The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics
An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance
1st Edition
Published on 21. July 2023
190 pages
978-1-000-91428-3 (ISBN)
Description
This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.
In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.
The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.
In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.
The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.
Reviews / Votes
"Richard Swinburne is famous for arguing from the conceivability of my disembodiment to my having an immaterial part. Weir's argument is not open to the criticisms levelled against Swinburne's, and the engine driving the argument is entirely different and entirely original. I was very impressed."Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University
"If you thought substance dualism was confined to history, then think again. Ralph Weir has developed one of the most compelling arguments for mental substance in contemporary philosophy. Essential reading for anybody working on the problem of consciousness."
Philip Goff, Durham University
"Weir shows that recent philosophy of mind is hampered by an unreflective abhorrence for the idea of the soul - an attitude which is at odds with serious reflection on the mind-body problem. A vastly important book for anyone serious about understanding human nature."
Benedikt Paul Goecke, Ruhr University Bochum
"Weir hasn't only contributed to the recent philosophy of mind. Moreover, he has given a profound insight into the question of the meaning of life. Hence, the real importance of this book, not only for philosophers, but also for every contemplating individual."
Marija Selak Raspudic, University of Zagreb
"An extremely important defence of substance dualism. Weir aims his critique at the growing trend toward property dualism. He rigorously works through the analytical literature to show that property dualism, while headed in the right direction, embarrassingly has no advantage over substance dualism."
Joshua Farris, Author of The Creation of Self and An Introduction to Theological Anthropology
"Weir has produced a compelling challenge to the current dogma that property dualism should be preferred to substance dualism. His book is one that no party to the contemporary mind-body debate can afford to ignore."
Alex Moran, Philosophical Quarterly
"Ralph Weir's book is without a doubt an outstanding and very important contribution to the metaphysics of mind."
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
More details
Series
Edition
1. Auflage
Language
English
Place of publication
London
United Kingdom
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Target group
College/higher education
Illustrations
1 Tables, black and white; 2 Line drawings, black and white; 2 Illustrations, black and white
ISBN-13
978-1-000-91428-3 (9781000914283)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Ralph Stefan Weir
The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics
An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance
Book
11/2024
1st Edition
Routledge
€62.90
Shipment within 10-20 days
Ralph Stefan Weir
The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics
An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance
Book
07/2023
1st Edition
Routledge
€206.00
Shipment within 10-20 days
Person
Ralph Stefan Weir is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln and Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford. His recent publications include "Bring Back Substances!" (Review of Metaphysics, 2021), "Can a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness Avoid Substance Dualism?" (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021), and "Does Idealism Solve the Problem of Consciousness?" (Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism, 2021).
Content
Introduction 1. Why Does Everyone Hate the Soul? 2. The Decline of Substance Dualism and the Substance-Property Distinction 3. A Defence of the Independence Definition of Substance 4. Four Theories of Mind and the Place of Russellian Monism 5. The Strangeness of Property Dualism 6. Parity of Reasoning Demands Nonphysical Substances 7. The Consequences of the Parity Argument for Non-Physical Substances Conclusion
