
Fundamentals of Power System Economics
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"Where economic theory meets the physics of electricity-everything you need to understand why power markets are unlike any other." -Jesse Jenkins, Princeton University
"Fundamentals of Power System Economics caters to a wide diversity of students; it can speak to economists and engineers alike." -François Bouffard, McGill University
"Perfectly bridges principles of economics with the power system." -Chongqing Kang, Tsinghua University
Understand competitive electricity markets in a decarbonizing energy landscape
Designing successful electricity markets requires mastery of both power systems engineering and market economics. Now in its third edition, Fundamentals of Power System Economics explains competitive market principles while contrasting them against the monopoly model as a reference framework. Written by two leading researchers in power system economics, this new edition addresses markets where carbon-free generation predominates.
This edition adds coverage of decarbonization economics, government market interventions, and market clearing with high renewable penetration. New material addresses transmission investment cost allocation, generation investment challenges in energy-only markets, and system operator tools including SCED and SCUC. A new chapter on retail markets covers prosumer interactions, flexible consumers, and energy equity.
The book also includes:
- Reorganized structure covering fundamental principles, short-term operational economics, and long-term investment economics across three distinct parts
- Detailed analysis of wholesale market structures including demand-side bidding mechanisms and examples showing different renewable generation proportions
- Coverage of transmission network integration with system operator responsibilities and optimal power flow methodologies explained in monopoly contexts
- Discussion of retail electricity tariffs for residential and commercial consumers alongside emerging prosumer business models and flexibility services
- Extensive end-of-chapter exercises and discussion points designed to reinforce concepts and enhance understanding of complex market dynamics
Designed for graduate and undergraduate students in electrical and power engineering, this book serves power system engineers, operators, planners, and policymakers working in deregulated environments. Fundamentals of Power System Economics provides the analytical foundation needed to navigate electricity markets during the transition to low-carbon generation.
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Persons
DANIEL S. KIRSCHEN, PHD, is the Donald W. and Ruth Mary Close Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Washington, USA. A Fellow of the IEEE and the Chinese Society for Electrical Engineering, his research focuses on renewable energy integration, power system economics, and grid resilience. He previously taught at The University of Manchester, UK, and developed utility control center software for Control Data and Siemens.
GORAN STRBAC, PHD, is Professor of Energy Systems at Imperial College London, UK, with extensive experience in modelling and analysis of operation, planning, security and economics of energy systems. He led the development of novel analysis methods that have been extensively used to inform industry, governments and regulatory bodies about the role and value of emerging technologies in supporting a cost effective transition to a resilient low carbon energy future.
Content
Preface to the Third Edition
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Why Study Power System Economics?
1.2 Industry Structure
1.2.1 Vertically Integrated Monopoly Utility
1.2.2 The Dawn of Competition
1.2.3 Introducing Independent Power Producers
1.2.4 Wholesale Competition
1.2.5 Retail Competition
1.2.6 Incorporating Distributed Energy Resources
1.3 Dramatis Personae
1.4 Competition and Privatization
1.5 Experience and Open Questions
1.6 Further Reading
1.7 Problems
Chapter 2: Concepts from Economics
