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Cowboys and Computers: Communicating National Animal Identification in the Beef Industry

David Wright

1.1 Industries Collide

In May of 2005, I began working with a small software firm that develops software that would allow data ownership and transfer on a granular level. The idea was that rather than transferring entire documents or entire records, small pieces of information could be shared on the basis of permissions and commerce. To the firm, it seemed like a fine idea and a practical one. As I learned more, I discovered that the software was being specifically developed in response to a push by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for a National Animal Identification System (NAIS) capable of tracking cattle moving through the supply chain. In theory, new technology and new methods of doing business would speed commerce and, more importantly, allow for swift containment of any disease outbreaks that might threaten consumers.

Upon being assigned to the project, my first thought was that this seemed like a significant advancement for the industry. As the technical communicator on staff, my first task was to establish relationships with potential customers and begin to gather information on what tools they would like to see included in a software product. Imagine my surprise, then, when one of my first cattle auction contacts told me that he did not understand the NAIS and did not need to.

In his opinion, the NAIS was nothing more than an elaborate plot orchestrated by the Internal Revenue Service to spy on cattle producers throughout the country.

This individual was successful, widely respected, and by no means alone in his opinion of the NAIS as a waste of time and money. His ideas about the true motives for the NAIS were perplexing, to say the least.

Although the original NAIS plan was scrapped in 2010, that was not the end of the story. In April 2013, the USDA launched a new program designed to be much less restrictive and transparent to members of the beef industry; it would rely much less on the use of computer technology in particular. Whether the new plan will enjoy more widespread acceptance remains to be seen, but the USDA's retreat from the earlier initiative shows us that diffusing technology into an industry like the beef industry is not simply a matter of producing that technology but an exercise in communicating new technology to members of that industry.

The story of the original NAIS plan's ultimate failure within the beef industry is also a warning to other industries and agriculture in general, in that it illustrates potential difficulties when it comes to implementing widespread technologies. For technical communicators, this means that we should be asking ourselves very pointed questions now:

• What do we need to know about this situation (and similar future situations) in order to predict successful communications in the future?
• How can we best study industries and their technology?
• How can technology diffusion be successfully enhanced through research and targeted communications for specific audiences?
• When conflicts between industries do arise, what is the best way to ensure successful communication?

The story of the NAIS and the beef industry offers a preview of situations to come in which entire industries are resistant to new information technologies. Unfortunately, investigating the communicative failures that take place within supply chains is complex. Communications are not limited by form. They come in paper and digital forms, over cell phones, through policy statements from governmental agencies, and from industry alliances that wield great power over industry opinion. Finally, they come through the elusive art of personal communication. Stakeholders in some traditional industries are often not available in chat rooms or on our e-mail servers or through any of the other high-tech means of communication that have segregated us from each other.

This, however, does not mean that they do not communicate. These industries have established, complex communication networks that often play vital roles in technological diffusion. Technical communication must, therefore, develop methods that take into account the various forms of communication that are now available while maintaining an ethnographic perspective and methodology that investigates industries at ground level. We need holistic approaches to understanding intricate problems. This chapter is one attempt to do so and to provide insight for the future. It also offers a set of tools for research that may give future technological deployments more success. Perhaps these insights will be useful to future practitioners and academics alike because of their direct link to the new technologies that show no signs of slowing down and continue to affect our lives at an increasing pace.

1.1.1 Resistance to Technology in the Beef Industry

The beef industry is steeped in tradition. It is an industry that does not change rapidly and does not readily adapt to change without good reason. Moreover, sometimes this industry has been unwilling to adapt to new technologies even when there would seem to be very good reason for it. Some sections of agriculture (and I will focus just on the beef industry in this chapter) have been slower to adopt new ideas and information technology. There are many factors that go into the lack of technological diffusion seen in the beef industry, not least of which is the fact that industry leaders see no need for new information technologies.

Yet, there have been substantial advances in other facets of the beef industry during recent years. For example, veterinary medicine has made remarkable advances in the treatment and prevention of many diseases and common animal sicknesses. Nasal sprays, injections, and other treatments enjoy widespread use to prevent animal deaths during transport and growth. Likewise, new techniques that include product branding, prepackaging, and efforts to make beef products healthier have radically changed supply chain management and distribution.

Yet, in one technological aspect, the beef industry has been at a standstill. I speak of computer and software technology in general and the slow pace at which the beef industry as a whole has adopted new methods of doing electronic business, even in the face of potentially disastrous consequences. While the beef industry seems perfectly willing to accept some types of innovations, computer technology and animal identification have been shunned, at least by many segments of the beef supply chain.

1.1.2 Having a Cow Over Mad Cow Disease

Still, the resistance to technology would be more understandable if the matters at hand were those of general office automation designed to make daily tasks easier. But beginning in December 2003, when the first case of "mad cow disease" or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalitis) was discovered in the United States, technology became a much more serious concern for the beef industry. In fact, the market for US beef changed so much that beef exports fell from more than US $3 billion in 2003 to barely US $500 million in 2004 [1]. The scare over the outbreak of mad cow disease led numerous countries to close their borders to US beef, and the fears hurt domestic sales as well.

The debate over using technology in the beef industry began in earnest at that time. Consumers were concerned about BSE because of the deadly effects of infected beef on humans. Adding fuel to the fire was a recent episode of BSE contamination, located in Alabama; USDA and state officials investigated five auctions and 36 different farms with DNA testing equipment in an unsuccessful effort to locate the source of contamination [1]. Worldwide, more than 150 deaths had been linked to infected beef from numerous sources, and there may have been many other misdiagnosed cases in underdeveloped countries. Cattle producers were also concerned. Similar incidents including outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have led to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of cattle, sheep, and pigs in numerous countries (most notably the United Kingdom in 2001) because of inability to trace the disease to its source or contain the outbreak [2].

After the 2003 BSE outbreak, Japan cut off shipments of US beef, as did many other countries including Canada and South Korea. The Japanese market was significant, as was the Canadian market. Japan alone bought US $1.3 billion worth of US beef in 2002, but then promptly cut off imports after the outbreak. Likewise, South Korea, which imported US $815 million worth of US beef, cut imports to zero. Although in 2006 both countries resumed imports after thorough inspections of US processing plants, they were still very wary of US ability to control and trace disease, and consumer/government confidence in those countries has yet to return to normal as of 2014. Thailand, China, South Korea, and Singapore, all significant importers as well, still had bans on US beef as of 2006 [3]. While South Korea and Japan have relaxed their stance on US beef since then, China (a major market) still bans US beef. The other countries still place restrictions on those imports [4].

In the wake of the scandal, the USDA and beef industry professionals began to seek answers to both national and international concerns. But industry resistance to a mandatory plan, coupled with a disagreement among industry associations, alliances, and businesses, crippled the proposed program and brought it to a standstill.

In addition to natural...