A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Published on 1. November 2007
336 pages
978-0-19-152595-7 (ISBN)
Description
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will
form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?
Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
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Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a
Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Análisis Económico (Barcelona).
Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.
Content
- Cover
- A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Preface
- Contents
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Part 1 The Setting
- Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games
- 2.3 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation
- 2.4 Farsightedness
- 2.5 Two Examples
- 2.6 Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?
- Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation
- 3.1 Definitions and Notation
- 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium
- 3.3 Partition Functions
- 3.4 Extensions
- 3.5 Summary
- Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation
- Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 A Model
- 4.3 Equilibrium
- 4.4 Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining
- 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining
- 4.6 Summary
- Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games
- 5.1 Symmetric Partition Functions
- 5.2 An Algorithm
- 5.3 Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria
- 5.4 A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs
- 5.5 Proofs
- 5.6 Summary
- Chapter 6. Applications
- 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly
- 6.2 Public Goods
- 6.3 Proofs
- 6.4 Summary
- Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case
- 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core
- 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors
- 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium
- 7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure
- 7.5 More on Efficiency
- 7.6 Externalities Revisited
- 7.7 Alternative Protocols
- 7.8 Proofs
- 7.9 Summary
- Chapter 8. A Framework for Reversible Agreements
- 8.1 An Example
- 8.2 A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation
- 8.3 Binding Agreements
- 8.4 Strategies and Equilibrium
- 8.5 Absorption and Efficiency
- 8.6 Summary
- Chapter 9. Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
- 9.1 Two Examples
- 9.2 Benignness
- 9.3 Absorption and Efficiency
- 9.4 Proofs
- 9.5 Summary
- Chapter 10. Reversible Agreements With Externalities
- 10.1 The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games
- 10.2 The Baseline Model for Four or More Players
- 10.3 Superadditive Games
- 10.4 Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency
- 10.5 Summary
- Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
- Chapter 11. Blocking
- 11.1 The Core Revisited
- 11.2 Farsightedness in Blocking
- 11.3 A First Pass at Farsightedness
- 11.4 Externalities and Farsightedness
- 11.5 Summary
- Chapter 12. Irreversible Commitments
- 12.1 Equilibrium Binding Agreements
- 12.2 Farsightedness and Prediction
- 12.3 Inefficiency
- 12.4 An Application to Political Party Formation
- 12.5 Beyond Nested Deviations
- 12.6 Summary
- Chapter 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 An Informal Description
- 13.3 A Process of Coalition Formation
- 13.4 Deterministic Equilibrium Processes
- 13.5 Stochastic Equilibrium Processes
- 13.6 Proofs
- 13.7 Summary
- Chapter 14. Directions
- 14.1 Coalition Formation Without Unanimity
- 14.2 Equity Within Coalitions
- 14.3 Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit
- 14.4 Overlapping Coalitions
- 14.5 Networks
- 14.6 Coalition Formation With Nonbinding Agreements
- 14.7 Incomplete Information
- 14.8 Nontransferable Utility
- 14.9 Axiomatic Approaches
- References
- Subject Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
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- Author Index
- A
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- D
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- G
- H
- I
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- K
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