The Grand Strategy that Won the Cold War
Architecture of Triumph
1st Edition
Published on 14. January 2016
1 pages
978-1-9787-5137-8 (ISBN)
Description
This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.
More details
Edition
1. Auflage
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Target group
College/higher education
Illustrations
40 b/w photos;
ISBN-13
978-1-9787-5137-8 (9781978751378)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
Douglas E. Streusand | Norman A. Bailey | Francis H. Marlo
The Grand Strategy that Won the Cold War
Architecture of Triumph
Book
07/2017
Lexington Books
€70.70
Shipment within 15-20 days
Persons
Douglas E. Streusand is professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics.
Norman A. Bailey is professor of economics and national security at the Center for National Security Studies at the University of Haifa and professor of economic statecraft at the Institute of World Politics. He served as President Reagan's special assistant for national security and international economic affairs from 1981 to 1984 and in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2006-2007.
Francis H. Marlo is associate professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Norman A. Bailey is professor of economics and national security at the Center for National Security Studies at the University of Haifa and professor of economic statecraft at the Institute of World Politics. He served as President Reagan's special assistant for national security and international economic affairs from 1981 to 1984 and in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2006-2007.
Francis H. Marlo is associate professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Content
Part I: Ronald W. Reagan and the Cold War
Chapter One: The Historiography of the End of the Cold War, Francis H. Marlo
Chapter Two: Ronald Reagan: the Spirit of Behind the Strategy, Francis H. Marlo
Chapter Three: The Cold War in Context, Norman A. Bailey
Chapter Four: On the National Security Council Staff, Richard Pipes
Part II: The Grand Strategy That Won the Cold War
Chapter Five: Defining the Strategy: NSDD 75, Norman A. Bailey
Chapter Six: Political and Ideological Warfare, John Lenczowski
Chapter Seven: Public Diplomacy and Psychological Warfare, Carnes Lord
Chapter Eight: Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan and the Collapse of Communism: An Historic Confluence, Richard V. Allen
Chapter Nine: The Economic Instruments of Power, Roger W. Robinson
Chapter Ten: Military Display: Continuity of Government and the Strategic Defense Initiative, Ronald B. Frankum
Part III: Conclusions
Chapter Eleven: Setting the Record Straight, Derek Leebaert
Chapter One: The Historiography of the End of the Cold War, Francis H. Marlo
Chapter Two: Ronald Reagan: the Spirit of Behind the Strategy, Francis H. Marlo
Chapter Three: The Cold War in Context, Norman A. Bailey
Chapter Four: On the National Security Council Staff, Richard Pipes
Part II: The Grand Strategy That Won the Cold War
Chapter Five: Defining the Strategy: NSDD 75, Norman A. Bailey
Chapter Six: Political and Ideological Warfare, John Lenczowski
Chapter Seven: Public Diplomacy and Psychological Warfare, Carnes Lord
Chapter Eight: Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan and the Collapse of Communism: An Historic Confluence, Richard V. Allen
Chapter Nine: The Economic Instruments of Power, Roger W. Robinson
Chapter Ten: Military Display: Continuity of Government and the Strategic Defense Initiative, Ronald B. Frankum
Part III: Conclusions
Chapter Eleven: Setting the Record Straight, Derek Leebaert
