To the Best of Our Knowledge
Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity
1st Edition
Published on 9. March 2018
208 pages
978-0-19-251234-5 (ISBN)
Description
Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
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03/2018
Oxford University Press
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Person
Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. He works primarily in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind and is the author of dozens of articles in these areas, as well as four monographs, including Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2010), and Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is also the editor of the Oxford Handbook of Assertion (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Content
- INTRODUCTION: The aim of this project
- I Foundations of Epistemic Normativity
- 1: Epistemically Proper Belief: the very idea
- 2: Epistemic Assessment: Core Criteria and General Expectations
- II Social Expectations, Epistemic Responsibility, and Epistemically Proper Belief
- 3: Core Criteria I: Permissions to rely on cognitive processes
- 4: Core Criteria II: Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR)
- 5: General Expectations I: Entitlements to expect and Social Epistemic Responsibility
- 6: General Expectations II: Normative defeat and ultima facie epistemic propriety
- 7: Epistemic Responsibility in (Social) Context