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Fundamentals of Markets
2.2.1 Modeling the Consumers
2.2.1.1 Individual Demand
2.2.1.2 Surplus
2.2.1.3 Demand and Inverse Demand Functions
2.2.1.4 Price Elasticity of Demand
2.2.2 Modeling the Producers
2.2.2.1 Opportunity Cost
2.2.2.2 Supply and Inverse Supply Functions
2.2.2.3 Producers' Revenue
2.2.2.4 Price Elasticity of Supply
2.2.3 Market Equilibrium
2.2.4 Pareto Efficiency
2.2.5 Global Welfare and Deadweight Loss
2.2.6 Time-varying prices
2.3 Concepts from the Theory of the Firm
2.3.1 Inputs and Outputs
2.3.2 Long Run and Short Run
2.3.3 Costs
2.3.3.1 Short-run Costs
2.3.3.2 Long-run Costs
2.3.3.3 Opportunity Costs
2.4 Risk
2.5 Types of Markets
2.5.1 Spot Market
2.5.2 Forward Contracts and Forward Markets
2.5.3 Future Contracts and Futures Markets
2.5.4 Options
2.5.5 Contracts for Difference
2.5.6 Managing the Price Risks
2.5.7 Market Efficiency
2.6 Markets with Imperfect Competition
2.6.1 Market Power
2.6.2 Monopoly
2.7 Regulation
2.7.1 Goals of Regulation
2.7.2 Traditional Regulation
2.7.3 Drawbacks of Traditional Regulation
2.8 Externalities
2.9 Role of Government
2.10 Further Reading
2.11 Problems
Chapter 3: Economic Operation in a Vertically Integrated Environment
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Short-run Characteristics of the Demand for Electrical Energy
3.3 Short-run Characteristics of the Generation of Electrical Energy
3.3.1 Thermal Generation
3.3.2 Wind and Solar Generation
3.3.3 Hydro Generation
3.4 Short-run Characteristics of Energy Storage Systems
3.5 Economic Dispatch
3.5.1 Mathematical formulation
3.5.2 Economic Dispatch Considering Unit Limits
3.5.3 Interpretation of the Lagrange Multipliers
3.5.4 Economic Dispatch Using Piecewise Linear Cost Curves
3.6 Load Flexibility and Storage
3.7 Unit Commitment
3.7.1 Mathematical formulation
3.7.2 Solving the Unit Commitment Problem
3.7.3 Handling Uncertainty
3.8 Further Reading
3.9 Problems
Chapter 4: Structure of Wholesale Markets for Electrical Energy
4.1 What makes a MWh a Unique Commodity?
4.2 Trading Periods
4.3 Forward Markets
4.3.1 Bilateral or Decentralized Trading
4.3.2 Centralized Trading
4.3.2.1 Principles of Centralized Trading
4.3.2.2 Day-ahead Forward Market
4.3.2.3 Formulation as an Optimization Problem
4.3.2.4 Market Clearing Price
4.3.2.5 Recovering the Fixed Costs
4.3.3 Comparison of Centralized and Decentralized Trading
4.4 Spot Market
4.4.1 Obtaining Balancing Resources
4.4.2 Gate Closure
4.4.3 Operation of the Spot Market
4.4.4 Interactions between the Spot Market and the Forward Markets
4.4.5 Virtual Bidding
4.5 The Settlement Process
4.6 Further Reading
4.7 Problems
Chapter 5: Participating in Markets for Electrical Energy
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Consumer's Perspective
5.3 The Retailer's Perspective
5.4 The Producer's Perspective
5.4.1 Perfect Competition
5.4.1.1 Optimal dispatch
5.4.1.2 Scheduling
5.4.1.3 Forecasting errors
5.4.1.4 Cogeneration plants
5.4.1.5 Ancillary services
5.4.2 Imperfect Competition
5.4.2.1 Bertrand model
5.4.2.2 Cournot Model
5.4.2.3 Factors that facilitate the exercise of market power
5.4.2.4 Supply Functions Equilibria
5.4.2.5 Agent-based modeling
5.4.2.6 Experimental economics
5.4.2.7 Limitations of these models
5.5 Perspective of Plants that Do Not Burn Fossil Fuels
5.5.1 Nuclear power plants
5.5.2 Hydroelectric power plants
5.5.3 Wind and Solar Generation
5.5.3.1 Intermittency and Stochasticity
5.5.3.2 Effect on the markets
5.6 The Storage Owner's Perspective
5.6.1 Self-scheduling
5.6.2 Centralized market
5.7 The Flexible Consumer's Perspective
5.7.1 Flexible demand vs. storage
5.7.2 Remunerating flexible demand
5.7.3 Implementation Issues
5.8 The Neighbor's Perspective
5.9 An Overall Market Perspective
5.9.1 Clearing the market
5.9.2 Default price and price cap
5.9.3 Exercising market power
5.9.4 Mitigating market power
5.10 Further Reading
5.11 Problems
Chapter 6: Integrating Wholesale Electricity Markets and Transmission Networks
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Decentralized Trading over a Transmission Network
