Reasoning with Attitude

List of Figures Preface 1 Expressivism 1.1 Semantics, postsemantics and meta-semantics 1.2 Why expressivism? 1.3 Speaker subjectivism 1.4 Traditional expressivism 1.5 Attitude expression 1.6 The Frege--Geach Problem 1.7 Sophisticated expressivism 1.8 The Many Attitudes Problem 1.9 The Wishful Thinking Problem 1.10 The Problem of Creeping Minimalism 2 Inferentialism 2.1 Inferentialist semantics 2.2 From semantics to meta-semantics and back 2.3 Why inferentialism? 2.4 The Problem of Defective Concepts 2.5 The Problem of Constitutive Rules 2.6 The Problem of Limited Applicability 3 Inferential Expressivism 3.1 Traditional expressivism about negation 3.2 Bilateralism and Frege--Geach 3.3 Inferential expressivism 3.4 Mixed inferences and Frege--Geach 3.5 Evidence and the problem of weak rejections 3.6 From bilateralism to multilateralism 3.7 Linguistic realization of strong rejection 3.8 Appendix 4 Epistemic Modals 4.1 Traditional expressivism about might 4.2 Might and perhaps 4.3 Weak assertion 4.4 Coordinating the speech acts 4.5 The meaning of might 4.6 Weak assertions, epistemic modal assertions, and evidence 4.7 Frege--Geach and its revenge version 4.8 Modal disagreement and Yalcinean sentences 4.9 Appendix 5 Moral Vocabulary 5.1 The Negation Problem 5.2 Bilateralism and the Negation Problem 5.3 Disapproval and moral vocabulary 5.4 Schroeder and the Negation Problem 5.5 Wishful thinking and evidence 5.6 Moral Moorean sentences 5.7 Moral motivation 6 Attitudes 6.1 Many attitudes, few contents 6.2 Expressing many attitudes 6.3 Ascribing many attitudes 6.4 Having many attitudes 6.5 Semantics in its proper place 7 Truth 7.1 Traditional expressivism about truth 7.2 The meaning of the truth predicate 7.3 Evidence and the truth rules 7.4 The truth predicate in multilateral logic 7.5 Truth and supervaluation 7.6 Classical recapture and revenge 7.7 Rejectability and revenge 7.8 Epistemic Liars 7.9 The question of realism 7.10 Appendix 8 Conditionals 8.1 Binary speech acts 8.2 Frege--Geach for conditionals 8.3 Counterfactuals and counterepistemics 8.4 The Gibbard Collapse Argument 8.5 Generalised Yalcinean sentences 8.6 Curry's Paradox 8.7 Content conditionals and inferential conditionals 8.8 On the plurality of conditionals 9 Probability 9.1 Traditional expressivism about probable 9.2 Probable and probably 9.3 Moderate assertion and moderate rejection 9.4 Coordination principles 9.5 Operational rules 9.6 Evidence and probability 9.7 Inferential expressivism about probability 9.8 Gradability 9.9 Moss on probabilistic belief 10 The Road Ahead Bibliography Index