Africa and IMF Conditionality
The Unevenness of Compliance, 1983-2000
1. Auflage
Erschienen am 13. September 2013
144 Seiten
978-1-135-52596-5 (ISBN)
Beschreibung
Ghana was one of the first African countries to adopt a comprehensive IMF reform program and the one that has sustained adjustment longest. Yet, questions of Ghana's compliance - to what extent did it comply, how did it manage compliance, what patterns of non-compliance existed, and why? - have not been systematically investigated and remain poorly understood.
This book argues that understanding the domestic political environment is crucial in explaining why compliance, or the lack thereof, occurs. Akonor maintains that compliance with IMF conditionality in Ghana has had high political costs and thus, non-compliance occurred once the political survival of a regime was at stake.
This book argues that understanding the domestic political environment is crucial in explaining why compliance, or the lack thereof, occurs. Akonor maintains that compliance with IMF conditionality in Ghana has had high political costs and thus, non-compliance occurred once the political survival of a regime was at stake.
Weitere Details
Reihe
Sprache
Englisch
Verlagsort
London
Großbritannien
Verlagsgruppe
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Dateigröße
1,94 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-135-52596-5 (9781135525965)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Weitere Ausgaben
Person
Kwame Akonor is Associate Professor of Political Science at Seton Hall University. He is also founding director of the New York-based African Development Institute, a non-governmental "think-tank" devoted to critical analyses of--and solutions to--the problems of development in Africa.
Inhalt
1. Introduction and Justification for Research 2. Ghana's Evolving Political Economy and the Conundrum of IMF Compliance: 1957-1983 3. The Political Logic of IMF Compliance and its Initial Distributional Impact on Social Groups 4. Compliance with IMF Conditionality and the Politics of Power: 1983-2000 5. Conclusion: Lessons on Compliance and Conditionality
