The Afghan Wars 1839-1919

I

The Afghan Chequerboard

The country and the peoples of Afghanistan

Afghanistan, the land of the Afghans, has at different periods of history extended over various tracts of territory. But it has always been centred on the vast mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush, a western offshoot of the even mightier Himalayan chain. A further series of ranges runs southwards from the Hindu Kush, forming the Suleiman Mountains and the Safed Koh, which block the north-western approaches to the Indian sub-continent. These hills have an elevation of from ten to fifteen thousand feet above sea-level, and include peaks that tower five or ten thousand feet above their surroundings, rocky, hostile, devoid of vegetation, snowbound in winter, baking hot in summer.

North of the Hindu Kush (the 'Hindu-killer', so called because so many slaves brought from India died there on their way to Central Asia) the country forms part of the basin of the Oxus, which flows west and then north to the Aral Sea. South of it, the country belongs to the basin of the Indus, which drains southwards to join the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Thus Afghanistan, astride the watershed, is simultaneously the southernmost state of Central Asia and the northernmost state of South Asia.

West of the Hindu Kush the land is lower and flatter, turning in places to areas of level desert. This is drained by the River Helmand, which, after flowing alongside an area known as Registan, the place of sand, finally disappears in a vast swamp, the Hamun. This western region, with Herat in the north and Kandahar in the south, was until recent times the only all-weather route between South and Central Asia when the winter snows blocked the passes of the Hindu Kush.

The term Afghan, though in recent times applied to any citizen of the state of Afghanistan, generically refers to a people of Indo-Iranian stock. In the same way the term Englishman, though it may be applied to any citizen of England, normally means someone of Anglo-Saxon stock. Thus, many Afghan citizens are not ethnic Afghans, and indeed many ethnic Afghans are not citizens of the Afghan state, but subjects of neighbouring countries. The area north of the Hindu Kush, known as Afghan Turkestan, comprising the ancient provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan, is populated mostly by Uzbeks, a people of Turkish stock. Many of the western areas around the Hindu Kush are peopled by Hazaras, descendants of Mongolian garrisons settled there by Genghis Khan. Around Kabul, the present capital of Afghanistan, live the Qizilbashes, descendants of Iranian garrisons, settled there by Nadir Shah to hold his conquests. These, like most Iranians, belong to the minority Shi'a sect of Islam, while the rest of the inhabitants of Afghanistan are more orthodox, Sunni, Muslims.

The ethnic Afghans are otherwise called Pathans, from a local word Pasht, the back of a mountain range. They are divided into two main branches, with certain linguistic distinctions. In very general terms, the western Pathans speak Pashtu, and inhabit the country from Herat to Kandahar, while the eastern Pathans speak Pakhtu and live in the mountains and valleys around Peshawar. This, they would call Pekhawar, but the official title is that given in the days when the western Pathans, the Durranis, were politically dominant. Between the two great branches of the Pathan people, in the region south of the Hindu Kush from Kandahar to Kabul, live the Ghilzais. These are said not to be true Pathans but an amalgam with peoples of Turkish stock.

But all these Afghans have generally been regarded by their Indian and Iranian neighbours as wild savage hillmen, uncouth barbarians, ever ready to prey on each other, to rob travellers passing through their country or even to sweep down upon the more fortunate and richer countries outside their own borders. The 1908 Imperial Gazetteer of India summed up what writers had recorded of the Afghans since they first appeared in history:

Their step is full of resolution, their bearing proud and apt to be rough. Inured to bloodshed from childhood, they are familiar with death, audacious in attack, but easily discouraged by failure. They are treacherous and passionate in revenge. . They are much under the influence of their Mullas, especially for evil.

