The Twilight of Ideologies

Name: The Twilight of Ideologies
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Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora y Mon(Autor*in)

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The Twilight of Ideologies
Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora y Mon
Translation of the Salvat edition (1971)by Thomas Burns Marañón (1974)
Revised for the present editionby Juan Fernández de la Mora Varela (2024)
The Twilight of Ideologies
Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora y Mon
Translation of the Salvat edition (1971)by Thomas Burns Marañón (1974)
Revised for the present editionby Juan Fernández de la Mora Varela (2024)
Academica PressWashington~London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Fernández de la Mora y Mon, Gonzalo (author) | Fernández de la Mora Varela, Juan | Burns, Tom (translator)
Title: The twilight of ideologies | Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora y Mon
Description: Washington : Academica Press, 2025. | Includes references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2024944227 | ISBN 9781680534108 (hardcover) | 9781680534351 (paperback) | 9781680534115 (e-book)
Contents
Preface ix
About the Author xv
I. Anticipations 1
The Subject 2
The Thesis 4
Two Prior Objections 5
II. Towards a Definition 7
Four Interpretations 8
Ideologies and Ideas 11
Opinion and Ideology 14
The Function of Tension 17
The Dialectics of Ideologies 22
III. Political Apathy 25
The Phenomenon 26
Assessment 30
The Nihilistic Outbreak 32
IV: The Convergence of Ideologies 37
Socialism Veers Right 38
Liberalism Veers Left 46
Cosmopolitanism 52
V. The Rationalization of Politics 55
The Horizon of the Ends 56
Protopolitics and Politics 59
The Mechanism of the Means 61
The Expert 64
The Ideologue 66
From Power to Authority 68
From Enthusiasm to Consensus 73
The Three Stages 77
VI. The Interiorization of Beliefs 79
The Ideological-Religious Connection 81
The Religious Content of Ideologies 83
The Parallel 84
The Subjectivation of Beliefs 86
VII. Economic Development 89
Humanization and Industrialization 90
Retarding Factors 93
VIII. Conclusion 99
A New Ideal 100
Assessment 103
Books by Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora 107
Preface
When this work was first published in 1965, it argued that scientific approaches were gradually replacing ideologies in the political life of culturally advanced nations. Sixty years later, the present translation of this classic will facilitate the participation of English-speaking readers in a long lived debate that is now particularly relevant in America. The double aim of this prologue is to present the author to English-speaking readers, and to investigate whether his thesis has held true i
Fernández de la Mora
We thank the illustrious historian Professor Stanley Payne for his permission to introduce our author through the following selected quotes:
"Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora was the deepest and most original conservative Spanish intellectual of the second half of the 20th century, and one of the most remarkable of that period. He is difficult to classify, as he was a diplomat who lived and worked mainly in Madrid
he was an important figure of Franco's regime who rarely was in government, and a notable philosopher that did not hold an academic post. He intervened in certain key aspects of the politics of the regime
but he always was mo
"Fernández de la Mora built his own philosophy, not a school, but a personal methodology which he called razonalismo - "reasonalism." This involved the use of reason, not in the Cartesian sense of "pure reason," but as an empirical rationalism applied to current problems. Here one sees the influence of Ortega y Gasset, something that Fernández de la Mora always acknowledged. He never participated in Ortega's rejection, typical of Spanish contemporary conservative writers. He rather stressed that
"Among his books, probably the one best known in his days was The Twilight of Ideologies, though perhaps it was also the least understood ... Fernández de la Mora referred to the failures and limitations of the so-called period of ideologies, and proposed their replacement, not by other ideological abstractions, but by rational analysis of existing problems according to empirical and positive criteria, and also coherently with lessons from the past. This directive had been constructed after year
"Fernández de la Mora entered government in 1970 as head of the Public Works ministry, and defined the regime as an Estado de obras, or "Government of Works." His presence in the government ended with the assassination of its Prime Minister, Carrero Blanco. In these years many thought of him as the official thinker of the regime. But his participation in government was relatively brief, and he was heavily criticized from within the system by traditionalists, falangists, as well as by the element
"After Franco's death he naturally accepted the need for certain changes. He participated in the transition process first as one of the founders of the political party Alianza Popular (now Partido Popular). In a second period he abandoned active political life, to devote himself fully to intellectual activities. This last stage of his life was most fruitful, including the publication of his memoirs Río Arriba (Upstream) and six more books on political and philosophical subjects. He also founded
"He was the most complete and sophisticated of all intellectuals formed during Franco's regime."
Is the twilight of ideologies thesis valid today?
A stunning confirmation of the Twilight of Ideologies' thesis was seen in Eastern Europe with the Revolutions of 1989 and subsequent collapse of the USSR in 1991. The singularly virulent Marxist-Leninist ideology imploded almost overnight into Russia's current autocratic capitalist regime, and a series of liberal democracies.
The opposite is often thought to have occurred in Western Europe, as the socialist, conservative, and liberal parties continue to dominate. If policy is currently dictated by parties representing each of the major ideologies, how could this possibly be indicative of their twilight? The fact is that the discourse of these parties continuously strays away from their theoretical origins, very much as anticipated by Fernández de la Mora. Furthermore, the convergence in legislation between these supp
1) The creation of the French party En Marche in 2016 (now Renaissance), which brought Macron to the presidency with a clear majority in 2017. Renaissance is a centrist party built from the integration of the principal socialist and center right parties in France. A political party unifying the socialist, liberal, and conservative ideologies would have been unthinkable just ten years earlier, yet closely fits the framework promoted by our author in 1965.
2) The European Union Parliament is governed by an alliance of its three major groups: the People's Party (center right), the Socialists & Democrats Party (center left), and Renew Europe (liberal), as the three vote jointly on nearly every occasion. This convergence of political positions, far beyond that of the corresponding national parties, also fits well the twilight thesis.
3) In the 2024 European Parliament elections in Romania, the Socialist (PSD) and the moderate right party (PNL) formed an electoral coalition, and presented joint candidates with a common set of political objectives: a stunning confirmation of their ideological convergence.
4) Recent developments with the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, further substantiate the convergence of ideologies. Meloni leads the Brothers of Italy party (far right), but since ascending to power she has followed a set of policies similar to those of the European People's Party.
We conclude that the evolution of ideologies in Europe over the last sixty years has clearly followed the pattern announced by Fernández de la Mora: disappearance of the extremist Communist ideology, and convergence of the conservative, liberal and socialist ideologies.
As relates to the United States, in 1965 Fernández de la Mora noted that the Democratic and Republican parties were the least ideological political entities in the world. This suggested that the US was relatively immune to the virus of ideology, but the opposite trend has now taken hold of US culture and politics. Given this clear antithesis, what would be the point of publishing an English translation of this classic? The obvious reason is that much is wrong with the increasing ideologization o
This general evaluation is well illustrated by a chief element of American culture. Universities are key centers for the discussion and elaboration of solutions to societal problems. They also used to instill the intellectual habits necessary for the young to contribute to this difficult creative process. However, increasing ideologization of academia is contributing to the opposite. Ideologically driven leaders have achieved an astounding level of control over most cultural institutions, attain
We conclude that the present radicalization of ideologies in the US does not match the prognosis of our author. Nevertheless, a key point in his analysis is that ideologies are irrational, and their influence tends to diminish in culturally forward moving societies. The counterexample presently offered by the US is accordingly of the highest relevance. History shows that even the greatest and noblest nations can not only decay, but also be entirely eradicated. It is thus evident that we cannot e
If we turn our attention to the remaining nations of the world, the analysis of a present-day twilight of ideologies is more nuanced. As a confirmation of our author's thesis, we can highlight the case of China: the communist ideology has been in retreat for decades, even as the CCP remains an authoritarian power. Today China is much better defined as a capitalist country led by communists than as a communist country, and its remaining ideology is steadily converging towards Western ideals. On
The present translation, the first published in English, is based on the popular 1971 Spanish Salvat edition. Of the many editions available in various languages, the most recent is a critical scholarly version edited by Carlos Goñi Apesteguia (OLMS, 2013). It includes a detailed introduction and numerous notes, but exists only in Spanish.
Juan and Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora Varela
July 1, 2024
About the Author
BIOGRAPHY. One of Spain's most distinguished philosophers, Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora y Mon was born in Barcelona on April 30, 1924. He graduated in law and philosophy from the University of Madrid with the highest distinction in both subjects and then entered the Spanish diplomatic corps, serving in West Germany and Greece and as head of the Diplomatic School of Spain. In 1950, he married Isabel Varela, with whom he had four children. In 1953, Fernández de la Mora y Mon began a lengthy collab
A summary of his exceptional merits is not easily made. He greatly enjoyed hunting for antiques. For instance, he assembled one of the best Spanish collections of antique silver, which he donated to the Museum of Pontevedra. To enrich his vast culture, he collected what would probably be the last large Spanish library, which he gave in life to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. He was a brilliant public speaker, and a feared polemist. He published his first book at age 19, the novel Pa
The leading aspect of Fernández de la Mora was his intellectual activity. As an independent thinker with a footing on the classics, he framed his work on the most current ideas of conservative thought, European (especially German) and North American, without concessions to the varying tides of Spanish politics. He published 22 books, 14 shorter works, and 116 studies. Leading among them are The Twilight of Ideologies (1965), Pensamiento español (7 volumes, 1964-1970), Egalitarian Envy (1984
ava
SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTIONS. The writings of Fernández de la Mora encompass a broad range of subjects, from literature to literary criticism, though his contributions in the theory of government and in philosophy are perhaps the most noteworthy. In the former, his ideas have led to radical advances, especially through works such as The Twilight of Ideologies, Partitocracy, Egalitarian Envy, and From the Ideal State to the State of Reason.
The Twilight of Ideologies dwelled on the convergence of ideologies, the rationalization of politics, and the strong link between ideologization and cultural decay.
La partitocracia (Partitocracy) is of comparable current interest, especially in political systems lacking an independent President. According to the theory of the general will, the function of a parliament is to approach truth through debate. But decisions in the modern parliament are made outside of the chambers by the heads of the parties. The party oligarchy also selects and controls the candidates to the chambers, who cannot therefore vote according to either their conscience or the mandate
Egalitarian Envy starts with a fascinating account of the views expressed about this passion by leading thinkers, including the author himself. Envy is born through the perception of the superior happiness of another. The envious subject then reacts by attempting to debase the envied object. In politics, this destructive sentiment is channeled through the abasement of those above, conveniently attained through the requirement of equality. This passion is therefore the driving force behind the ap
Del Estado ideal al Estado de Razon (From the Ideal State to the State of Reason). In The Twilight of Ideologies, Fernández de la Mora rejects the utopian ideological approach to judge a government irrespective of its success, by its similarity to an ideal standard (communism, socialism, liberalism, etc.). What alternative means should one then use to evaluate a political system? The author notes that the State has not been created to satisfy a certain theoretical standard of beauty and harmony.