6.2.1 Physical Transmission Rights
6.2.2 Issues with Physical Transmission Rights
6.3 Centralized Trading over a Transmission Network
6.3.1 Centralized Trading in a Two-bus System
6.3.1.1 Unconstrained Transmission
6.3.1.2 Constrained Transmission
6.3.1.3 Congestion Surplus
6.3.2 Centralized Trading in a Three-bus System
6.3.2.1 Economic Dispatch
6.3.2.2 Correcting the Economic Dispatch
6.3.2.3 Nodal Prices
6.3.2.4 Congestion Surplus
6.3.2.5 Economically Counter-intuitive Flows
6.3.2.6 Economically Counter-intuitive Prices
6.3.2.7 More Economically Counter-intuitive Prices
6.3.2.8 Nodal Pricing and Market Power
6.3.2.9 A Few Additional Comments on Nodal Marginal Prices
6.3.3 Losses in Transmission Networks
6.3.3.1 Types of Losses
6.3.3.2 Marginal Cost of Losses
6.3.3.3 Effect of Losses on Generation Dispatch
6.3.3.4 Merchandising Surplus
6.3.3.5 Combining Losses and Congestion
6.3.3.6 Handling of Losses under Bilateral Trading
6.3.4 Mathematical Formulation of Nodal Pricing
6.3.4.1 Network with a Single Busbar
6.3.4.2 Network of Infinite Capacity with Losses
6.3.4.3 Network of Finite Capacity with Losses
6.3.4.4 Network of Finite Capacity, dc Power Flow Approximation
6.3.4.5 ac modeling
6.3.5 Managing Transmission Risks in a Centralized Trading System
6.3.5.1 The Need for Network-related Contracts
6.3.5.2 Financial Transmission Rights
6.3.5.3 Point-to-Point Financial Transmission Rights
6.3.5.4 Flowgate Rights
6.4 Further Reading
6.5 Problems
Chapter 7: Power System Operation
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Operational Reliability
7.2.1 The Value of Reliability
7.2.2 The Cost of Reliability
7.2.3 Procuring Reliability Resources
7.3 Operational Issues
7.3.1 Balancing Issues
7.3.1.1 Load/generation Balance
7.3.1.2 Balancing Resources
7.3.2 Network Issues
7.3.2.1 Limits on Power Transfers
7.3.2.2 Voltage Control and Reactive Support
7.3.2.3 Other Stability Resources
7.3.3 System Restoration
7.3.4 Market Models vs. Operational Models
7.4 Obtaining Reliability Resources
7.4.1 Compulsory Provision
7.4.2 Market for Reliability Resources
7.4.3 System Balancing with a Significant Proportion of Variable Renewable Generation
7.4.4 Creating a Level-playing Field
7.5 Buying Reliability Resources
7.5.1 Quantifying the Needs
7.5.2 Remunerating Reliability Resources
7.5.2.1 Co-optimization of Energy and Reserve in a Centralized Day-ahead Market
7.5.2.2 Operational Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC)
7.5.3 Allocation of Transmission Capacity Between Energy and Reserve
7.5.4 Allocating the Costs
7.5.4.1 Who Should Pay for Reserve?
7.5.4.2 Who Should Pay for Regulation and Load Following?
7.6 Selling Reliability Resources
7.7 Further Reading
7.8 Problems
Chapter 8: Investing in Generation and Other Resources
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Assessing the Profitability of Generating Plants
8.2.1 Building New Generation Capacity
8.2.2 Retiring Generation Capacity
8.2.3 Cyclical Demand and Peak Price Hours
8.2.4 Variable Renewable Generation
8.2.5 Energy Storage
8.2.6 Levelized Cost of Energy
8.2.7 Production Costing Models
8.2.8 System Integration Cost
8.3 Generation Adequacy
8.3.1 Assessing Generation Adequacy
8.3.2 Generation Adequacy in Energy-only Markets
8.3.3 Capacity Payments
8.3.4 Capacity Markets
8.3.5 Strategic Reserve
8.3.6 Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC)
8.3.7 Reliability Contracts
8.3.8 Long-term Contracts
8.4 Supporting Investments in Renewable Generation
8.5 Integrated Resources Planning (IRP)
8.6 Further Reading
8.7 Problems
9 Investing in Transmission
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The Nature of the Transmission Business
9.3 Calculating the Optimal Transmission Capacity
9.3.1 The Arbitrage Value of Transmission
9.3.2 The Transmission Demand Function
9.3.3 The Transmission Supply Function
9.3.4 Optimal Transmission Capacity
9.3.5 Effect of Load Fluctuations
9.3.6 Cost Recovery with Optimal Transmission Capacity
9.3.7 Cost Recovery with Suboptimal Transmission Capacity
9.3.8 Economies of Scale
9.3.9 Optimal Transmission Capacity in a Meshed Network
