
All the Power in the World
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Content
- Intro
- Contents
- 1. THE MYSTERY OF THE PHYSICAL
- 1. A Brief Exposition of the Scientiphical Metaphysic
- 2. Three Kinds of Basic Property and the Denial of Qualities
- 3. The Denial of Qualities, Particles in Space and Spaces in a Plenum
- 4. When Limited by the Denial, How to Conceive a Particle's Propensities?
- 5. Can Particles Rotate, but Not Plenumate Bubbles?
- 6. Simple Attempts at Clear Conception May Highlight Our Mystery
- 7. Rejecting the Denial, but Postponing a Resolution of Our Mystery
- 2. A HUMANLY REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY
- 1. I Am a Real Thinking Being and You Are Another
- 2. We Are Differentially Responsive Individuals
- 3. Against Descartes, We Are Intermittently Conscious Individuals
- 4. Our Realistic Response to Descartes Raises a Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
- 5. Against Hume's Restriction, Human Understanding Transcends Human Experience
- 6. We Are Experientially Varying Individuals
- 7. We Are Not Bundles of Experiences, Thoughts or Perceptions
- 8. We Substantial Individuals Are More Basic Than Our Thoughts and Experiences
- 9. As We Communicate with Each Other, We Are Reciprocal Interaction Partners
- 10. There Is Perplexity Concerning How We Commonly Communicate
- 11. Much of the World Interacts with Us, But Doesn't Communicate with Us
- 12. We Often Choose What to Think About, and Even What to Communicate
- 3. DEMYSTIFYING THE PHYSICAL
- 1. We Recall the Denial of Quality and the Mystery of the Physical
- 2. Spatially Extensible Qualities and Intelligible Propensities
- 3. Spatially Extensible Qualities Are Perfectly Pervasive Properties
- 4. Intelligible Physical Reality and a Principle of Constrained Contingency
- 5. Extensible Qualities as a Factor in the Development of Physical Reality: A Problem
- 6. The Problem of Influence for Extensible Qualities in Physical Reality: A Solution
- 7. Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds and Distinct Eons of the Actual World
- 8. Mightn't the Recognized Physical Properties Just Be Spatially Extensible Qualities?
- 9. The Identity Theory of Qualities and Dispositions
- 10. A Limited Identity Theory?
- 11. Can There Be Spatially Extensible Yellow Entities That Aren't Ever Propensitied?
- 12. Can an Extensible Blue Body Be Attracted by Concreta That Aren't Blue-Attractors?
- 13. Can an Extensible Blue Body Be Perceived to Be Extensible Blue?
- 14. We Consider an Antinomy of Spatially Extensible Quality
- 15. The Ontological Parity of Qualities and Propensities: By Contrast with Hume
- 16. The Ontological Parity of Qualities and Propensities: By Contrast with Lewis
- 17. What May We Learn from Our Demystification of the Physical?
- 18. Remarks on What's Been Done and on What's to Come
- 4. A CORNUCOPIA OF QUALITY
- 1. The Qualities Most Available to Me Are My Own When Consciously Experiencing
- 2. Our Power to Experience Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Individuals
- 3. Our Power to Experience Visually Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Spatial Things
- 4. Might Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color Be Our Most Central Concept of Color?
- 5. Our Power to Experience Auditorally Can't Promote Such Full Spatial Conceiving 159
- 6. Might an Extensible Red Object Be Qualitatively Like an Experiential Red Subject?
- 7. The Great Range of Color for Spatially Extended Concreta
- 8. Contrasting Quality Families and a Sketchy Speculation
- 9. Transparently Colored Bodies and Opaquely Colored Bodies: A Neglected Distinction
- 10. Is This Neglected Distinction Philosophically Significant?
- 11. Conscious Perceiving as an Aid to Fuller Conceiving
- 12. Full Conceiving of Concreta Is both Experiential and Intellectual
- 13. Extrapolating from the Highly Experiential in Conceiving Spatial Individuals
- 14. Conceiving Concreta All Qualitied Uniformly, but Propensitied Quite Variously
- 15. Are Felt Bodily Qualities Well Suited to Conceiving Nonmental Individuals?
- 16. How Well Do We Conceive Insensate Bodies as Pervaded with Tactile Qualities?
- 17. Extensible Qualities, Experiential Qualities and Powers to Affect Experientially
- 18. Why Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color May Be Our Most Central Idea of Color
- 19. We Focus on Substantive Metaphysics, Not Natural Languages or Conceptual Relations
- 5. A PLENITUDE OF POWER
- 1. The Idea That All Propensities Concern Something as to Quality
- 2. Power-directed Powers (Propensities with Respect to Propensities)
- 3. Power-directed Powers May Distinctively Distinguish among Other Powers
- 4. Propensity, Possibility, Accident and Probability
- 5. Power-directed Powers and Probabilistic Propensities of Very Low Degree
- 6. Powers are Nonconditional, Including Powers to Acquire and Lose (Other) Powers
- 7. Standard Scientific Thinking and Generalistically-directed Propensities
- 8. Individualistically-directed Propensities
- 9. Individualistically-directed Propensities and Cartesian Dualism
- 10. Individualistic Propensities and the Intellectual Aspect of Our Conceiving
- 11. Self-directed Propensities: A Special Case of Individualistically-directed Propensities
- 12. A Human's Self-directed Propensities with Respect to Her Own Experiencing
- 13. Can There Be Any Concrete Entities That Aren't Ever Propensitied?
- 14. Scientiphicalism, Self-directed Propensity and Experiential Awareness
- 15. Temporal Monotony and Temporal Change
- 16. Propensity for Monotony and Propensity for Change
- 17. Possibility, Accident, Probability and Self-directed Propensity
- 18. Basic Concreta, Propensity for Annihilation and Propensity for Continuation
- 19. Self-directed Propensities with Respect to Propensities: The Basis of Stable Monotony
- 20. Thinking about OTHERONS: A Good Long-Term Investment for Substantial Dualists?
- 21. The Confused Idea of a World's Default Setting
- 22. Time without Change
- 23. Do Our Reciprocal Propensity Partners Present a Cosmic Miracle?
- 6. IS FREE WILL COMPATIBLE WITH SCIENTIPHICALISM?
- 1. A Few Points about Real Choice
- 2. Free Will and Determinism, Real Choice and Inevitabilism: Not an Urgent Issue
- 3. A Widely Disturbing Argument Presents a More Urgent Issue
- 4. Real Choice (Free Will) Is Incompatible with Inevitabilism (Determinism)
- 5. Is Real Choice Incompatible with the Denial of Inevitabilism?
- 6. Our Scientiphical Metaphysic and the Currently Dominant Conception of Ourselves
- 7. Simple Physical Entities and Their Basic Properties
- 8. Reciprocal Propensities, and Physical Laws
- 9. Objective Probabilities, Random Happenings and Real Choices
- 10. Can Inhering in a Field Help Us Have Real Choice?
- 11. Can an "Infinitely Deep Hierarchy" of Physical Powers Help Us Have Real Choice?
- 12. Radically Emergent Beings with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose
- 13. Physical-and-Mental Complexes with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose
- 14. The Scientiphically Supposed Causal Closure of the Physical: How Much a Side Issue?
- 15. Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Physical Conservation Laws?
- 16. Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Other Physical Principles?
- 17. Radically Self-directed Power
- 18. An Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice
- 19. The Real Reason Why an Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice
- 20. Apparent Scientiphical Incompatibilisms and Further Philosophical Explorations
- 7. WHY WE REALLY MAY BE IMMATERIAL SOULS
- 1. Recalling the Problem of the Many
- 2. A Couple of Comments on That Comparatively Uninteresting Problem
- 3. The Experiential Problem of the Many
- 4. How the Singularity of Experiencing May Favor Substantial Dualism
- 5. Many Overlapping Experiencers, but Only One of Them Now Experiencing?
- 6. Some Cases of Singular Causal Resolution
- 7. An Immaterial Experiencer's Causally Resolved Singularity Is a Relevant Singularity
- 8. These Are Metaphysical Matters, Transcending All Purely Semantic Issues
- 9. These Problems Transcend Questions of Spatial Boundary: On Complex Complexes
- 10. Problems of Propensitively Redundant Propensitive Contributors
- 11. Our Experiential Problem Doesn't Presuppose Any Suspicious Identifications
- 12. The Problem of Too Many Real Choosers
- 13. Wholly Immaterial Souls Favored over Emergentist Physical-and- Mental Complexes
- 14. A Singular Physical Manifestation of Many Choosers' Powers to Choose?