"REASONALISM." Fernández de la Mora initiated in 1982 a philosophical movement called razonalismo, first through his editorials in Razon Española (to be collected in book form under the title El buho de Minerva, or Minervas's Owl), and also through his deeply anthropological books La envidia igualitaria (Egalitarian Envy) and Sobre la Felicidad (On Happiness). The essence of the movement is the application of reason to all areas of human life, especially its intellectual and moral dimensions. In
RAZÓN ESPAÑOLA. In 1983, Fernández de la Mora founded the journal Razón Española (Spanish Reason) which has become the main organ of Spanish conservative thought. Along its main lines of action have been the following:
-Exposition of the author's philosophical system, Razonalismo. First in its personal facet as a guide for human life. And also in its public facet, especially on leading public issues of the day, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to globalization.
-Defense of the positive aspects of Spanish history, and in particular Franco's Spain, given its exceptional achievements in areas such as economic development, social justice, convergence with Europe, political honesty and rule of law.
-Defense of cosmopolitanism, and other processes of integration, particularly the European Union, and a concomitant criticism of disintegrating nationalisms, especially those contributing now and then to the collapse of Spanish unity.
-Criticism of partitocracy, including measures to moderate party powers, to help nations having fallen into this oligarchic system better approach the liberal paradigm.
-Design of a new state for the next millenium, characterized by technification, depolitization, decentralization, liberalization, and more direct democratic forms
SUMMARY. Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora Varela was undoubtedly the leading Spanish conservative thinker of the twentieth century. He created an important body of doctrine in political theory, as well as in philosophy. His precocious announcements on such matters as ideologies, political parties, or the passion driving egalitarianism provide ample evidence for the clarity of his vision. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to describe the man without stressing that most important in his life was the r
I. Anticipations
The Subject
The Thesis
Two Prior Objections
Social contemporary life has been dominated by ideologies. In the programs of candidates and governments, dictators and revolutionaries, there has been a predominance of the ideological content. Mass movements and opinion makers have also been driven by ideologies. The signs of weakness of this vast, long-lived, and strong empire had not begun to be worrying until past the end of World War II. Very recently, certain negative symptoms have multiplied and increased in strength. One of the most str
Why one studies a subject is a complex and intimate question
but the reasons why one publishes a book must at this time in history be justified. Tons of printing ink are used daily in broad areas of the western World. And the disciplines still counting with a readily digestible bibliography are now rare. The truth is that there are too many materials, either known, or mediocre, or previously published, which only serve to increase and muddy the stream of printed letter. To satisfy a desire of v
Much has already been written about ideologies, and a little, though contradictory, about their decline. The present absence of the notes that overload some of my other studies, mean neither a pretension of originality, nor disrespect for the sources. I am astronomically distant from either. But to describe with sober lines a phenomenon as vast and contemporary as the agony of ideologies, the testimony of others seems unnecessary to me. And to support polemic conclusions, it is more sportive to
Throughout this meager study I try to analyze, with some systematism and rigor, a phenomenon complex but solitary: the twilight of ideologies. Each and all of the lines converge towards a focal point. The data complement each other, and the reasonings condition each other. It is a thematic monopoly and a Robinsonic conceptual monarchy. The effort is also governed by a sustained intentional unity and by a single driving force. The accessory and marginal achieves its meaning by being rooted on the
The extinction of ideology seems to imply a sort of political unanimity, and therefore, the end of dissonances and pluralism. The first would be utopic because differences of both opinion and of interest are consubstantial with social life. The second would be counterproductive because debate is the nerve of dialectics, and the collision of different intentions is what drives groups. Would the suppression of ideological tensions be the end of political entropy and something close to social death
The second objection is of far greater weight: what hidden ideological charge hides behind a criticism of ideologies? From Marx's times, especially after Manheim, the great obsession of cultural sociologists and of all suspicious readers has been to guess the prejudices of the author, the interests he defends, the principles from which he proceeds, the sentiments moving him, that is, the impure, what misguides reasoning and deforms reality. Some believe that a new ideology hides behind positions
The proposed solution is not technocracy, but "ideocracy." It is not a new ideologism, but a plain anti-ideologic position. It is not a deintellectualization, but a superintellectualization of social life. It is not a dehumanization, but an exaltation of the most human, because it is proper to man to operate, not just by instinct or emotions, but also according to rational ideas. These are the supreme and absolute weapons. Taking ideologies apart is not an endeavor for technocrats, but rather fo
II. Towards a Definition
Four Interpretations
Ideologies and Ideas
Opinion and Ideology
The Function of Tension
The Dialectics of Ideologies
All political terms are simultaneously names of things, masks, and throwing weapons. They are situated at the meeting point of interests and passions. The harsh treatment of doctrinaires, statesmen, demagogues, and the plebs deforms and wears them out. They follow a painful and triumphant path of semantic volatilization. They appear to be cruelly destined to walk towards complete amphibology and loss of all proper meaning. After almost three millennia of manipulation, who knows the meaning of "d
Although a modern term, the word ideology is ambiguous. Some of its meanings are so different from each other that they have hardly anything in common. In order to approach the subject with any degree of exactness, it is therefore necessary to ascertain our terms. We must distinguish between the science of ideas, a prejudice, an epiphenomenon, and vulgarized philosophy.
1) Ideology was a Hellenic term that was resurrected by Destrutt de Tracy in a brief note in the introduction to his Elements. He defined it etymologically as the science of ideas. The philosophy of this disciple of Condillac was sensualism. Starting from the premise that superior psychical phenomena originated in the senses, Destrutt de Tracy concluded that ideas were composed of sensations and that thinking was equivalent to feeling. Such empiricism placed him in a position hostile to classica
A second philosophical school attempted to rehabilitate the term by freeing it from its sensualist connections. Thus, Balmes termed pure ideology that part of metaphysics which had as its object pure intellectual order. Balmes' reinterpretations, directed precisely against the empiricism of Condillac and Destrutt de Tracy, while contributing to a less partisan and more generic acceptance of the term, were not however generally adopted.
2) A second meaning complicated matters. There is a fundamental preoccupation in all philosophy: one must abandon prejudices in order to indulge in pure thinking. This is the obsessive concern of modern critical thought. With his theory of idols and prejudices Bacon gave it a striking and fruitful formulation. He defined idola as erroneous notions that were formed by a man's biological, social, or cultural condition, and that hindered the search for truth. Idola were inherited fallacies that clo
3) It was however Marx who weakened both the theory and practice of ideologies. Already in 1758 Helvetius had written "Our ideas are the necessary consequences of the age in which we live." Marx reduced ideas to the simple condition of epiphenomena, that is the result of a basic and ulterior situation, in his case the socioeconomic relationship. He declared that "the mode of production of material life conditions the process of social, political, and spiritual existence." In short, so called sup
The identification of ideologies with propaganda came as an inevitable variant of the Marxist interpretation. If they are unable to have a pretention of absolute truth, ideologies are inherently false. When the will to give a rational justification and an apologetic explanation of an unjust situation is conscious, like the defense of a criminal, they are a mask, a deformation, and a sophism. It is nevertheless evident that the presentation of ideologies as lies requires a study, not from the per
In the Marxian thesis and the later one of Dilthey, concepts are historical, that is, are subject to a dependence on time. This premise has given rise to a very modern discipline, the sociology of knowledge. Its object is the study of thought in relation to the socio-economic conditions in which it was formulated. Scheler, Manheim and Geiger have been the leaders of this school. According to it, ideologies are important, not so much because of their truth, but as reflections or symptoms of any g
4) There is a fourth meaning that is a final precipitate of all the former ones. According to it, an ideology is a simplified and vulgarized political philosophy. The epistemological problem is left aside. It does not matter whether ideologies are prejudices or epiphenomena or neither, nor the extent of their truth. Although the veracity of ideologies parallels that of the conceptual system giving rise to them, that is a critical question which we cannot here undertake. The concept that is obtai
Ideologies are not tangible realities such as a range of hills. Rather, like algebra, they belong to the realm of thought. Predominantly they contain principles for action and behavioral norms, in the same way as do logic and morality. They are therefore a class or type of idea, since one cannot think or act rationally without having ideas. An ideology is an amalgam of concepts, judgments and reasonings, but it is a peculiar one. There is a distinction between what is ideological and what is str
First precision. An ideology is a practical, not a theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge such as metaphysics does not presuppose any action and sees pure knowledge as its only end. An ideology leads directly to the execution of acts, the adoption of decisions and modes of conduct. They are fertile and spectacular, and are always reflected in external history. They are the agents provocateurs of programs and operations. As a result, the nerve-end of every ideology is always a series of rec
Second precision. The implicit norms of any ideology are not rules of conscience such as the command to love God. They concern the citizen, the man in society and not the solitary man. They attempt to order men's lives jointly on earth. Ideologies seek to form a basis for the polity, and so necessarily become a program for government and the structuring of society. Ideologies aspire to be the ferment of constitutional law and social morality.
