Commercial Crew Program, Space Telescopes and the Global Positioning System
Erschienen am 17. Januar 2019
232 Seiten
978-1-5361-4981-4 (ISBN)
Beschreibung
NASA's Commercial Crew Program is a multi-phased effort that began in 2010. Across the phases, NASA has engaged several companies, using both agreements and contract vehicles to develop and demonstrate crew transportation capabilities. As the program has passed through these phases, NASA has generally narrowed down the number of participants. NASA's mission is to drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space exploration, and contribute to education, innovation, our country's economic vitality, and the stewardship of the Earth. To accomplish this mission, NASA establishes programs and projects that rely on complex instruments and spacecraft. NASA's portfolio of major projects ranges from space satellites equipped with advanced sensors to study the Earth to a telescope intended to explore the universe to spacecraft to transport humans and cargo to and beyond low-Earth orbit.
Weitere Details
Weitere Ausgaben
Inhalt
- Intro
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1
- NASA Commercial Crew Program: Plan Needed to Ensure Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station*
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Current Program Contracts
- Certification
- Prior GAO Work
- Contractors Have Made Progress, but NASA Has Not Finalized Plans to Ensure ISS Access Given Persistent Delays
- Contractors Continue to Make Progress, but Risks Remain
- Program's Schedule Risk Analysis Indicates More Delays Likely to Certification Milestone
- NASA Has Neither Shared Complete Information on Delay Risk with Congress nor Developed a Contingency Plan
- Agency Certification Process Includes Mechanisms to Assess Safety, but Is Complicated by Assessment of Key Safety Metric and Oversight Structure
- Program Has Several Contractual Mechanisms to Assess Safety
- Certification Data Package
- Phased Safety Review Process
- Program Requirements
- Testing
- NASA Lacks a Consistent Approach to Assess Key Safety Metric
- The Commercial Crew Program's Organizational Structure Impairs Independence of Safety Technical Oversight Supporting the Certification Process
- Conclusion
- Recommendations for Executive Action
- Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
- Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Appendix III: Staff Acknowledgments
- Appendix IV: Accessible Data
- Agency Comment Letter
- Text of Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Recommendation 1
- Management's Response
- Recommendation 2
- Management's Response
- Estimated Completion Date
- Recommendation 3
- Management's Response
- Estimated Completion Date
- Recommendation 4
- Management's Response
- Estimated Completion Date
- Recommendation 5
- Management's Response
- Estimated Completion Date
- Chapter 2
- NASA Commercial Crew Program: Continued Delays Pose Risks for Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station(
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Both Contractors Have Made Progress but Continue to Experience Schedule Delays
- Contractors Continue to Advance Development of Their
- Crew Transportation Systems
- Schedule Delays Continue, and Risks Remain to Final Certification Dates
- Aggressive Schedules
- Programmatic and Safety Risks
- SpaceX Risks
- Boeing Risks
- Program Safety Risk
- Program Office Workload
- Staff Acknowledgments
- Chapter 3
- Commercial Space Industry Launches a New Phase*
- Abstract
- Introduction
- The Commercial Space Industry
- Satellites
- Launch Services and Vehicles
- Launch Services
- Launch Vehicles
- Ground Systems
- Space-Related Products and Services
- Insurance
- New Entrants Change the Industry
- U.S. Government Redefines Procurement
- Private Financing Increases
- Growing Deployment of Small Satellites
- Commercial Space Workforce Declines
- Policy Issues for Congress
- Regulating and Managing Commercial Space
- Export Controls
- Spectrum Allocation
- Appendix A. Satellite Size Comparison
- Chapter 4
- NASA: Preliminary Observations on the Management of Space Telescopes*
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Status of NASA's Major Telescope Projects
- WFIRST
- TESS
- JWST
- Lessons Learned from NASA Acquisitions
- Manage Cost and Schedule Performance for Large Projects to Limit Implications for Entire Portfolio
- Establish Adequate Cost and Schedule Reserves to Address Risks
- Regularly and Consistently Update Project JCLs to Provide Realistic Estimates to Decision Makers
- Enhance Oversight of Contractors to Improve Project Outcomes
- Staff Acknowledgments
- Chapter 5
- James Webb Space Telescope: Integration and Test Challenges Have Delayed Launch and Threaten to Push Costs Over Cap(
- Abbreviations
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Schedule and Cost Reserves for NASA Projects
- History of Cost Growth and Schedule Delays
- Previous GAO Reviews of JWST Project
- Considerable Progress Made Across JWST Project, but Integration and Test Challenges Have Delayed Launch at Least 5 Months with Further Delays Likely
- JWST Project Completed Significant Integration and Test Work
- JWST Delayed Launch Due to Integration Challenges on the Spacecraft Element, Avoiding a Potential Launch Site Conflict
- JWST Project Consumed all of its Planned Schedule Reserve to Address Technical Challenges
- Ongoing Spacecraft Integration and Test Issues, Challenging Remaining Work, and Slow Contractor Performance Make Additional Launch Delays Likely
- Higher Contractor Workforce Levels to Address Continuing Technical Challenges Places JWST at Risk of Exceeding Cost Commitments
- Agency Comments and our Evaluation
- List of Committees
- Appendix I: Elements and Major Subsystems of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Observatory
- Appendix II: Staff Acknowledgments
- Appendix III: Accessible Data
- Data Tables
- Chapter 6
- Global Positioning System: Better Planning and Coordination Needed to Improve Prospects for Fielding Modernized Capability(
- Why GAO Did This Study
- What GAO Recommends
- What GAO Found
- Background
- Key GPS Modernization Points
- GPS Satellite Constellation
- Ground Control Segment
- Receiver Cards
- Acquisition Risks Persist on GPS III Satellites but Do Not Threaten Sustainment of the Constellation in the Short Term
- Progress: Programs Advancing to Support Constellation Sustainment Requirements
- Short-Term Challenges: Compressed and Concurrent Schedules, Component Issues with the First GPS III Satellite
- OCX Block 0 and Pre-Launch Testing Schedules
- First GPS III Satellite Capacitors
- Contingency Operations Schedule
- Short-Term Risk Mitigation: Nearly 2 Years of Schedule Buffer to When First GPS III Satellite Needed
- Long-Term Challenge: Most GPS III Satellites Under Contract Will Have Launched before Operational Testing Confirms Satellite Performance
- Modernizing GPS Military Broadcast Challenged by High-Risk Development Schedules
- High-Risk Programs Underlie Strategy to Deliver M-code Broadcast Capability
- MCEU
- OCX Blocks 1 and 2
- Greater Coordination Needed to Prevent Duplication of Effort Developing and Fielding M-code Receivers
- DOD Has Made Some Progress in Developing Technology for New M-code Receiver Cards
- Significant Development Work Remains to Eventually
- Field M-code Receiver Cards
- DOD Has Begun Cost and Schedule Planning
- Full Cost Is Unknown but Likely to be Many Billions of Dollars
- DOD Risks Duplication of Effort Integrating and Testing M-code Receiver Cards
- Conclusion
- Recommendations for Executive Action
- Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
- List of Committees
- Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
- Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
- Appendix III: GPS Modernization Cost Increases, Original Baseline vs. Current Estimate
- Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments
- Appendix V: Accessible Data
- Data Tables
- Agency Comment Letter
- Text of Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
- Department Of Defense Comments to the GAO Recommendation
- Index
- Blank Page
- Blank Page
