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The Foundations of America's Russia Policy

On January 28, 1992, before a joint session of Congress, President George H.W. Bush triumphantly declared victory in the Cold War. "A world once divided into two armed camps," he said, "now recognizes one sole and preeminent power, the United States of America." And it trusted that power to do "what's right."1

Earlier, the president had avoided any note of jubilation, concerned that he might alienate or undermine the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, whose actions had greatly benefited American interests. Gorbachev had refused to use force to crush the anti-communist, anti-Soviet revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989; he had pursued major arms control agreements with the United States; he had wound down Soviet involvement in regional conflicts across what was then known as the Third World of developing nations. And he had been slowly, if haphazardly, dismantling the Soviet totalitarian system in favor of a more open, democratic political system and a market-based economy.

But Gorbachev was no longer the Soviet leader. By the end of December, the Soviet Union had dissolved into fifteen new states, the unintended consequence of Gorbachev's ill-fashioned reforms. Bush could now say publicly what he deeply believed without fear of doing harm.

But, if the Soviet Union had collapsed, a new Russia had emerged from the wreckage. It was in crisis - the government was in disarray, the economy was imploding, inflation was surging, food shortages loomed. Russia nevertheless remained a potentially powerful presence on the global stage. It was still by far the largest country in the world, spanning eleven time zones, with the world's richest endowment of natural resources. It had inherited the lion's share of the Soviets' fearsome nuclear arsenal, as well as the Soviet Union's permanent seat - and accompanying veto - on the United Nation's Security Council. What happened in Russia would impact developments all along its long periphery stretching from Europe through the Middle East and South and Central Asia to Northeast Asia and the Arctic. What's more, this Russia aspired to play a large role on the world stage. No matter what its current plight, Russian leaders could conceive of their country as nothing other than a great power. They were determined to reassert Russia's prerogatives and compel others to respect them as soon as possible.

What this new Russia would become was uncertain. The Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, had played the leading role in breaking up the Soviet Union. For the past two years he had criticized Gorbachev's political and economic reforms as much too timid. He stressed his commitment to democracy. He surrounded himself with young, aggressive reformers who were laying the basis for what they hoped would be the rapid erection of a free-market economy on the ruins of a planned economy. Western leaders fervently wished Russia success. But Russia's imperialist past weighed heavily in their calculations, and the prominence of vengeful communists and rabid nationalists in the legislature, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, did little to ease anxieties.

Bush may not have said so in his address, but this new, inchoate Russia still loomed large in American foreign policy. How should the United States approach it to prolong America's period of preeminence as far as possible into the future? How should the United States balance its hope for a democratic Russia and its fear of revanchism? Was productive partnership possible, or was the return of dangerous confrontation inevitable?

Anchoring Russia

The beginnings of an answer came four days later, when Bush met with Yeltsin at Camp David for three-and-a-half hours to discuss Russia's reform program and arms control. The two leaders issued a short declaration that laid out principles to guide relations. The first and most important was that the two countries no longer viewed each other as potential adversaries; rather, relations were to be "characterized by friendship and partnership, founded on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom."2 When Yeltsin traveled to Washington in June for a formal summit, the two presidents issued "A Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship," which stressed the two countries' commitment to democracy, their determination to promote a democratic peace, and their intended cooperation in advancing market-based economic reform in Russia.3

In broad terms, the administration's goal was to anchor Russia (and the other former Soviet states) in the Euro-Atlantic Community as a free-market democracy. Success would go a long way toward building the Europe "whole and free" that Bush sought, sharply reducing the risk of another great European war, hot or cold, like those that had plagued the twentieth century and devoured so much American blood and treasure. Advancing that goal entailed most immediately working closely with Russia's popularly elected leader and his government to consolidate democracy. A critical step would be to assist Russia in revitalizing the economy on the basis of free markets, in alleviating the hardship for vast numbers of Russians, so as to help to expand and deepen support for the country's democratic leaders. In response to Yeltsin's urgent plea, the administration took the lead in forging a $24-billion multilateral assistance package ($18 billion in loans, debt deferral, and other financial assistance, and a $6 billion stabilization fund),4 and pushed the Freedom Support Act through Congress to back democratic and economic reform in Russia and the other post-Soviet states.5

Nevertheless, Bush and his colleagues knew that a bet on integration and Russian democracy was far from a sure thing. Two threats loomed large: anarchy and Russia's reversion to its expansionist traditions. Either would resurrect ominous threats to European peace and stability and undo America's triumph in the Cold War. Bush needed to hedge against both.

One hedge was to ensure that the Soviet Union's vast nuclear arsenal, now split among four states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), remained under firm, reliable control and did not create an acute proliferation risk. The preferred option was to bring all the weapons under Russia's control and then sign an arms control agreement with Russia that would reduce the size of the arsenal. After tough negotiations - the Ukrainians proved especially recalcitrant - the United States persuaded the three non-Russian states to commit to relinquishing their nuclear weapons and joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. Washington and Moscow then negotiated the START II agreement, which would lead to only a small reduction in arsenals after the massive reductions achieved under START I (signed in July 1991) but, more importantly, would ban intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs), one of the most destabilizing systems.6

While pursued primarily to limit the dangers of possible anarchy, the nuclear agreements also acted as something of a hedge against the reversal of reform - if Russia turned hostile, it would be better if it had fewer weapons. But we should not exaggerate their significance in this regard. Both sides had an interest in maintaining strategic stability. In the past two decades, treaties had been negotiated with the Soviet Union, and a Russia that abandoned reform would undoubtedly have engaged in arms control talks, even if reaching agreement would have proved to be much more arduous. The United States needed a more formidable hedge against Russian recidivism to prevent the reemergence of a threat of Soviet dimensions in Eurasia.

The critical geopolitical task - the second hedge - was to block Russia from reasserting its dominance over the states that had emerged from the Soviet empire. The United States was already working closely with former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe to bolster their independence after the revolutions of 1989; with the demise of the Soviet Union, it moved quickly to recognize the independence of the new post-Soviet states. Shortly after Yeltsin's February visit, Secretary of State James Baker embarked on a ten-day trip to those states to reinforce the American commitment to their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.7

Oddly, however, the Bush administration did not put much effort into building relations with the new Russia, to consolidate what the president saw as a hard-won victory in the Cold War. With that war over, he turned his attention to his reelection campaign, which compelled him to focus on his domestic agenda amid mounting economic anxiety. Rhetorical support for Yeltsin and his reformist government was never matched with vigorous concrete action, except in the area of strategic arms control. Tellingly, the president and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, end their joint memoir with the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 - there simply wasn't much to write about their effort to engage the new Russia.8

Nevertheless, the Bush administration created a broad framework for relations with Russia that was to endure a quarter century, until Russian invaded and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Euro-Atlantic integration, equal...