Third precision. An ideology is however neither morality nor rigorous political science in the exact sense of those terms. For some doctrinaires, an ideology can be the object of a more or less scientific treatment and justification. This is the case of Marx's socialism. But there remains in all cases an irresistible urgency for practice and a high degree of popularization. Unlike calculus, an ideology is a mental product for the consumption of the masses. It is not even an originally esoteric d
Fourth precision. The plebeian element in ideologies does not deprive them of their condition of ideas. But it does make those ideas simplistic and sensationalist. The socialist who preaches egalitarianism does not stop to explain how the innate differences between blacks and whites, geniuses and mediocrities are to be overcome. The liberal who propagates the government of the people by the people does not explain the mathematical formulae which will account for the electoral coefficients in sys
Fifth precision. Ideologies, even when they are originally the work of intellectuals, and so the product of reason, acquire, as they become popularized, the characteristics of a belief. They become received beliefs that the believer does not question. If he is forced to defend himself in a polemic, he does so with mechanical arguments or with personal sentiments. One has ideas, but where ideology is concerned, one is part of them. Ideologies are not reasoned, they are affirmed, lived, felt, and
Sixth precision. There is moreover a sacralization of ideologies. They become crystallized into dogmatic passwords and intangible hypotheses. One is either for them or against them. To abandon them is apostasy, and to reform them constitutes heretical deviationism. As in religious conceptions, they ultimately condition everything. This is the case of communism
nothing escapes its tutelage, from biology to metallurgy. Ideologies in their prime are lay gospels, secularized dogmas. They have their
Seventh precision. Ideologies concern themselves with ultimate goals rather than with immediate stages. They avoid the minutiae of technical and bureaucratic details. They do not therefore usually contain details on the procedure to be followed in order to achieve what is desired. Exceptionally, when they make long-term policy decisions, they do so in very general drafts, which later need constant reappraisals. This is the case with the universal Marxist slogan of the nationalization of the mean
It is not therefore a question of ideologies not being ideas. They are, but they are pragmatic, political, popular, elemental, generalized, emotional, dogmatic, and utopian. Nor is it a question of ideologies being inherently and absolutely false. Their degree of falseness and exaggeration depends on their fidelity to the philosophical systems that nurtured them, and the greater or lesser veracity of these. Even what was originally just and exact, as it is turned into an ideology, becomes radica
When one says ideology, one speaks of what is neither rigorous science nor strict knowledge. This distinction between certain knowledge and problematic knowledge, between what is exact and what is approximate, what is reason and what is improvised, what is pure and what has an interest at stake, is as old as speculative philosophy. It more or less corresponds to the division between wise and ignorant men. When 2,600 years ago philosophy was born, Parmenides of Elea, the father of metaphysics, di
This contraposition is also the nucleus of Platonic philosophy. Doxa or opinion is changeable, not very clear, susceptible to error and unintelligent. It is opposed by epistema or science in its truest sense. Equally, Aristotle defined opinion as "knowledge that can be wisdom or ignorance." Throughout history, great minds have confirmed this sentence. Hegel took the conclusion to its limits: "Philosophy has no room for opinion. Philosophic opinions do not exist, only certainties exist." This was
The average man generally knows for certain what he wants and what hinders or favors the satisfaction of his desires. These simple, clear coordinates orient his life. But when dealing with questions of theory and principle, only the scientist can be certain. This favorable situation occurs of course only in areas in which the scientist is a specialist. In other domains, like the immense majority of people, he also depends on opinions and beliefs. The jurisdictions of inferior rational knowledge
Let us attempt an outline of the concept by distinguishing it from the three notions closest to it. An opinion is not a "faith" because it is earthly and rationally understandable. A faith is supernatural and inaccessible to reason. Nor is it "a belief," that is, a conviction never personally verified by those who live by it. There are many who believe in Pythagoras' theorem without being able to prove it. Instead, inherent in an opinion is the suspicion that the opposite might be true. "I am of
In the formation of opinions haste is a decisive factor. We make an opinion when we need an idea but lack any scientific certitude. Man is a thinking animal and life sometimes places him in a situation when he has to improvise a conceptual solution. Then, lacking time, inspiration, and strength, he is reduced to forming opinions.
From the existential perspective, opinions manifest themselves as emergency exits, improvised recourses, and compromises between the will and the intellect, substitutes for real knowledge. Opinions respond to man's intellectual condition and to his inherent pride. That is why the man who opines has neither the peace of mind of a believer, nor the detached irony of the man who formulates a hypothesis. There is only the rushed and anguished attachment of one who needs a weapon, and grasps the best
When opinions are shared by great numbers and concern common interests, they cease to be an individual operation and, being collectivized, they acquire a special virulence. They become strong and outgoing, and, on occasions, they become stabilized within a program. They are then no longer a face-saving, private artifact, and extend their vigilance in time and space. They become transformed into the liberating panaceas of a group. And because they know that they can be contradicted by other opini
All this means that, when an ideology confronted by rigorous political science receives a pejorative significance, no intellectual juggling is at work. One is simply applying in a concrete case a key distinction which, since Parmenides, structures all knowledge: that between opinion and science.
An atmosphere of mutual tolerance is rather similar to the notion in physics of fields (magnetic, gravitational), and registers two polarized situations: that of balance and that of movement. The balance in such an atmosphere is dynamic, not static, it is the permanence of an order that is always identical to itself. It is a purely speculative term because historically social life is in constant alteration. The movement which in sociology is known as "change" is the distance between two limiting
The two major factors in social tension are interests and ideologies. Their respective modes of action are very different. Interests concern possessions of an economic character. The man who acts under the motivation of an interest is calculating and realistic
his internal motivation allows him to make concessions and bargains, enabling formulae for compromise. Instead, ideologies are essentially maximalist
they must be so in order to realize themselves fully. Ideological authenticity is synon
Like "liberal," "pronunciamiento" and "fifth column," "integrism" is a word that Spain has given to the political lexicon. It is not a senseless and popular catch phrase, for it has documented and cultured origins. The word was coined by Ramón Nocedal when he founded the "Integrist" Party in 1898. His program outlined a theocratic state, inquisitorial, republican, and entirely subject to the temporal and religious instructions of Rome.
It is not, however, infrequent for proper names to gain popular acceptance, above all, when they concern the state. The use and abuse of political terms generalizes them in addition to wearing them out. Integrist, fascist, radical, are not solely the names of specific historical groups and programs. They are also abstract concepts. Integrism no longer means loyalty to Nocedal's extinct political party, but a certain quality that any political party can adopt, whatever its specific program might
Integrisms have not died, for they are the natural end of every ideology. Mao Tse Tung is the head of Marxist integrism. The Ku Klux Klan is a form of racist nationalism in an overdeveloped country. It has innumerable parallels in the Afro-Asian world. The 19th century was rich in extreme democratic formulae. "Let liberty be established though the heavens should fall." In Spain, what was then known as left wing integrism, has been one of the classic attitudes of political and intellectual life.
All integrisms are philistine and this is particularly true of those of a revolutionary kind. They eventually end in negativism, violence, and error. History is full of frightening examples of this, from Marat to Stalin. The tactical skill of those movements consists in labelling their opponents as integrist. But that dialectic is not correct nor can be correct, because there are no reactionary, entrenched integrists: they are all aggressive and expansionist. Today's integrist tendencies are not
In contrast to the compromise that is essential to interests, ideologies lean towards integrism. They respond to a mechanism that is in part logical and in part passionate, that is inflexible and repudiates give and take. It is either all or nothing. There is no compromise between truth or error, love or hate. Ideologies will not be submitted to an economic valuation which would leave room for negotiation. They admit no bargains and are resistant to any arithmetical operation. Between two health
Interests are very susceptible to juridical protection, and so to peaceful compatibility. Ideological demands, on the other hand, are not. That is why violence, the class struggle and war, is their normal outcome. Civil strife caused by the explosion of internal pressures is not brought about by interests but by ideologies. This was the case of the war of succession, of the Carlist wars and of the civil war in Spain. It was the case of the European revolutions of 1848. It was also the case of al
There remains the question of whether interests give birth to an ideology. If they do, then the distinction that has been made has only a passing value. Man, being the ethical animal that he is, seeks to justify his desires. And among the root of all ideologies there are barely disguised interests. But there are a multitude of interests that do not give rise to an ideology. Among them are those that are essentially individual, since the desires for esoteric objects corresponding to very personal
To conclude, there are some interests that are justified by an ideology, there are many that we see as contrary to any form of justification, namely as illegitimate interest, and there are many that are justified not by an ideology but by reason, that is to say, by an ethical code. The distinction between ideology and interest is a categorical one.
Man does not progress either instinctively or mechanically. He is attracted by exemplary causes, by idealistic goals that are generally proposed by eminent minds. The utopian and human elements that exist in every ideology act as a spur, a factor of social acceleration. In this sense, ideologies fulfill a positively stimulating role. However, the rational mechanisms, that is, the concrete ideas on what is good and what is attainable and the means necessary to achieve it, are administered by ethi
Our previous discussion was directed principally at established ideologies. There exist also the young, new ones. As they are no more than a compendium of beliefs, they undergo the same process as social uses
they are born, they develop, and they die. The creation of hierarchies according to the models of feudalism and the ancient regime is now an extinct ideology in the West. Instead, nihilism is awakening, and it would be very speculative to predict its destiny. The trajectory of ideologies,
In spite of the fact that ideologies have millenary precedents, they are relatively modern phenomena. Their great historical flowering coincides with the intervention of the masses in collective life, with the development of the means of communication and with the secularization of knowledge and morality. All this occurred in the second half of the XVIII century. Up to that point, ideologies had a meagre social base and a confused spiritual relationship. The normal pattern of an ideology is as f
There comes, however, a moment when the virulence of a given ideology recedes. This is a qualitative as well as a quantitative matter. It concerns decadence, recession and indifference, a lack of militancy and enthusiasm. Those that received authoritarian patronage depend on political situations, and the fall of a protective regime usually means the end of the ideology. This was the case of Nazism. But those that hatch tenaciously confronting the political power last longer and resist decline. A
III. Political Apathy
The Phenomenon
Assessment
The Nihilistic Outbreak
It is difficult to establish the degree of political awareness in a people. In democracies, its interest in the polity would appear to be manifested through the exercise of the vote. However, electoral absenteeism can sometimes be a political act, while the actual act of voting might be the result of inertia. Moreover, in countries having introduced mandatory voting, the percentages of voters are distorted by the compulsion factor. Statistics must therefore be treated with prudence. The electora
The abstentionist percentages in Spain are as follows: 35% l846, 33% 1850, 30% 1851, 38% 1857, 31% 1858, 47% 1865, 30% 1869, 35% 1871, 45% 1872 (54% in the second election), 60% 1873, 45% 1876, 66% (in Madrid) 1879, 29% 1881, 28% 1884, 50% (in Madrid) 1891, 90% (in Barcelona) 1899, 70% 1901, 50% 1903, 75% (in Madrid) 1905, 33% 1907, 46% 1910, 46% 1914 56% 1916, 41% 1918, 48% 1919, 46% 1920, 58% 1923, 30% 1931, 44% 1933. This shows a very high average of non-voters, with a rising trend.
The percentages would be increased if one subtracted the false votes of the traditional gerrymandering. Between 1846 and 1868, 27% of the returning deputies had their credentials contested, more than half of them due to electoral fraud. In 1910, out of the 404 deputies, 139 were re-scrutinized while 119 were elected unopposed. Thus, out of the properly contested seats, only 146 were not the subject of objection. Introducing these correcting factors into the abstentionist percentages we arrive at
Among contemporary states, the Italian is today the one closest to the demo-liberal idea, and is both potentially and theoretically the most open-ended. Any political apathy in this case would be very relevant, as it would occur despite the strong stimulus and permeability of the institutions. The results of the Almond memoranda (Princeton 1962) are highly conclusive: 62% are never interested in political questions, 26% are sometimes, 52% are not interested in political campaigns, 66% never disc
Inhibition on such a considerable scale is not, however, the clearest index of a general climate of political apathy. Much more revealing is this same attitude among the young. In the British election of 1964, out of 3 million new voters, one million had not bothered to register, so a third of the young British citizens had not taken a single step towards the voting urns. The percentages of electoral participation are on the whole either becoming stabilized or decreasing. This occurs in spite of
Political apathy is not solely manifested in suffrage abstentions. There are other symptoms, perhaps less measurable, but still considerably illuminating.
The first is the decrease in party memberships. As trade unions and recreational and technical associations grow, so parties become weaker. There are fewer militants and more indifferent fellow-travelers. Consequently, the more or less uninterested neutral masses, on whose electoral swing the outcome of an election depends, are growing.