They were also generally agreed to be proud of their country, their tribe, their descent, their prowess in arms, and, above all, their independence. Other races were despised as effete, and among themselves each man considered himself as good as or better than his neighbour. In short, the Afghan has always been like other highlanders in the way in which he is regarded by his plains-dwelling neighbours with mingled apprehension and condescension, for his high regard for personal honour, for his clan loyalty, for his readiness to carry and use arms to settle disputes, for his lack of respect for other people's property, and for his religious intolerance.

The main wealth of Afghanistan has always been its flocks and herds of sheep and goats. Large numbers of camels and horses were necessary prior to the coming of modern automobiles, and were bred for export and for use in the carrying trade. Wool and hides still form an essential part of the economy. Traditionally, the government income on these commodities was levied in the form of customs transit dues, and a grazing tax of one animal in every forty.

The real money, in revenue terms, came from the land revenue, or government share of the crop - mostly wheat or barley, but also lucerne grown for fodder, and orchard fruits. This was assessed at rates varying from up to one-third, where land was irrigated from rivers, etc., to one-tenth, when it was dependent only on rainfall. Revenue was collected in kind, and taken to local treasuries. Whatever was not needed for the use of the government's own men and beasts as sold to merchants and then back by them to the local consumers. But if there was a better market elsewhere, such as, for instance, a well-financed army of occupation, then the local consumer and his animals might well find themselves going hungry, as inflation drove up the price of their food. Thus, as we shall see, even an army that paid for what it took was bound to be hated, and the government it supported unpopular, because in a poor season there simply was not enough local produce to go round.

The tribal system, which ordered the life of most people outside the city areas, was certainly as potent in political terms as the national-state system of Europe in 1914. Men felt a fierce loyalty to their own tribe, such that, if called upon, they would without hesitation assemble in arms under their own tribal chiefs and local clan leaders. In the same way, men throughout Europe flocked to the colours in 1914, forming up in regional divisions and battalions, under command of the local nobility and gentry. In theory, under Islamic law every believer is under obligation to bear arms at the ruler's call, but there was no more the need to enforce this than there was to introduce conscription to fill up the British Army in 1914. The Afghan shepherd or peasant, when called on, went to war for much the same mixture of reasons as the more 'civilized' European clerk or factory worker - a desire for adventure, a desire not to be left out, nor to lose esteem in the eyes of his fellows, a dislike or contempt of foreigners, perhaps even the chance of extra cash or enhanced personal prospects. The tribal system was not something particularly backward, or warlike. It was simply the best way of organizing large groups of people in a country that was geographically difficult, and in a society that had an uncomplicated way of life. Indeed, even at the present time, it is a force that governments disregard at their peril.

The administration of the country was conducted by a combination of this patriarchal tribal organization and the more sophisticated jagirdari, or quasi-feudal system. The relative importance of these two elements varied from area to area, according to the poverty or difficulty of the terrain. In areas that were remote or without much in the way of a crop, central government rarely had the power or desire to exert detailed control, and there tribalism predominated. In the plains and around the cities, which were accessible and worth having, central government asserted itself and the jagirdari system was the stronger.

The head of the tribe or great clan was the Sirdar, a title corresponding in importance to that of Earl or Count in medieval Europe. Sirdars were always from the same noble family of their tribe, though not necessarily succeeding through primogeniture. Their election (for life) was by the assembled elders of their tribe, ratified by the central government, usually as a matter of course.

The extent to which a tribal chief could enforce his authority depended on a number of variable factors. These included his own force of personality, the independence of spirit of his clansmen, and especially his success or failure in delivering financial rewards. The latter consideration, after all, weighs heavily with voters in any modern electoral system. In Afghanistan it was measured by the open-handedness of the chief in giving feasts, or presents to his followers, and in providing them with extra emoluments and employment as official retainers. (Nineteenth-century Afghans, demonstrably, have not had the monopoly of this attitude to government on the part of the governed.)

To fulfil his obligations to his supporters the Sirdar needed funds and patronage. The central government, on the other hand, needed troops, which it lacked the machinery to pay and maintain other than in...