9.4 Non-wire Transmission Expansion
9.5 Allocating the Cost of Transmission Expansion
9.6 Other Sources of Value of Transmission
9.6.1 Sharing Reserve
9.6.2 Sharing Balancing Capacity
9.6.3 Sharing Generation Capacity Margin
9.7 Problems
Chapter 10: Retail Tariffs
1.1 Introduction
10.2 Theoretically Optimal Pricing
10.2.1 Marginal Cost Pricing
10.2.2 Paying for the Fixed Costs
10.2.3 Incorporating the Externalities
10.3 Conventional Pricing
10.4 Refinements to Conventional Pricing
10.4.1 Customer Classes
10.4.2 Time-of-use Tariffs
10.4.3 Critical Peak Pricing
10.4.4 Social Tariffs
10.4.5 Tiered Pricing
10.4.6 Minimum Bill
10.4.7 Demand Charges
10.4.8 Peak Demand Limit
10.4.9 Penalty for Low Power Factor
10.5 Behind the Meter Generation
10.6 Retailers
10.7 Further Reading
10.8 Problems
Index
1
Introduction
1.1 Why Study Power System Economics?
If kilowatt-hours could be stacked on a shelf - like kilograms of flour or television sets - ready to be used as soon as the consumer flips the switch or starts the industrial process, electricity would be a simple commodity, and there would be no need for this book. Despite recent advances in electricity storage, distributed generation, and demand-side flexibility, most electrical energy is still produced by large power plants and delivered to consumers through vast transmission and distribution networks. Any commercial transaction between a buyer and a seller of electrical energy thus has an impact on the state of the power system. Since consumers have high expectations regarding the reliability of their electricity supply, commercial transactions that could endanger the stability of the system cannot be allowed. Trading in electrical energy thus requires closer supervision than markets for traditional commodities. Power system economics is thus closely linked to power system operation.
Building the infrastructure required to generate electrical energy and delivering it to consumers requires enormous amounts of capital. Decisions about what facilities should be built must therefore balance the investment expenses against the benefits that they will provide in terms of reducing the cost to consumers, improving reliability and resilience, as well as meeting environmental objectives. The assessment of an investment project must therefore consider not solely its profitability but also how it would affect the operation of the entire system.
The drive to decarbonize our economies to mitigate climate change affects both the short-term operational economics and the development of the infrastructure. Conventional fossil-fired generating plants are rapidly being replaced by wind and solar generation that have very different economic and operational characteristics. At the same time, the electrification of transport, heating, and industrial processes increases the demand for electrical energy and hence the need for large infrastructure investments. Developing market frameworks that align profitability, reliability, and sustainability objectives is thus a challenging and critical task.
Development of smart control paradigm will support cost effective transition to low carbon energy future.
1.2 Industry Structure
This section discusses the common types of electricity supply industry structures and how a particular structure determines the responsibilities different entities have in the electricity markets.
1.2.1 Vertically Integrated Monopoly Utility
A vertically integrated monopoly utility generates electrical energy, transmits it from the power plants to the load centers, and distributes it to individual consumers. It has a monopoly on the supply of electricity in a given geographical area, which means that consumers have no choice: if they want to purchase electricity from the grid, they must buy it from their local utility. This industry structure was universal for most of the twentieth century, and it remains the model in many parts of the world. Some of these utilities are regulated investor-owned companies, while others are government agencies or government-owned companies.