The second symptom is the low level of enthusiasm. Following the fanatical demands made by the totalitarian parties between the wars, the western masses have become increasingly serene. Political rhetoric has suffered a profound mutation
electrifying harangues and mobilizations are no longer fashionable. In their place, we have press conferences and commissions of experts. The politician has abandoned his high-pitched, emphatic frenzy, to model himself on a modest and efficient member of the ma
The third symptom is the contraction of the genuinely political press. The papers with the greatest circulation are sensationalist, not doctrinaire. The evolution is a very clear one. The old prestige journals that were platforms for an ideology either indulge in popular reporting or become minority organs. The masses are not sufficiently interested in parliamentary debates, electoral promises, and ideological questions. They prefer reading matter far removed from cabinet backchat.
The fourth symptom is that people devote less and less of their increasing leisure time to political questions. Political clubs either transform themselves or cease to exist. The pub conversation has little to do nowadays with matters of government. During weekends and holidays political controversy disappears. It is becoming difficult for parents to share their political anxieties with their children. Fiscal pressure and socialization makes inexorable inroads on inheritances, but the crisis on
Electoral absenteeism, the decline of party politics and enthusiasm, the demise of the doctrinaire press, the depolitization of leisure time, the dehumanization of the state are at once the causes and the effects of the reduced interest of the citizen for party political action, and for the channeling of his ambitions into other activities. The struggle for power no longer attracts the attention of the average man, as it did half a century ago. But, at the same time, this political apathy consti
The spatial and temporal scope of the phenomenon has given rise to a controversy which, although more axiological than empirical, is nevertheless of great interest. The question is whether political apathy indicates a good or a bad social order. Those who judge such apathy negatively do so from liberal precepts: an electoral result that contains a strong margin of abstentionism is a caricature of the general will, and the resulting government is a sham. Inhibition substantially falsifies the tel
Important objections can be made to such thinking. The exercise of the vote is not a duty, but a right that can be renounced. To abstain is just another way of manifesting an opinion. The compulsion to vote has raised the number of voters, but it has not changed genuine attitudes about the state. Coercion deforms the results because it causes hurried, alienated, and fortuitous reactions
compulsion is antiliberal and humiliating. Man cannot interest himself in the whole spectrum that surrounds h
One of the phenomena that has lately attracted the attention of politicians, pedagogues and sociologists is the so called youth revolt. Could this evidence be a sign of ideologization and a warning of ideological reactivation in the future? The issue seems to deny the panorama of growing political apathy that has been described. This is a complex matter that cannot be easily understood in a political sense unless it is previously defined at an abstract level.
First, the revolt has not involved youth in general, but just students. In other words, its protagonists are students, particularly those in higher grades. It cannot therefore be characterized as a generational conflict, given the absence of young peasants and workers from the conflict, and not out of lack of information and opportunity, as the case of France has shown.
Secondly, the student element converts the phenomenon into a socially restricted one, as the higher strata of learning represent, even in the most developed countries, a small proportion of the population. Moreover, within the centers of learning themselves, the protestors are in their turn a fraction, of varying importance according to the particular case, but always a minority. It is not therefore a class movement, but one of a group, or more exactly an elite.
Thirdly, the student revolt has some outside support which consists of certain more or less reputable academics and certain political leaders. This is why, according to the time and place, some student demonstrations appear to be part of an ideology or a party. An example of the first is the passing connection of the protest movement with the doctrines of H. Marcuse, or the so-called "new left", with organizations such as Maoism. And with this we arrive at the substantial part, the content of th
Fourthly, a comparative analysis of the events shows a great diversity of objectives. In Portugal it appears that what was demanded was a regime of inorganic democracy. But this cannot be the inspiration behind the Italian students, since theirs is the standard demoliberal state. The French demonstrations were said to have been caused by the desire for University autonomy, but this cannot apply to the Swedish students, since they were already administering their institutions. In England and the
Fifthly, there is more than just a variety of admitted derivations and objectives. There are manifest contradictions, which appear when comparing student rebellions in different countries and universities. At the center of many of the rebellions we find the inescapable paradox caused by the simultaneous allegiance to liberalism and socialism. It has been frequent in Spain and in other countries for the same students to demand absolute political liberty, parties, parliamentary life, private initi
Sixthly, beneath the profuse pluralism and even notorious incoherence of the positive demands, there is a coincidence in the negative objectives. The general protest cannot be reduced to a "yes", but it can be to a "no". The repudiation of authority, be it on a personal or institutional level, is a universal factor in the revolt. The contemporaneous social structures are all rejected. This general threat of liquidation respects neither religious beliefs, moral norms, political institutions, aest
This analysis of the phenomenon coincides with two of its most widespread slogans, which are self-defining: "It is forbidden to forbid" and "all progress immobilizes." The question is whether there is a revival of old tendencies such as anarchism, revolutionarism and skepticism. All three are certainly present, but I believe that the concept that most closely explains the significance of the student revolt is nihilism.
Every idea has its history. It was Ivan Turgenev who, in Fathers and Sons (1860) described for the first time as a nihilist a type of young man who had begun to appear in Russian society. It concerned a University student whose doctrinal sources included Rousseau, Hegel, Buchner and Feuerbach. Let us quickly examine the leading thinkers of nihilism. Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) wrote in After the Tempest (1850): "long life to chaos and destruction! . . . on passing from the old to the new world
The present student revolt is not simple neoromanticism. It takes from the romantics the protest, the audacity, the rationalism, the impetus, and theatricality. But it lacks the affirmative unity achieved by this movement in ascetics and politics. Instead, there are numerous points of contact between the University rebellion and Russian nihilism. Their protagonists are a student minority of a bourgeois background that are out of touch with the power structure and the masses. The lack of solidari
IV: The Convergence of Ideologies
Socialism Veers Right
Liberalism Veers Left
Cosmopolitanism
Another clear manifestation of the crisis of ideologies is the symptom of their convergence. When two opposing ideas approach each other, with or without synthesis, they are on the path to extinction. This phenomenon must not be confused with temporal coalitions that exist in order to obtain a greater parliamentary majority, and involves only an occasional and tactical concession, not an irreversible doctrinal evolution. The individual parties within the coalition retain their programs, and when
The word "socialism" appeared abandoned among the pages of an obscure Parisian revue on a winter's day in 1831, and from this modest birth it mounted the Olympus of utopists. By mid-century the ponderous mind of a German Jew attempted to give the newly born tendency a level of scientific knowledge and world conception. Soon there came the executors, the associations, the parties, which in spite of their structural crises and programmatic hesitations, assumed with anger and without pause the defe
There are three elements in Socialism: a social idea, a theoretical foundation, and certain administrative techniques. Philanthropic precursors were followed by systematic doctrinaires, in turn succeeded by political experts. Fourier represented the utopian phase, Marx the scientific one, and Stalin the third, that of power. But these different ingredients, even when examined in isolation, remain difficult to grasp because the objectives, the ideological foundations and the implementations of so
Pursuing this analysis, we find that, by the second half of the 20th century, the socialist ideals of social justice have been incorporated into the programs of all the great countries, and that Marxism, convicted before humanity of great crimes, has been doctrinally overcome. The definitive condemnation was made by Keynes, the founder of a new economic theory, when he declared The Capital to be "an antiquated economic manual which, in addition to being scientifically in error, lacks interest an
In this largely unfavorable climate, characterized by the almost universal malaise of socialism, the British labor party, the most active doctrinally, reelaborated its program in 1958 in two substantial and carefully thought out pamphlets. The more general one was The Future Labor Offers You. Perhaps only to be consequential with itself on the fundamental question of nationalization, it proposed the return to state hands of the steel and road transport industries. On this point, it announced rat
The last word on the labor party came from Harold Wilson in his book, Purpose on Politics (1964). Far from rectifying Crosland's line, he pursues it to its ultimate conclusions, emphasizing the deideologization of the party. The most recurring word is realism, and all is based on the fundamental assumption that, in politics as much as in science and technology, amateurs must be disposed of, and it must be recognized that on all levels a prepared and professional mind is required. The methods are
The British experience has its counterpart in the program that was approved by the German socialist party, the SPD, at its congress of Bad-Godesberg towards the end of 1959. The project was the work of Ollenhauer, of the economist Deist and of the two most eminent theoreticians of the party, Eichler and Kautsky. It was no improvised novelty
it was a profound revision of the draft project that had been submitted to the congress of Stuttgart in 1958. Published in a 23 page pamphlet, the program c
Such a turnabout in the sociological composition of the party has its inevitable doctrinal parallel. The SPD has not only repudiated absolutely and for the first time the venerable name of Marx, but has also confessed itself to be "tied to the Christian ethic in traditional humanism and philosophy." It proclaims liberty to be the supreme social value and desires dialogue with other parties on an equal basis. The essential points of classical socialism, dialectical materialism, atheism, authorita
In western democracies, it is undeniable that socialism is increasingly less of an antithesis and more of a spare part in the party game, an element of relief in the process of government exhaustion. Notwithstanding this, Communism subsists as the purest and most extreme form of Marxism. The homogenization of western politics does not seem to have expanded worldwide. One then wonders whether the convergence of ideologies is just a local phenomenon? Between the two blocks separated by the Iron Cu
The international détente is in great part the result of an evolution of communism. The growing economic development of the soviet people is turning the Marxist ideology into something that increasingly resembles an official religion. Russian agriculture no longer responds to extreme collectivism. Instead of egalitarianism, new classes have been created, perhaps with more justification and less separated among themselves than the tsarist, but present and extensive nonetheless. And among all, the
The fascinating myth of liberty has presided over the greater part of western political life since the end of an uneasy 18th century. Consciences thrilled to the Jacobin impetus. It was a kind of general delirium, a great popular passion. At few times in history have men been so extensively and so intensely moved by a utopia: individual and collective self-determination, that is, each man free and master of himself, and government for the people by the people. It was the response to the estates
The two ideological pivots of demoliberalism have for a quarter of a century been moving towards areas that are less propitious for the free coexistence of the citizens and for the preponderance of the popular will. There is a slow but palpable approximation to authoritarianism and socialization. The myths are effectively changing
from liberty to security and from representation to fiscalization. The demoliberal ideology, in moving left, is drawing close to its classical rival. At a hypothetica
Liberty is, to be sure, a desirable good. It admits no limits on the essential level. But on the plane of actual existence, all human behavior finds itself flanked by "duty" and "power". Namely, by moral imperatives and historical possibilities. But this is not a static situation. In our time judicial norms and the conditions of life effectively reduce the possibilities of selfdetermination. The liberal principle of individual sovereignty, as it gives way to the demands of reality, becomes incre
Analyzing the phenomenon factually one starts with man's two types of activity. The first is leisure, which is diverting, and the second is work, which is necessary. For millennia, work and self-defense have occupied the immense majority of man's waking hours. The inflexion point is contemporary. General security has overcome the anguish of personal safety. The diminution of the active working day has increased the amount of free time. It is not that we are moving towards a paradise or towards a
The empirical analysis of leisure meanwhile produces unexpected results. That the average North American works 37 hours a week does not mean that the remaining 131 hours may be devoted to some sort of hobby. Out of those hours must come his normal rest time, and an additional period of relaxation to ease the nervous tension caused by the immense effort and responsibility that the technical age demands. Further consumers of leisure time are the domestic and household tasks, which grow as the serv
A judicial situation corresponds to this state of affairs. The modern state forced the rationalization of tolerance which implies the mobilization, organization, and specialization of all human resources. It is a kind of general bureaucratization that can ultimately take the form of a military discipline. This interventionism corresponds to a disappearance of the liberal professions, which gain in stable security what they lose in independence. The result is that the citizen becomes a gear in a
What distinguishes an advanced society from a primitive one is that the first has many more prohibitions and regulations. The present sphere of individual sovereignty is fixed by what others are not able to do, rather than by what one is actually able to do oneself. Liberty is negatively expressed. The situation is reflected in any judicial situation, but particularly in those involving possessions. 19th century liberalism still understood property in the roman manner, as the right to use and ab
The profound evolution of liberalism is most apparent in economic matters. The physiocratic dogma of laissez-faire and the belief in an invisible hand and natural laws that automatically regulate and balance the market are gone forever. Since 1926, when Keynes published The end of Laissez-faire, pure economic liberalism has remained theoretically untenable. Its most obvious deficiencies include the imbalance between savings and investment, the unequal distribution of income, monopolies and redun
But it is not only because of factual and juridical-political causes that the exercise of concrete liberty is becoming difficult
the very myth of liberty is on the wane. The mass is more interested in security, and attempts to suppress such romantic notions as risk and adventure. The goal is to know when to stop. It is virtually economic and judicial determinism. There is an inverse relation between being safe and being free. The castle wall eliminates danger, but it also limits one's horizons.
A similar process occurs over representation. The demoliberal format has the appearance of an equation. Each citizen has an equal vote, the majority decides, the representative organ of a popular will is a chamber elected by inorganic universal suffrage, and this chamber maintains confidence in or withdraws it from the cabinet. In this way the ideal that people should govern themselves was hopefully to be maintained. But in fact, as Rousseau recognized, the general will is irrepresentable. Today
The demoliberal program of representation appears to be a fiction. But neither does a straight line exist in nature, notwithstanding which, Euclid's geometry has been largely instrumental for the technical progress of humanity. The worst of it is that the program, either has to be falsified, or causes instability. The strengthening and continuity of the state is indispensable to guarantee the collective security to which we all aspire. This does not mean that representation is to disappear and t
In conclusion liberalism is declining. Its two foundational stones are crumbling, in part because they are unrealizable, but also because they are not practical. In the recorded scale of existing values, security and control are more important than liberty and representation. This readjustment brings liberalism closer to socialism.
We have attempted to show that neoliberalism and neosocialism are converging, and that ideologies are becoming less utopian and less virulent.
Cosmopolitanism, once a minority attitude, gains new adepts every day. The unifying continental movements have become so important that they cannot be ignored in today's international politics, nor when planning future policies. The world is regrouping, not just in relatively circumstantial blocks, but also in higher units. Americanism and Europeism have begun to form new institutions, though of different caliber in each case. Nationalism is declining in the West, and the increasingly rare appea
It is a historical fact that cosmopolitanism has philosophic origins. It was one of the defining characteristics of the oriental and the Hellenistic wisdoms. It occurs in the oldest speculative tradition, that of Yu in the 3rd. millennium before Christ. He declared, as later echoed by Confucius and his school, "All men that live within the four seas are brothers." (Lun-Yu, IX,13). The Greek stoics, the heirs of Asian wisdom, liked to call themselves citizens of the world. Zeno of Citium consider
Nationalisms always define themselves by means of a reciprocal contrast. Their history is always comparative and based on oppositional relationships: separatism, imperialism, annexation, autonomy, etc. If nationalities sustain themselves by confronting others, their field of action clearly lies in foreign politics. And diplomacy has been primarily the maieutic of nationalities. Nationalism is a sentimental and polemical affirmation that can be made without any recourse for technical complexities
From the sociological point of view, cosmopolitanism is an integrating movement that reconciles the interests of a fraction with those of all. It is the substitution of patriotism by the sentiment of universal solidarity, and a sense of belonging to the human race. The common national goods -bonum civitates-, as they become part of universal goods -bonum orbis-, lose their original irreducibility and pugnacity, and end up becoming compatible with each other through a series of concessions and cu
V. The Rationalization of Politics
The Horizon of the Ends
Protopolitics and Politics
The Mechanism of the Means
The Expert
The Ideologue
From Power to Authority
From Enthusiasm to Consensus
The Three Stages
There is no lack of books on the content and method of politics. The disagreement among the political professionals, both in theory and practice over the object of their study, is even greater than that among philosophers. This is not the place to sum up the polemic. We only refer to it in as far as it is necessary to show the process of rationalization that all sciences, but in particular the social sciences, are undergoing. We have to distinguish between three basic meanings: politics as the p
The first meaning is the oldest
nearly all the classical writers conceived politics as an inventory of norms, duties, rules, and ultimate ends. The actual problems were not totally ignored but the principal object was to determine what ought to be. The source of all political precepts was natural law, and the study was conjectural and deductive. A better absolute, a political optimum was sought. The cardinal point of reference was justice. Such a treatment of the problem caused it to be absorbe
The framework of an ideal state -a monarchy, an aristocracy, a republic- is usually formed by the enumeration of the fundamental rights, of legislative criteria, and of desirable conditions for collective life. In this case it is not solely a question of proclaiming the ends but also of proposing the means to achieve them. However, on this point there is a further essential difference between utopian and sociological thought. When Plato postulates a philosopher king, or when Marx preaches the di
It is certainly possible to draw conclusions about existing political circles on the basis of the efficiency of their actions. But it is not possible to do this when dealing with the hypothetical products created by thinkers. These may be evaluated on the level of essence according to the precepts of logic and of ethics
but as far as their existence is concerned, they are neutral. To compare monarchy and aristocracy in the abstract is like comparing a saw with a scythe. The extent of the effici
There is rather more realism in the treaties on constitutional law, from the lost one that Aristotle wrote on Hellade to the most exhaustive of the present day, as they describe political forms that have already been promulgated. But in this case too one remains in the normative sphere, since political constitutions do not describe the state, but deal with the way in which the legislators would like it to be. There naturally tends to be a great gulf between the real and the legal state
specific
Whatever the pragmatic limitations of social ethics, political conjecture, and its variant, constitutional law, the three disciplines have reached a degree of rationalization, specialization and esoterism that precludes a generalized approach to them. Political development today, even when politics is taken to be a branch of morality, is moving away from ideological formulae.
The actual approach to sovereignty is not a strictly political matter
it is prepolitical, or protopolitical, a primitive approach. We owe to the first major theorist, Machiavelli, a series of precepts, in part intuitive, in part the result of experience, on gaining and maintaining power over the principality. He ignored morality in order to concentrate on the technical aspects. Machiavelli's work lacks system and is even contradictory
it is elementary, disjoined and scarcely useful. Its greate
Once the first hurdle of protopolitics has been crossed, once power has been obtained, the situation is very different. Limiting the analysis to the modern state, one can observe the disjointed but irreversible quantitative and qualitative growth of public activity. For centuries legislation was nothing more than a commentary and an elaboration of Roman law, education was the concern of the universities and the religious institutions, public works were few and far between, political economy amou
More than 80% of the activity of the modern state concerns the economy: the promotion and execution of economic matters, as well as their ordering and accounting. Economics is a highly elaborate science. It is the study of markets. The creation of wealth is the application of pure science. Just as the doctor substituted the monarch's will in everything that concerned his health, so today the jurists, sociologists, economists, and engineers replace the prince in the majority of the actual governm
If protopolitics represents the zero level of public life, the point at which one begins to govern, the pure politician is something akin to a sociologist's universal. He is present by analogy in all the communitarian order, and in fact this is something very simple. In practice a state needs only two pure politicians: One at the head of the administration and the other exercising control over it. The two should be the visible heads of the government and of the opposition. Obviously, a larger gr
It is an open question whether human behavior, something as concrete and free as man's activities, can be the object of scientific research. The philosophy of history has attempted to give an answer to this problem, which is as old as it is important. Unfortunately, the results have been rather disjointed, and above all, out of proportion, since the field that must be covered includes such vast sets as peoples and civilizations. The scientific treatment of human behavior started with sociology a
Anthropology, like sociology and psychology, is at its beginnings. These are uncertain sciences, as much because of their novelty, as due to the time required to synthesize and to generally cope with the torrent of facts that their experiments disclose. The youngest member in this family of positive sciences is political science, which I consider to be the branch of sociology that concerns the structure of suprafamiliar authority. Its object is neither to streamline ideals, nor to promulgate nor
There is an embryo of positive political science and a hopeful field of development. It is rather surprising that there can still be polemics today on the disadvantages of the multi-party system and the necessity of representing minorities, when the laws set down by Duverger have reduced the problem to an option. Statesmen as much as the masses ignore the fact that, alongside traditional engineering, there is also social engineering, that is, a rational understanding of the relationships of auth
Every constitutional form and every change in a community's structure corresponds to a type of governor. The demo-liberal state, consolidated scarcely a century ago, produced a type of politician that was distinct from preceding ones. He was quite different from the medieval lord, the renaissance chancellor, the baroque court favorite, and the 18th century enlightened man. The public figure of the demoliberal state was a rhetorical ideologue, for words prevailed over action, and form over conten
But the situation has now changed. Science and action have replaced the spoken word in politics. Politics in no longer a saying
it is a doing, doing something more. That more can be constitutional law, or social security or economics. The point is that it is a rigorous discipline. Moreover, the people have ceased to be a passive, receptive audience
words are accepted only for a period, after which they must be acted upon. Speeches, programs, declarations of principle, even evident good intenti
Another type of politician -the expert- corresponds to the rationalization of the social sciences and the transformation of the popular mentality and popular demands. His intellectual baggage is science instead of ideology. He depends on actions, not words. His appearance is neither ostentatious nor theatrical but efficient and modest. He is neither an amateur nor an improviser, and represents reason rather than desires. He attains power not through street smartness, but through the sum of his a
Does this herald a period of depolitization, as the opponents of the rationalization process argue? No
it involves a process of deideologization, and a saturation of politics with a more rational content. Moreover, at the highest levels, each expert is part of the government, and, as such, is co-responsible for the nation's direction. Although centered on a specific sector, this particular vision of the common good must be wide and consensual. Specialization in particular areas is compatible wi
The man who cultivates "ideological though" is not an authentic intellectual. He is simply interested in political power. The unions of such men form pressure groups, not philosophical schools. This can be shown both deductively and experimentally. On the first count an ideology is a popularized political philosophy, and is therefore very far from constituting scientific thought. The greatest fault for what Spengler called the homo theoreticus is to be ideological, which must be avoided as the d
