A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Published on 1. November 2007
Book
Hardback
336 pages
978-0-19-920795-4 (ISBN)
Description
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?
Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?
Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
Reviews / Votes
beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist * B. Douglas Bernheim, Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics, Stanford University * A must for anyone who wishes to discover the treasures hidden within the cooperative approach. * Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University and New York University * Ray's substantial accomplishments in this area will inspire researchers and students alike. * Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business * a masterful account * Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics *More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 23 mm
Weight
669 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-920795-4 (9780199207954)
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Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions
E-Book
11/2007
OUP eBook
€0.00
Available for download
E-Book
11/2007
OUP eBook
€63.49
Available for download
Person
Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Analisis Economico (Barcelona).
Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.
Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.
Content
PART 1 THE SETTING; PART 2 THE BARGAINING APPROACH TO COALITIONS FORMATION; PART 3 A BLOCKING APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION