Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Prologue.- Section 1 Agency Theory and Risk Sharing.- Agent and Principal.- Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information.- Risk Sharing and Subcontracting.- Section 2 Information and Incentives.- Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems.- Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts.- Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods.- Incentives to Forecast Honestly.- Section 3 Capital Markets and Moral Hazard.- Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues.- The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem.- On Stakeholders' Unanimity.- Section 4 Financial Contracting and Dividends.- Signalling and Market Behavior.- Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information.- Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis.- Section 5 External Accounting and Auditing.- The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting.- Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation.- Auditing in an Agency Setting.- Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information.- Section 6 Coordination in Groups.- Managers as Principals and Agents.- Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations.- Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach.- Section 7 Property Rights and Fairness.- Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm.- Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making.- A Note on Fair Equality of Rules.- Section 8 Agency Costs.- Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets.- Agency Costs are not a "Flop"!.- About Contributors.- Author Index.