Historical experience ratifies this analysis. There are those, Tiberius and Cesar Borgia are the most notorious, who sought naked power and sovereignty without any pretense at justification. There are also citizens who, without seeking it, and almost despite of themselves, are promoted to the leadership of the state by grace and virtue of society's mechanisms. This shows that there has been an abundance of rulers who did not come from an ideological background, while history does not recall any
Do ideologies decline because there is less desire for political power? No, but the twilight of ideologies allows people with a vocation for government to do without them, and to choose other more suitable and contemporary means to conquer power. For over a century the way into politics consisted generally in swearing loyalty to some vague slogans and to the party that represented them. There then started a career that, passing through the various levels of mayor, deputy and undersecretary, fina
The remainder of the 20th century bodes ill for the surviving recalcitrant ideologues. All retain hopes of office, but few will achieve it. The ideologues will become bitter and resentful. The most unsettling issue for them is the obvious observation that their presumed theories can be reduced to nothing more than a rampant, avid will for power. On the end, the ideological puppet show will be over, and the tragi-comic person will remain on the stage - a man who has always hidden his desire to go
Ambition is the motor of progress and there is no cause to censure its licit manifestations, although to me an ambition to rule has always appeared crude and lacking in compensation. What at this stage appears difficult to accept is the pretension to rule without being an expert in any of the knowledges that are required to govern the state. Every genuine intellectual must really convey this, already over-repeated message: an ideologue is not a thinker: he is a candidate for a council post, for
The distinction between power and authority can first be found in a disputed passage of Augustus' Res Gestae. It never really crystalized completely in either private or public roman law. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between political power (potestas) and the capacity for acting or potency (potentia). He concluded that "power is a potency with a certain preeminence and authority. Already in this all important text there appears a dangerous confusion between potestas and auctoritas, which unfortu
The distinction is not just nominal, nor one of terminology. It is essential in its practical consequences. There is no need to base it on norms, as it streams from facts. The distinction can be empirically and phenomenologically based. Political power is held by the man in a situation enabling him to force his will on the individuals of a group. It is accordingly the capacity to order about a free being. Instead, "authority" is the possession to an eminent degree of a recognized virtue. Unlike
By its origin, political power is something that is granted outside of itself, while authority is internal and autonomous. No one is naturally powerful
one is powerful only by accident. Dialectically it is a non sequitur to claim that sovereignty is received, since it is born of consensus. It is not gained by one alone but is the result of the delegation of the people. Factually things occur in an analogous manner
one is on the throne thanks to the support and loyalty of others, even in the ca
By its operational mode, political power is coercive, and even the most democratic requires violence. Its object is human freedom, and its intention is to subjugate it, at least partially and temporarily. The exercise of command has spilled so much blood over the world, that against it, the cruelest activities appear comparatively tame. The old history of sovereignty is inexorably violent
the curial chair and the praetorian guard are as inseparable as the axes and staves borne by the lectors. O
By its natural inclination power tends to perpetuate and strengthen itself. As Montesquieu said, power will expand until it is stopped. If it does not encounter any obstacle, it will constantly advance. Its own internal mechanisms lead it to be ever more profound, more absolute, and more comprehensive. It tends to free itself from all external precepts, and to constitute itself as its own ultimate raison d'être. Princeps a legibus solutus and L'Etat c'est moi are the classic maximalist formulae.
By its end, although ethics teaches us that political power must work for justice and the common good, sociology shows that it does not automatically realize that ideal. Left to itself and decoupled from external constraints, power becomes egotistical and ultimately immoral. That is why Lord Acton declared that all power corrupted, and absolute power corrupted absolutely. It is a will to dominate implacably and without limits, and, if necessary, it will uproot, sacrifice, humiliate and destroy.
In reference to its passive subject, power is not rational. He who obeys it, even if he is free to do so, is primarily moved by fear. Even he who exercises it, for all his justifications, feels he has power because he has it, and that is that. He expresses himself in decisions, not in reasonings. Power becomes part of the will. Rationality is an accidental aspect, a forced addition in the actual exercise of power. Authority however exists where it is objectively recognized. "X has said it," no o
In relation to its temporal nature, power is fleeting and volatile. It is won or lost for some motive, but rarely for a real reason. The loss of power is in part a burlesque, in part a dramatic situation, that few men can completely overcome. Authority instead tends to last for a lifetime, and once gained, is not threatened in the way power is. Rather the opposite is true, and circumstances conspire to perpetuate it. If authority is lost, it is always the result of an error or of biological deca
Perhaps because political power intends possession of the other man, the mass leader has come to be thought of as the hero par excellence, in spite of the fact that he has been morally classified time and again as rapacious, unjust, and cruel. It is an almost universal conviction that power ennobles, and that the highest calling is to govern. The great champion of irrationalism, which is always the philosophy of tyranny, Freidrich Nietzche, maintained that the will for power, Wille zur Macht, wa
From its delegated origin, its coercive character, its absolutist tendency, its natural egoism, and its concomitant irrationalism, power is much less noble than the creative, peaceful, liberal, altruistic, and rationalized concept of authority. That is why the truly superior spirits, the philosopher, the scientist, the technologist, the mystic, and the poet always prefer the path of authority to that of power. And when they fall to the temptation, like Plato and Seneca, they withdraw contrite an
As ideologies become extinguished and politics becomes rationalized, so power becomes saturated with authority, and the coercing, absolutist, amoral and arbitrary factors scarcely come into operation. The prevailing factors are determined by authority, that is, merit, spontaneity, self-determination, common good and reason. This then is the way in which politics are progressing in our time
from ideologies to ideas, from liberty to security, from election to control, and from power to authority.
The Greek origin of the word enthusiasm means ectasis or divine transport, something close to deification or apotheosis. In mode and usage, it has come to mean an exaltation or fervent adhesion which multiplies psychic energies, brings tension to the spirit, and creates the situation for so many great gestures. But, for all its Olympian and heroic genealogy, philosophers have never been devoted to enthusiasm. Plato termed it, "a state of being outside oneself", "a deviation like an illness or li
In the individual, enthusiasm is a vehement adhesion to something which he takes to be best. It is a positive, hopeful, and apologetic movement. It is excitement and the heightening of emotion. We find our vision restricted, and all effort concentrated: it is as if we are in the middle of a race, the pupils of the eyes fixed on the finishing line and blind to all else. The woman is more enthusiastic than the man, the adolescent more than the adult, and the primitive man more that his civilized c
Impetus, a basic vital quality on which one's biological and psychic level depends, is something very different, that may apply equally to a faustian or a blessed biography. Enthusiasm deserves a poor speculative grade, and is a weakness that disqualifies intellectually. Its worth in the individual is accordingly slight.
The enthusiastic condition of the masses has always been a capital political factor. An enthusiastic people becomes more aggressive and, on occasions, more efficient
it is easier to govern because it is immune to polemical objections. It is so docile that it can be led anywhere, even to suicide. It is as if drunk, unconcerned with daily worries. Such people do not need to be kept informed: only stimulated. Enthusiastic people are not sustained by realities but by simple words. An enthusiastic m
It is questionable whether the manipulation of enthusiasms, for all its efficiency, is desirable. Three points must be borne in mind. Firstly, an enthusiastic people is an easy prey to tyranny
enthusiasm is the technique of the totalitarian government. The reason for this is obvious: It allows for personal command, the predominance of activism, the substitution of information by propaganda and of reason by illusion, the curtailment of dialogue, the perpetuation of the states of emergency, absol
In the second place, while enthusiasm can be a part of a conservative totalitarianism, it is more usually the instrument of revolutionary movements, for a revolution is a break with the past, a rupture of continuity, an attempt to perpetuate instability, to seek utopias, to simplify problems, and to impose violence and morality. All this is more easily achieved through passion, in an atmosphere of enthusiasm.
In the third place, collective enthusiasm is more likely where socioeconomic development is slow. The obstacles to mass enthusiasm are institutions, the raising of the cultural level, the rationalization of the political conscience, the technification of the administration, the consolidation of the state structure, public order, and constitutional stability. Moreover, modern means of communication have created something that was difficult to believe possible in a mass society: a bilateral, almos
It is a serious matter for those who prefer liberty to dictatorship, and evolution to subversion, that the politics of enthusiasm are so bound up with totalitarianism and revolution. The objection is all the stronger and is also independent from any ideological position when such politics are shown to be anachronistic and retrogressive. As a group emerges from underdevelopment, enthusiasm declines. A government that relies on oratory influences the socially deprived, and has therefore an interes
The old phenomenon of the decline of an individual's enthusiasm corresponds to a similar decline on the level of societies as a whole. The 19th century European states were effusive and declaratory. The totalitarian regimes of this century took this rhetoric to its ultimate limits, and it still survives in Eastern Europe. But it is rapidly disappearing in the West.
The substitute for collective enthusiasm in a developed society is a tacit adhesion to consensus. This is not simply logical consent to a given thesis
it implies confidence and support. Consensus is relatively silent and far from being exhibitionist. Consensus is rational rather than passionate because it springs from intelligence and will, not from sentiment. Consensus is more stable than enthusiasm because it feeds on sober judgments and intimate decisions. It has no need for hot air. Consens
On the ethical plane consensus embraces traditional customs and ultimately moral norm and judicial procedures. The idea of consensus appeared with that of "what ought to be." But this, though important, is not the extent of it, for consensus is the root of all science. The first principles and basic postulates gained their strength from what the romans termed the "consentium gentium."
The institutions that are founded on enthusiasm tend to be extremist and transitory. Those built upon consensus are more likely to be moderate, to maintain equilibrium, and to possess continuity. Societies are enthusiastic in inverse proportion to their level of development
consensus however is the choice of an enlightened and mature community. While enthusiasm belongs to ideologies, consensus is part of truth and virtue. What is the best in the history of humanity has been the work of the cons
The great historical law of positivism, freed from its pseudo-theological trammels, is confirmed in political knowledge and forms. There is a first level which is charismatic, and in which government is based on oracles and imagination. Its most ancient theoretic expression was fetishism, and its most modern ones are the divine right of kings and the commands of providence. There is a second ideological level in which myths are secularized by popularized political philosophies. Governments act b
Although slowly, positive methods are beginning to throw light on man's behavior, something that was formerly thought to be indeterminate and inexplicable. Categories and types are elaborated, and constant relationships and functions are discovered and measured. Political science is now placing new data at a statesman's disposal. The patient manipulation and observation of events in history is beginning to bear fruit. One wonders what the reaction of Vives would have been on being informed that
Ideologies can never form the criteria for wholesome government. Comparing them to the science of politics is like comparing an ordinary lens to an electron microscope. The crudeness and lack of precision of ideologies make them altogether inadequate to cope with the governmental decisions of today. What can liberalism or socialism say about the proper location of a development area, or the fixing of custom tariffs, or the oil prospecting, other than confused vagaries? Ideologies have had to mak
VI. The Interiorization of Beliefs
The Ideological-Religious Connection
The Religious Content of Ideologies
The Parallel
The Subjectivation of Culture
The West is undergoing a process whereby beliefs are becoming more intimate. It is difficult to think in terms of a return to the wars of religion. The exterior manifestations of religion are diminishing, and the separation between church and state is growing. The distances between the internal conscience and the external conduct are widening, secular institutions are appearing, there is an increasing respect for the liberty of conscience, and an increasing capacity to live with men of other cre
All the major existing religions have an inherent ethical code and therefore a series of precepts concerning mutual tolerance. As these precepts become popularized, they can take on the aspect of a new ideology, or associate themselves directly with an existing one, or they can serve as a pretext for a lay ideology to obtain ecclesiastical approval. That is why there are parties that boast religious approval and pretend to be the political arm of a religious conviction. Obviously as religion wit
But the fact that certain ideological convictions are able to base themselves on religion leads to a highly suggestive and significant series of questions. What is the interdependence existing between the ideological and the religious phenomena? Are the ideologies that claim sacred origins genuine religions? Does the twilight of ideologies imply a similar process where beliefs are concerned?
A religion is a human manner of establishing a relationship with divinity. It does not really matter whether this relationship is based on knowledge, sentiment, a sense of dependency or one of bondage. Whatever it might be, a Religion always implies an idea of God or of theology, but not necessarily one of ethics, an idea of what ought to be done. The law of Moses came after Abraham's worship, and there is an infinity of Primitive rituals that do not adopt moral positions. A religion paves the w
Essentially Christian morality does not pretend to be anything other than a system of precepts that are imperative for the human being. An ideology that appeals to moral theology does not therefore assume a religious mantle but an ethical one instead, one that can be -and in the event always has been- assumed by widely separate sectors throughout history. An ideology that flaunts its Catholicism to differentiate itself from others can have two motives: a) it might insist on those points that amo
Are ideologies that claim sacred origins witnesses to religiosity? The spokesmen for such ideologies are the political parties that more or less closely follow a specific creed. But these parties are not by their nature associations formed for spiritual perfectioning and are not and cannot be judged as one would a monastic order by the sanctity of their members. In fact, the religious example given by the party leaders and militants is far from being satisfactory, but this cannot be raised as a
Does the twilight of ideologies imply a decline in beliefs? Is there a quantitative correlation between what is ideological and what is religious? We are here concerned with a hurried updating of the old pseudo-dilemma of reason and faith, that is, of the supposed anti-religiosity of the rationalist movements. The somewhat irrational characteristics of an ideology and of a religion and the manner in which both influence human behavior are the indices of such a possible connection. But both exper
The direct observation of individual examples is corroborated when history is generalized to a certain level of abstraction. The great religions were born in roundabout and profound ways, under conditions of almost family intimacy. A faith then matures in an esoteric, hermit-like and unworldly manner. These features are the complete antithesis of the populism, the pragmatism and vulgarization, archetypical features of the ideologic. A religious movement, because it seeks to completely bind itsel
For all their partial irrationalities, religions and ideologies do not develop in a parallel fashion. The rationalist process destroys ideologies because these have a deceptive and frustrated pretension to reason. Beliefs however are not incompatible with pure speculation and have even given rise to philosophy. They are not in any danger because of this, since in the nooks and crannies of dogma there are always irrational nuclei which are inexplicable by the logos. There is not a necessary quant
In conclusion ideologies are the parasites of religion, not their resultants. The ideological institutions that adhere to a religious creed do not represent it with any degree of purity, nor could they do so. An ideology is rather a ballast where the divine is concerned. There is therefore no cause to value negatively the interiorization of beliefs and its repercussion on the crisis of ideologies.
The interiorization of beliefs, like any other trend, however peculiar, does not arise in isolation, but within a context. This environment is the subjectivation of culture. By widening our field of observation, we gain in perspective without losing contact with our principal theme, the disappearance of ideologies. Our theme will reappear from different premises.
Up to the beginning of the 20th century western scholarship divided humanity into cultured and uncultured peoples. The most notable antecedents of this basic dichotomy can be found in the Hebrew notion of the chosen people, and the later distinction between Greeks and barbarians. This second dualism was basic to the classical world and, far from disappearing, took renewed forms as modern man made contact with the East, the New World, and Africa. A vestige of this belief is found in the still ver
This presently antiquated absolutist notion of culture did not exclude, but in fact implied the notion of progress. Culture was not conceived as whole and completed, like a platonic idea, but as something that man was progressively creating. It was a movement of asymptotic approximation, hence situated within time. The fact that baroque culture was less advanced than that of the enlightenment historifies and qualifies the concept, but does not relativize it. In the drastic formulation of Eugenio
This conception began to be undermined from several flanks, and most directly by sociology and anthropology. Culture came to be defined as the sum total of the modes of life of a particular society. Given this meaning, the savage had as much culture as the civilized man. And not because the culture of the former is a preliminary stage to that of the latter. Rather, because, even supposing it to be irreducible, imperfectible and immutable, the most primitive is a culture in itself. Sociologist at
For non-westerners, pluri-culturalism overcomes an inferiority complex and vindicates a group. For the westerner there is more than a mere enrichment of his knowledge of the world beyond. He experiences a partial relativization of his conception of the world. On all sides there is a process of breaking down barriers, from religion to fashion passing through art. It can no longer be claimed that the white man's tie is more civilized than a native dress or that a romantic "Lied" is superior to a B
Does this cultural relativism lead into pure and simple skepticism? I don't think so. The mutual tolerance of different cultures allows an element of choice and even of arbitrariness over habits, beliefs, and modes of life. Within this element of choice there is not, in a certain sense, any truth. Much that had aspired to be objective and that many had struggled to have recognized as such, becomes subjective. Tolerance does not extend to all that is attainable and knowledgeable
while certain po
Pluriculture is not free of negative implications. One of them is its role as a spur to nationalism. But once the interchangeable and optional character of local traditions and cultural idiosyncrasies is realized, then the process of cosmopolitan convergence is underway. Moreover, it is tendentiously reactionary to massively promote little known or nearly extinct languages, as in the case of Hebrew. The multiplicity of languages is, socially speaking, a hindrance. One would hope that in the futu
Alongside this concurrent relativization and absolutism, there exists in the polity a corresponding double phenomenon. It consists of the twilight of ideologies, and so of similarly arbitrary positions, as well as of the primacy of the empirical and efficient element in the governmental programs. Pluriculture infuses irony into much of our conception of the world, while at the same time making the rigorous more radical. In the same way, the process of deideologization reveals the inconsistent fa
VII. Economic Development
Humanization and Industrialization
Retarding Factors
The famous controversy over technology, which has occupied the cream of the European intellectuals for over half a century, has always appeared Byzantine to me. Reason is what is noblest on earth, science is the very product of reason, and technology is applied science. It is a very clear progression. Obviously, technological breakthroughs such as the splitting of the atom can be used evilly, but this is true of everything in man's experience, from truth to beauty, from liberty to intellect, fro
Technology is as old as Adam, but only in the last century did it progress sufficiently to be able to transform the life of the masses. That moment has now come: two thirds of the increase of the national income is due to technology as opposed to natural resources. Technology both liberates man from servile work and supplies him with goods and services that were formerly reserved to only the most privileged minorities. The quality of western man's life is constantly being raised, and the possibi
Already in the old Primum vivere deinde philosophari there is a vague anticipation of the precise data on the evolution of consumption that modern analysis has revealed. There is a priority of essential needs and consequently a hierarchy of goods is built up. The starving man does not spend his resources buying a book any more than the naked purchases a jewel. The primary necessities are satisfied first, and the superior ones later. Those sectors of humanity to whom food, clothing, housing and s
Aside from permitting the satisfaction of needs, technology has analogous repercussions on production. Around 1860 the value of the national income in France was as follows: agriculture 58%, industry 21%, and services, teaching etc. 21%. A century later the respective distribution was 14%, 4l% and 45%. The products of the so-called tertiary sector, services, teaching, hygiene, liberal professions and so on, which were formerly a fifth of the total, amount now to nearly half. A second example fur
Economic development dignifies man and turns, among innumerable other secondary effects, the attentions of the masses towards productive work, and so separates them from political battles. Simultaneously it raises the number of property owners, increasing social responsibility and stability. Both the proletarian and the aristocrat become bourgeois
classes are drawn together as do their interests, so that different groups establish solidarity among each other, political programs resemble each ot
Technology and economic development, the most evident characteristics of our time and the determinants of our future environment, are factors of egalitarianism and rationalism. There is an inverse relation between ideology and development. That is why politics is more ideological in Albania than in Belgium, or more so in Britain than in the United States. The most fruitful ground for ideologies today lie with the emergent African nations, that are intellectually, politically, and economically ba
The disappearance of ideologies, initiated in the West but not yet apparent in other areas, is a slow process because it is linked to the fundamental transformation of the social structures. Tradition and the inertia that it causes is the first great retarding factor. For the past one and a half centuries politics have been built up around ideological juxtapositions. It is therefore almost a mental habit to think of the polity in terms of socialism or liberalism. The mark of certain ideologies i
It is not only habits and traditions that act as brakes, as retarding factors. Institutions also play an important role because ideologies claim their support as much as that of the average man. There are parties that are purely instrumental or personalist, hence having practically no ideological content. They are normally transitory but can be permanent, as is the case of the Democrat and Republican parties in the United States. However, many of the major modern political parties are ideologica
The third major factor lies with the politicians who continue 19th century uses. Right at the start of the democratic state, the ideologues gained ruling positions
as the masses became something more tangible and concrete, there came a flowering of local political bosses and demagogues. But the first of these were ephemeral figures, and the second became part and parcel of their own slogans. That is why, in spite of changes, the professional politician has for a century and a half been confused
But among the several retarding factors, perhaps the most important and widespread is man's instinct for play. In contrast to work, which is fatiguing and a means to an end, play is an agreeable activity, indulged in for its inherent pleasure, rather than for any particular result. Play is deemed such, not so much because of the nature of the activity, but because of the manner and the state of mind in which it is undertaken. In this way politics, while in itself a serious matter, has had for th
The inertia caused by habit and tradition, the ideological parties, the rhetorical political leaders and the playful conception of politics are the four major factors that retard the rationalization process of the polity. Nowadays they act as brakes on the latter's advance but, in the end, they will give way. At present the great dialectical barrier of reaction consists in the farcical denunciation of the supposed "dangers of dehumanization and technocracy." But this is pure sophistry
it is ide
VIII. Conclusion
A New Ideal
Assessment
The twilight of ideologies implies neither the disappearance of all ideals nor political apathy. A logical and factual analysis according to definitions as well as events will illustrate this.
