This collection of new papers surveys the major themes in the study of information, including mechanisms for implementing desired social allocations. The volume is a review of current debates and state of the subject and is intended as a reference for graduate students of economic theory, particularly of general equilibrium. The contributors relate their own work to that of Leo Hurwicz, whose contributions established the field of information and allocation rules. They are as follows: J.O. Ledyard, X. Calsamiglia, T.A. Marschak, J.S. Jordan, K.R. Mount, K.J. Arrow, J.J. Laffont, E. Maskin, J.C. Rochet, A. Mas-Colell, R.B. Wilson, M. Aoki, J. Green, A. Postlethwaite, D. Schmeidler, J. Roberts, W. Thomson. This volume should prove to be a useful reference in many graduate courses on economic theory, and could be the required text in an advanced course on theoretical microeconomics and general equilibrium. It should also be useful for economists and information scientists.
Auflage
Sprache
Verlagsort
Verlagsgruppe
Zielgruppe
Für höhere Schule und Studium
Für Beruf und Forschung
Editions-Typ
Illustrationen
Maße
Höhe: 230 mm
Breite: 150 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-631-13798-6 (9780631137986)
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Schweitzer Klassifikation
Part 1 Introduction: decentralization and incentives, Roy Radner; incentive compatibility since 1972, Theodore Groves and John Ledyard. Part 2 Informational Comparisons: informational requirements of parametric resource allocation processes, Xavier Calsamiglia; price versus direct revelation - informational judgments for finite mechanisms, Thomas Marschak. Part 3 Information and stability: the informational requirements of local stability in decentralized allocation mechanisms, James S. Jordan; on the existence of a locally stable dynamic process with a statically minimal message space, Kenneth R. Mount and Stanley Reiter. Part 4 Market mechanisms: technical information, returns to scale, and the existence of competitive equilibrium, Kenneth J. Arrow; optimal nonlinear pricing with two-dimensional characteristics, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric Maskin, and Jean-Charles Rochet; on the Second Welfare Theorem for anonymous net trades in exchange economies with many agents, Andreu Mas-Colell; double auctions, Robert Wilson. Part 5 Nonmarket and general mechanisms: incentive-compatible approximation of a Nashlike solution under nonconvex technology, Masahiko Aoki; limited communication and incentive-compatibility, Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; differential information and strategic behavior in economic environments - a general equilibrium approach, Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler; incentives, information and iterative planning, John Roberts; the vulnerability to manipulative behavior of resource-allocation mechanisms designed to select equitable and efficient outcomes, William Thomson.
