33. The Ineliminable Contingency of the Statement "The World Exists."
?Lecture 34. Transcendental and Empirical Semblance. On the "Objection of Insanity."
?Chapter Two. Supplementations and Clarifications in Connection with the "Objection of Insanity"
?Lecture 35. On the Doctrine of "Empathy."
?Lecture 36. Transcendental Solipsism. The Negative Result of the Critique of Mundane Experience
?Chapter Three. Opening Up the Field of Transcendental Experience Transcendental, Phenomenological and Apodictic Reduction
?Lecture 37. The Apodictic Certainty of the Possible Non-Existence of the World and the Transcendental Life of Subjectivity in Contrast to It
?Lecture 38. The Field of Transcendental Experience as Topic of a Transcendental Critique
?Section Three. On the Phenomenology of the Phenomenological Reduction. Opening Up a Second Path to the Transcendental Reduction
?Chapter One. The Transcendental Temporal Form of Subjectivity's Transcendental Stream of Life
?Lecture 39. The Full Content of Universal Transcendental Self-Experience: Transcendental Present, Past, and Future
?Lecture 40. Reflection as Splitting of the I and the Identity of the I in the Streaming Living Present
?Chapter Two. On the Theory of the Theoretical Attitude of the Phenomenologist: What the Epoché Means and Accomplishes
?Lecture 41. Reflection and Theoretical Interest, Splitting of the I of Position-Takings
?Lecture 42. The Most General Notion of Interest, of "Attitude," of "Theme."
?Lecture 43. The Possibility of a Pure Interest in the Subjective Being in the Phenomenological Epoché and Reflection
?Chapter Three. The Conscious Activity of Natural Egoic Life and the Reduction to Pure Subjectivity
?Lecture 44. Positional and Quasi-Positional Acts and Their Reduction
Epoché and Quasi-Epoché
?Lecture 45. The Natural Mundane Life of the I as Act Subject and the Unnatural Life of Phenomenologically Pure Self-Reflection. On the Train of Thought
?Lecture 46. The New Shaping and Deepening of the Phenomenological Method: The Cartesian Path and the Path of the Psychologist to the Transcendental Reduction
?Section Four. Phenomenological Psychology, Transcendental Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy
?Chapter One. The Accomplishment and Problematic of a Phenomenological-Psychological Reduction
?Lecture 47. Intentional Implications and Iterations
?Lecture 48. The Problem of the Transition From the Psychological Reduction With Respect to Certain Acts to the Universal Phenomenological Epoché and Reduction
?Chapter Two. The Opening of the Realm of Transcendental Experience Following the Second Path
?Lecture 49. The Horizons of the Living-Streaming Present
?Lecture 50. The Endless Temporal Stream of Life and Possibility of a Universal Reflection and Epoché
?Lecture 51. Transition to the Universal Epoché and Reduction. The Pure Universal Life and Its World of Experience
?Chapter Three. The Philosophical Significance of the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction
?Lecture 52. Philosophy as Systematic Self-Unfolding of Transcendental Subjectivity in the Form of a Systematic Transcendental Self-Theorizing on the Basis of Transcendental Self-Experience
?Lecture 53. The Problem of Intersubjectivity
a). The Possibility of Transcendental Naiveté on the Part of a Pure Phenomenology and the Philosophical Task of an Apodictic Critique of Transcendental Experience
b). Transcendental Egology ("Solipsistic Phenomenology") and the Transition to the Intersubjective Reduction
?Lecture 54. The Path of the Phenomenological Reduction to Transcendental Idealism and the Latter's Phenomenological Meaning as Transcendental Monadology
?Supplemental Texts
?1. Kant's Copernican Turn and the Meaning of such a Copernican Turn in General
?2. Descartes and Skepticism. (Ad Lecture 9)
?I
?II
?III
?3. A Difficult Point in the Critique of Descartes (ad Lecture 10)
?I
?II
?III
4. A Critique of the Regressive Method of Kant and Neo-Kantianism. Ad Lecture 26.
?5. Meditation on the Idea of an Individual Life and a Communal Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility
?6. Reflection as Activity. On the Phenomenology of Reflection Upon the Goal of a Universal Science (ca. 1924)
?I
?II
?7. Path Into Transcendental Phenomenology As Absolute and Universal Ontology Via the Positive Sciences and Positive First Philosophy (1923)
?8. Attempt at a Distinction of the Stages on the Way to a Science of Transcendental Subjectivity (December 1925)
?9. The Cartesian Path and the Path of Universal Phenomenological Psychology Into Transcendental Phenomenology
?10. Husserl's Critical Notes on the Train of Thought [of Part II of the Lecture]
?11. The Principle of Sufficient Reason For Every Scientific Judgment (Ad Lecture 28)
?12. The Initial Questions
?13. What Is Given as Apodictically-Absolute, As Presupposition of All Striving for Cognition.
?14. On the Possibility of the Non-Existence of the World (ad Lecture 33)
?15. To What Extent Can One Even Posit the Demand for Apodicticity With Respect to a Cognition of Being? Ad Lecture 36.
?16. Nature and Nature-Experiencing Ego
?17. All Being Presupposes Subjectivity. Ad Lecture 38
?18. Double "Latency" of the Ego (ad Lecture 40)
?19. What Kind of Ego Is It That I Cannot Cancel Out? (Ad Lecture 40)
?20. Critique of the Two Steps By Which I Had Arrived At the Idea of the Reduction In 1907 and 1910. (Ad Lecture 46)
?21. Critique of the Wrong Presentation of the Difference Between Psychological and Transcendental Reduction in the Winter-Lecture of 1923/24 (Ad Lecture 48)
?22. The Immanent Adequation and Apodicticity and Immanent Time As Apodictic Form of Objective Subjectivity (Constituting Itself for the Living Ego) or Subjective Objectivity of Itself Constituting Itself in the Streaming-Presentifying I-Am. (Ad Lecture 53, a)
?23. Difficulties Concerning the Deepest Grounding of Philosophy as Universal Science on the Way of the Phenomenological Reduction (ad Lecture 53, a)
?24. Alleged Difficulty that One, Remaining Within the Epoché, "Never Returns to the World" (Ad Lecture 53, b)
?25. Ground-Laying of Transcendental Idealism. The Radical Overcoming of Solipsism. (Ad Lecture 54)
?26. Ground-Laying of Transcendental Idealism Phenomenological Reduction and Absolute Justification
?German-English Glossary
?Index of Names

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