Conceptually, doubts and ambiguities are possibly the result of the etymological similarity of the words ideologies and ideals, both having their roots in the Greek eidos. But these two words have different meanings. Ideologies are modern products, conditioned by historical circumstances. In contrast, ideals, for example justice, have always existed
they are pure and optimal goals that do not depend on historical circumstances, and are held by the wise man and the simple man alike. Ideologies c
Historically the ambiguity has more of a basis, for since the 19th century ideologies have usually functioned as collective ideals, and have at times been the rational for national undertakings. One wonders whether, as ideologies become extinguished, contemporary nations will lose their raison d'être and impulse.
There are numerous motives behind the behavior of a group or an individual, but this is not true of nations. A statesman's imagination is considerably less fertile than one is led to believe. Virtually all the ideals that have moved the ancient, the medieval and the modern state fall into one of three categories: independence, imperialism, or faith. The first two, although dignified by ethical or aesthetic elaborations, are usually in substance based on material and selfish interests: autocracy
The flagrant decadence of ideologies takes place when the wars of religion were over, and coincides with the universal condemnation of imperialism, and the consummation of nearly all the independence struggles. Will this virtual liquidation of traditional objectives lead to social apathy and ultimately to the stagnation of communal life? The ideals of the past are certainly declining, but this does not mean the extinction of a conscience of a concrete common good capable of generating a forcefu
Development is not a new ideology as doubtlessly the remaining ideologues will claim in a final desperate sophism. It is, like justice, an ideal that has always been present in humanity, but which has never before been so collectively desired, nor so possible in the short term. As such, it does not have a program in the manner of an ideology, for it is neither a utopia nor a myth. It is a planned project that cannot degenerate into rhetorical verbosity, for it has to be rigorously applied and ba
The idea of development that obsesses nations today appears to be particularly emphatic over "useful" values and this economic bias has led some to isolate two dangers: spiritual atrophy, and materialism. I believe this attitude is the result of a fragmentary and superficial understanding of the reality, and rests on the reactionary hypothesis that the intellect is a dehumanizing factor, and that science conflicts with life. This is simply not so. "Prehistoric man has been transformed into the i
As far as religiosity is concerned, experience shows that civilized man is no further from God than primitive man, and that the genuine religious phenomenon is immune to rationalism. Little could be said for believers, if, in order to retain their faith, they had to return to prehistory and ignorance. The presumed incompatibility between philosophy and revelation is a trap into which many have fallen. The greatest dialectical triumph of atheism has been to infuse in certain religious spirits a f
Authentic development is much more than simply altering circumstances and modifying our environment in order to make it more comfortable and pleasing. It consists also in internal perfectioning of man, in the maturation of the supreme faculties of logic, ethics and aesthetics. Development, while accelerating the processes of invention, production, and the distribution of goods, creates in men a desire to pursue the logos. Development is not only the consolidation of physical progress
it is the
Societies that are freed from ideologies do not lack an ideal. The contrary is true
the imprecise, utopian, contradictory and scarcely yielding ideologies are replaced by rigorous, viable, coherent, and efficient projects. Development is an ideal that corresponds to an ideocracy or to a "logoarchy." Development, the triumph over passions, is the spur that will urge humanity on to new heights of refinement and well-being. Development is not another name for materialism. It is the humanism of rea
Ideologies, like customs, are born, develop, decline, and die. The symptoms of their decline are patently clear in the most developed nations of the West. Let us finally and briefly refer back to them.
First. Electoral abstentionism, the decline of party politics, the disappearance of the doctrinaire press, the depolitization of leisure time and the dehumanization of the state are at the same time both cause and effect of the reduced interest of the citizens on political matters. Power does not rivet the attention of the average man as it did once
he is concerned with other things. Political apathy is an important witness to the process of deideologization.
Second. When two opposing ideologies tend to merge, both are on the way to dissolution. Today socialism has renounced the class struggle and the total nationalization of the means of production, and accepts commercial competition and democratic procedures. For its part, liberalism has abandoned its individualist dogmas and has substituted the principle of representation by that of administrative control, taking for its own the concepts of economic planning and the social function of property. Co
Third. Social ethics is a discipline that has attained the highest levels of theoretic perfection. The government of people has become a complex matter, whose overriding concern is economic promotion
it is no longer a question of providing simply for law and order. But because the material advance of a society depends above all on the progress of the pure and applied sciences, the administration becomes a center of highly specialized scientific research. New ground is being broken in the formul
Fourth. Religions are becoming purer, less pragmatic, less political. They are losing their temporal interests. The separation between what is intimate and what is public, between the administrative and the confessional is growing. Liberty of conscience is uppermost, and beliefs are becoming interiorized. While there is a new interest in the divine, ideologies can no longer tie themselves to a religion or a lay creed, and so lose their securest mooring posts. Religions themselves, in the midst o
Fifth. Our time is marked by economic development that, far from dehumanizing society, dignifies individuals, intellectualizes them, increases the sense of solidarity and responsibility
the utilitarian interest of the masses is enveloped in productive work, and classes and interests are brought together. As a result, ideologies lose their most important raisons d'être and exert influence only in the most underdeveloped areas. In spite retarding factors such as reluctance to change, the continue
Ideologies are declining, and where historical evolution has been greater, they are now no more than a shadow. The most profound and defining tendencies of the age are opposed to them. It is not a question of the classical ideologies needing renovation. The point is that every ideology is inherently an imperfect logical instrument, a concept of terrible simplicity that is completely inadequate to resolve the arduous and specialized political questions of our age, and particularly those that are
Political realities are very complex, and it is often difficult to find one's way. But the situation is not that different from the realities of physics or biology, and yet no one turns to alchemy or sorcery for enlightenment. We are at the juncture of a more human and rational understanding of politics, and government is altogether something too serious to be left to the ideologues. The best way of accelerating the process is not to meet the adversary in his own territory, in other words, not t
Books by Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora
Paradoja, (Paradox
novel) Madrid, 1944, 178 pages.
Laina, (novel) 1944, nonvenal, Madrid, 1994, 76 pages.
Ortega y el 98 (Ortega and the generation of 1898), ed. Rialp, Madrid, 1961, 266 pages.
Ortega y el 98 (Ortega and the generation of 1898), 2nd ed. extended, Rialp, 1963, 298 pages.
Ortega y el 98 (Ortega and the generation of 1898), 3d ed. Newly extended, Rialp, Madrid, 1979, 256 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1963. From Azorín to Zubiri, Rialp, Madrid, 1964, 286 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), Rialp, Madrid, 1965, 172 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 2º edition, extended, Zig-Zag, Santiago de Chile, 1968, 190 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 3ª ed., extended, Zig-Zag, Santiago de Chile, 1968, 192 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 4ª ed., further extended, Andina, Buenos Aires, 1970, 144 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 5ª ed., further extended, Salvat, Barcelona, 1971, 180 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 6ª ed., extended, Edicol, Bogotá, 1974, 190 pages.
Crepuscle de les ideologies (The twilight of ideology), Catalan translation by R. Bech, Dopesa, Barcelona, 1972, 168 pages.
To Lycophos ton Ideologion (The twilight of ideology), Greek translation by K. Tsiropoulos, ed. Philon, Atenas, 1973, 164 pages.
O Crepúsculo das Ideologias (The twilight of ideology), Portuguese translation by H. Barrilaro, Ulissea, Lisboa, 1973, 206 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideologías (The twilight of ideology), 7ª ed. revised, Espasa Calpe, 1986, 224 pages.
El crepúsculo de las ideología (The twilight of ideology. Critical edition, notes and preliminary study by Carlos Goñi. Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2003, 203 pages.
Il crepusculo delle ideologie (The twilight of ideology), Italian translation, Nuove Idee, 2005, Roma, 205 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1964. From Unamuno to D´Ors, Rialp, Madrid, 1965, 304 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1965. From Ortega to Nicol, Rialp, Madrid, 1966, 344 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1966. From Marañón to López Ibor, Rialp, Madrid, 1967, 462 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1967. From Castro to Millán Puelles, Rialp, Madrid, 1968, 408 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1968. From Amor Ruibal to Zaragüeta, Rialp, Madrid, 1969, 452 pages.
Pensamiento español, (Spanish thought) 1969. From Sanz del Río to Morente, Rialp, Madrid, 1971, 380 pages.
Del Estado ideal al Estado de razón (from Utopia to government by reason), Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Madrid, 1972, 130 pages.
La partitocracia (Partitocracy), Gabriela Mistral, Santiago de Chile, 1976, 180 pages.
La partitocracia (Partitocracy), 2nd edition extended, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1977, 308 pages.
El Estado de obras (Government of works), Doncel, Madrid, 1976, 416 pages.
La Constitución contemporánea (the contemporary constitution), in collaboration with J.M. Bordaberry et al., ed. Universitaria, Santiago de Chile, 1980, 284 pages.
La envidia igualitaria (Egalitarian envy), Planeta, Barcelona, 1984, 256 pages.
Egalitarian envy, extended, English translation by A. T. de Nicolás, Paragon, New York, 1987, 208 pages.
Der gleichmacherische Neid (Egalitarian envy), Extended, German translation by P. Matthes, Matthes & Seitz, Munich, 1987, 274 pages.
La envidia igualitaria (Egalitarian envy), prologue by Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, Áltera, Madrid, 2011, 270 pages.
Los teóricos izquierdistas de la democracia orgánica (The left wing theorists of organic democracy), Plaza & Janés, Barcelona, 1985, 216 pages.
Los errores del cambio (The blunders of our political change), Plaza & Janés, Barcelona, 1986, 256 pages.
Los errores del cambio (The blunders of our political change), 2nd to 6th Plaza & Janés, Barcelona, 1987, 256 pages.
Filósofos españoles del siglo XX (20th century Spanish philosophers), Planeta, Barcelona, 1987, 216 pages.
Río arriba. Memorias (Upstream, memoirs), Planeta, Barcelona, 1995, 360 pages.
Río arriba. Memorias (Upstream, memoirs), 2nd ed. revised, Planeta, Barcelona, IV-1995, 360 pages.
Río arriba. Memorias (Upstream, memoirs), 3d ed. newly revised, Planeta, Barcelona, V-1995, 360 pages.
El hombre en desazón (Man in distress), Nobel, Oviedo, 1997, 377 pages.
El buho de Minerva. Pliegos razonalistas (Minerva's owl. Considerations on reasonalism). unpublished
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