The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default

Name: The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default
Brand: Princeton University Press
Price: 51.49 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

Mark Aguiar Manuel Amador(Autor*in)

Princeton University Press

1. Auflage

Erschienen am 21. Dezember 2021

200 Seiten

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978-0-691-18924-6 (ISBN)

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Inhalt

Cover
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
1.2 Empirical Landscape
1.3 Goals
2. Limited Commitment
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Environment
2.3 First-Best Risk Sharing
2.4 Limited Commitment
2.5 Constrained Efficient Allocations
2.5.1 The Case of ßR=1
2.5.2 An Impatient Sovereign
2.6 The Bulow-Rogoff Critique
2.7 Conclusion
3. Growth under Limited Commitment
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Environment
3.3 Full Commitment Allocation
3.4 Limited Commitment
3.5 Growth with Political Economy Frictions
3.6 Conclusion
4. IncompleteMarkets
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Environment
4.3 CompleteMarkets Benchmark
4.4 IncompleteMarkets: A Planning Problem
4.5 IncompleteMarkets: Decentralization
4.6 Conclusion
5. The Standard One-Period Bond Model
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Environment
5.2.1 Timing
5.2.2 Equilibrium Objects
5.3 Characterizing Equilibria
5.4 Two Operators
5.4.1 The Price Operator
5.4.2 A Pseudo-Planning Problem
5.5 Quantitative Results
5.6 Conclusion
6. Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Environment
6.2.1 Eaton-Gersovitz Timing
6.2.2 Cole-Kehoe Timing
6.3 Self-Fulfilling Rollover Crises
6.4 Debt Issuance
6.5 The Security of Long-Term Bonds
6.6 Extensions: Sudden Stops and Over-Borrowing
6.6.1 Sudden Stops
6.6.2 Over-Borrowing and Prolonged Crises
6.7 Domestic Currency Bonds and Rollover Risk
6.8 Policy Responses and Debt Design
6.9 Conclusion
7. Long-Term Bonds
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Environment
7.2.1 The Government's Problem
7.2.2 Lenders' Break-Even Condition
7.2.3 Equilibrium with Long-Term Bonds
7.3 Characterizing Competitive Equilibria
7.3.1 The Safe Zone
7.3.2 The Crisis Zone
7.4 Inefficiency and Long-Term Bonds
7.5 Maturity Choice, Debt Buybacks, and Restructuring
7.5.1 AModified Planning Problem
7.5.2 Maturity Choice
7.5.3 Buybacks vs. Restructuring: The Role of Holdouts
7.5.4 The Yield Curve and the Elasticity of the Bond Price
7.6 Example Equilibria
7.6.1 A Closed-Form Solution: The Case of Perpetuities
7.6.2 An Example with IntermediateMaturity
7.7 The Pareto Frontier and the Debt Laffer Curve
7.8 Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution
7.8.1 Environment
7.8.2 Efficient Allocations with Relative Impatience
7.8.3 Competitive Equilibria Revisited
7.9 Quantitative Models
7.10 Conclusion
8. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

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