The Emotional Brain and the Guilty Mind

1. The Rationalist Soul of Culpability: An Analysis of the Guilty Mind
I. Introduction
II. The 'Broad' Nature of Culpability
III. Autonomy and Rationality: Framing the Model of the 'Person' in Criminal Law
IV. The Voluntarist Architecture of Culpability: Choice, Capacity, and Fair Opportunity
V. Voluntarism and Legal Doctrine
A. Mental Capacity and Excuses: Legal Insanity
B. Fair Opportunity and Excuses: Duress
VI. Voluntarism, Emotions, and Socio-Environmental Factors
A. A Mechanistic Conception of Emotions
i. Emotions and the Law of Homicide
ii. Emotional Incapacity and Legal Insanity
B. The Irrelevance of the Social Environment
VII. Emotions and Socio-environmental Factors in Sentencing
VIII. Conclusion
2. From the Guilty Mind to the Punished Person: Criminal Culpability through the 'Evolution' of Punishment
I. Introduction
II. Rational Individualism and the Enlightenment
III. Between Libertarian and Scientific Individualism
IV. The Rise and Fall of Treatmentist Rehabilitation: From Penal Modernism to the Model Penal Code
V. Voluntarism and the Resurgence of Retribution
VI. Backlashes
A. Harsh Punitiveness
B. Social Exclusion and Stigmatisation
VII. Conclusion
3. Critiques of the Model of the 'Person' in Culpability and Punishment
I. Introduction
II. A Th in Account of Human Agency
A. A Flawed Conception of Emotions
B. The (Political) Exclusion of the Social Context
III. A Static View of the Culpable Person
IV. Dehumanisation
V. Conclusion
4. Emotions, the Social Environment, and the Brain
I. Introduction
II. The Emotional Brain
A. Definition(s) of Emotions
B. Modern Theories of Emotions: The Emotion/Cognition Ambiguous Divide
C. From Emotion Generation to Emotion Regulation: Insights from Neuroscience
D. Emotion and Decision-making
III. Emotions, Empathy, and Moral Behaviour
A. Social/Moral Emotions
B. Empathy
C. The Neuromoral Network
D. Emotions, Morality, and Self-regulation
IV. From the Emotional Brain to the Social Brain: How the Social Environment Becomes Embedded and Informs
Social Behaviour
V. Emotional Plasticity, Social Connections, and Positive Behavioural Change
VI. The Pain of Social Exclusion
VII. Conclusion
5. Holistic and Situated Culpability
I. Introduction
II. Autonomy and Rationality as Multidimensional Concepts: Reframing the 'Person' in Criminal Law
III. Holistic and Situated Culpability: Revising the Architecture of the Current Paradigm
A. Normative Competence
B. Situational Control
C. Situational Control and the Role of Context: Situating the Fair Opportunity to do Otherwise
IV. Implications for Legal Doctrine
A. Legal Insanity
i. Moral Capacity Test
ii. Control Capacity Test
B. Diminished Opportunity, Diminished Culpability: A Re-interpretation of Stephen Morse's Proposed
'Generic Partial Excuse' Doctrine
V. Holistic and Situated Culpability, and the Personal Guilt Principle
VI. Conclusion
6. Social Rehabilitation
I. Introduction
II. Dynamic Personhood
III. Social Rehabilitation: Theory, Pillars, and Normative Value
A. Definition and Distinguishing Features
B. Social Rehabilitation, Dynamic Personhood, and Crime Desistance
C. Social Rehabilitation, Human Dignity, and the (Neuro)Science of Change
D. Social Rehabilitation and Other Justifications for Punishment
i. Retribution
ii. Incapacitation
iii. Special Deterrence
E. Social Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice
IV. Practical Corollaries
A. Humanising Sentencing
B. Banning Mandatory Life Sentences
C. Transforming Incarceration
D. Abolishing (or Profoundly Reforming) Solitary Confinement
V. Conclusion