Electric utilities operating under this model made truly remarkable contributions to economic activity and quality of life. Most people living in the industrialized world have access to an electricity distribution network. For several decades, the amount of energy delivered by these networks doubled about every eight years. At the same time, advances in engineering improved the reliability of the electricity supply to the point that in many industrialized countries, the average consumer is deprived of electricity for less than two minutes per year. These achievements were made possible by ceaseless technological advances. Among these, let us mention only the development and erection of transmission lines operating at over 1,000,000 V and spanning thousands of kilometers, the construction of power plants capable of generating more than 1,000 MW, and the online control of the networks connecting these plants to the consumers.
Figure 1.1 illustrates this traditional industry structure. Commercial activity is limited to consumers purchasing electricity from their local electric utility. This utility makes all the operational decisions (e.g., how much power each of its plants should produce to supply the load) and investment decisions (e.g., what type of power plants should be built and where they should be located).
Because monopolies could take advantage of the fact that their customers don't have a choice to charge them extortionate prices, they must either be government entities or be subject to oversight by a government department called the regulator. This regulator enforces the regulatory compact, which is an agreement that gives the utility a monopoly on the supply of electricity over a given geographical area. In exchange, the utility agrees that its prices will be set by the regulator, that it will supply all the consumers in that area, and that it will maintain a certain quality of service.
This vertically integrated monopoly model does not preclude bilateral energy trades between utilities that have a monopoly over different geographical areas. Such trades take place at the wholesale level, i.e., through interconnections between transmission networks.
Figure 1.1 Flows of electrical energy in a monopoly vertically integrated industry structure.
Figure 1.2 Flows of electrical energy in the variant of the monopoly vertically integrated industry structure.
An increasing number of consumers have installed photovoltaic (PV) panels or other forms of distributed generation on their premises. Such a consumer becomes a producer when the power output of its generator is larger than its load. This excess power then flows back into the distribution network, and the utility has to buy it from these prosumers.
Figure 1.2 shows a fairly common variant of the vertically integrated monopoly model. In this variant, one organization has a monopoly over the generation and transmission over a fairly wide area and sells electrical energy to several distribution companies (Discos), each of which has a local monopoly over the sale of electricity to consumers.
1.2.2 The Dawn of Competition
In the 1980s, some economists started arguing that the vertically integrated monopoly utility model had run its course. They said that the monopoly status of the electric utilities removed the incentive to operate efficiently and encouraged unnecessary investments. They also argued that the cost of the mistakes that investor-owned utilities made should not be passed on to the consumers. Closer supervision by the regulator would not be effective because the operations of the utilities were rather opaque, making it difficult for regulators to assess where improvements could be made. On the other hand, publicly owned utilities were often too closely linked to the government. Politics could then interfere with good economics. For example, the revenues from some public utilities were used to support other government expenditures, while others were prevented from setting rates at a level that reflected costs or were deprived of the capital that they needed for essential investments.
These economists suggested that prices would be lower and the overall economy more efficient if the supply of electricity were subjected to the discipline of a competitive market rather than monopoly regulation or government policy. This proposal was made in the context of the general deregulation of Western economies that started in the late 1970s. Before attention turned toward electricity, this movement had already affected airlines, transportation, and the supply of natural gas. In electricity and these other sectors, regulated markets or monopolies had previously been deemed the most efficient way of delivering the "products" to the consumers. It was felt that their special characteristics made them unsuitable for trading on free markets. Advocates of deregulation argued that the special characteristics of these products were not insurmountable obstacles and that they could and should be treated like all other commodities. If companies were allowed to compete freely for the provision of electricity, the efficiency gains arising from competition would ultimately benefit the consumers. In addition, competing companies would probably choose different technologies. It was therefore less likely that the consumers would be saddled with the consequences of unwise investments.
Figure 1.3 Incumbent vertically integrated utility with independent power producers (IPPs).
Since then, many jurisdictions around the world have implemented one of the levels of competitive electricity markets described in the following sections. In other areas, the vertically integrated monopoly model persists, either for political reasons or because the small size and isolated nature of the power system mean that the cost of implementing a market would be higher than the potential benefits.
1.2.3 Introducing Independent Power Producers
A first step toward a more competitive industry structure consists of...
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