Defending Husserl
Description
The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl's non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl's career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.
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2 - Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book [Seite 16]
3 - Chapter I: On Imagining [Seite 21]
3.1 - I.1 Ryle on imagining [Seite 22]
3.2 - I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining [Seite 31]
3.3 - I.3 Bennett&Hacker on imagining [Seite 40]
3.4 - I.4 Husserl on imagining [Seite 54]
3.5 - I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining [Seite 79]
3.6 - Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation [Seite 110]
4 - Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life [Seite 123]
4.1 - II.1 Against privatism and eliminativism [Seite 123]
4.2 - II.2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life [Seite 136]
4.2.1 - II.2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience) [Seite 140]
4.2.2 - II.2.2 Wittgenstein's argument against knowledge of the inward mental life [Seite 169]
4.2.3 - II.2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias [Seite 185]
4.3 - II.3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences [Seite 192]
4.3.1 - II.3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism [Seite 220]
4.3.2 - II.3.2 Knowing one's own mind and the minds of others [Seite 229]
4.4 - II.4 Coda: the second-person point of view [Seite 239]
4.5 - Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation [Seite 246]
5 - Chapter III: On Intending [Seite 267]
5.1 - III.1 A prologue: epoché [Seite 267]
5.2 - III.2 Technical intentionality-predicates [Seite 268]
5.3 - III.3 The great divide in intentionality theory - first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl [Seite 271]
5.3.1 - III.3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl [Seite 286]
5.3.2 - III.3.2 Does Husserl's theory of intentionality lead to idealism? [Seite 299]
5.4 - III.4 The great divide in intentionality theory - second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl [Seite 310]
5.4.1 - III.4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist [Seite 326]
5.5 - III.5 Dennett's nihilism regarding intentionality [Seite 335]
5.6 - III.6 Bennett&Hacker's nihilism regarding intentionality [Seite 345]
5.7 - III.7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionality [Seite 351]
5.8 - III.8 Wittgenstein's profundity [Seite 367]
5.9 - Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation [Seite 371]
6 - Chapter IV: On the Literature [Seite 381]
6.1 - IV.1 Husserl without introspection? [Seite 381]
6.2 - IV.2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way [Seite 394]
6.2.1 - IV.2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection [Seite 394]
6.2.2 - IV.2.2 Thompson on representationalism [Seite 405]
6.2.3 - IV.2.3 Thompson on imagining [Seite 409]
6.3 - IV.3 Was Husserl an externalist? [Seite 416]
6.4 - IV.4 Husserl's theory of intentionality misinterpreted [Seite 439]
6.4.1 - IV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl's theory of intentionality [Seite 454]
6.5 - IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian [Seite 464]
6.5.1 - IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection) [Seite 464]
6.5.2 - IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe's mistranslation of "Vorstellung" and, allegedly, of "Bild") [Seite 467]
6.5.3 - IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings [Seite 470]
6.5.4 - IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings) [Seite 474]
6.6 - IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king [Seite 480]
6.7 - IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism [Seite 486]
6.8 - IV.8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants [Seite 490]
6.9 - Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation [Seite 503]
7 - Bibliography [Seite 513]
8 - Index of labelled quotations from Bennett&Hacker, Dennett, Husserl, Ryle, and Wittgenstein [Seite 520]
9 - Index of other quoted authors [Seite 527]