- 15. Do These Problems Favor Substantial Dualism over Its Most Salient Alternatives?
- 16. Some Less Salient Options to a Quasi-Cartesian Substantial Dualism
- 17. Aren't Immaterial Souls Really Just Eliminable Middlemen?
- 18. Wholly Immaterial Souls Are Generated Abruptly, Not Gradually
- 19. Our Own Souls and the Wholly Immaterial Souls of Nonhuman Animals
- 20. Metaphysically Material Ruminations about Extraordinarily Different Gestations
- 21. People and Nonhuman Animals Again: Might All Souls Be Equally Powerful Individuals?
- 22. Bodily Flexibility as Regards Individualistically-directed Soulful Propensity
- 23. Taking Stock and Moving On
- Appendix: Beyond Discriminative Vagueness, Safe from Nihilistic Sorites
- 8. WHY WE MAY BECOME DISEMBODIED, BUT TO NO AVAIL
- 1. Why We May Become Disembodied Souls, with the Deaths of Our Brains and Bodies
- 2. Even While You May Be an Immaterial Soul, Are You really an Existential OTHERON?
- 3. Immaterial OTHERONS Are Just as Problematic as Material OTHERONS
- 4. Metaphysical Asymmetries and Further Forms of Substantial Dualism
- 5. Some Questions about Disembodiment, and about Reincarnation
- 6. Prospects for Disembodiment
- 7. Even If We Disembodied Souls Last for Eons, What Are Our Prospects for Experiencing?
- 8. What Are Our Prospects for Reincarnation?
- 9. The Question of Disembodied Souls and the Question of an Almighty Creator
- 10. Why Our Long-Term Prospects May Be Very Bleak Prospects
- 9. THE PROBLEM OF OUR UNCONSCIOUS QUALITY
- 1. Physical Objects Aptly Qualitied, Experiencers Differently Qualitied Just as Aptly
- 2. Every Individual Is Qualitied, Including You and Me
- 3. We Reconsider the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
- 4. We Notice How Descartes Heroically Denies this Problem
- 5. A Quasi-Humean Substantial Dualist May Heroically Deny the Problem
- 6. A "Compositist" Substantial Dualist May Similarly Deny the Problem
- 7. Will Unconscious Experiential Quality Provide a Less Heroic Dualistic Answer?
- 8. How Fully May Dualists Offer a Speculative Answer to the Problem?
- 10. HOW RICH IS CONCRETE REALITY?
- 1. Sameness and Difference of Concrete Individuals
- 2. Conceiving Nonspatial Simultaneous Souls, Always Precisely Alike
- 3. Berkeleyan Idealism: Even If Just Modestly Grasped, It Might Be True
- 4. Cartesian Dualism: Even If Just Modestly Grasped, It Also Might Be True
- 5. Substantial Individuals and Our Conceptions as to Such Concrete Particulars
- 6. We Prepare an Analogy between the Properly Spatial and the Relevantly Spacelike
- 7. The Hypothesis of Spacelike Extension: An Analogical Speculation
- 8. The Deflationary Approach: An Apparent Alternative
- 9. An Hypothesized Dimension Far More Like Space Than Like Time
- 10. Our Fullest Conceptions of Spatial Bodies
- 11. An Analogical Conception of Nonspatial Souls
- 12. Our Hypothesis Allows More Fully Conceivable Substantial Dualist Views
- 13. Nondualistic Forms of This Hypothesis: Integrated and Nonintegrated Dimensions
- 14. How Might We Nonspatial Souls Precede Even Our Initial Physical Embodiment?
- 15. Do Immaterial Souls Ever Change Propensitively?
- 16. A More Complex Quasi-Emergentive Dualism: A Constitutional View of Souls
- 17. Drawbacks of This Constitutional View
- 18. Fusional Dualism
- 19. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Mental Problems of the Many
- 20. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
- 21. Recalling and Addressing the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners
- 22. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners
- 23. Does Our Hypothesized Dualism Make My Current Quality Too Inaccessible?
- 24. Two Cartesian Arguments for Some Spacelikely Substantial Dualism
- 25. Is Reality's Temporal Aspect Uniquely Distinctive?
- 26. Why Are Our Concrete Conceptions of Such Limited Variety?
- Bibliography
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- V
- W
- Z
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