Being in Time
Dynamical models of phenomenal experience
1st Edition
Published on 11. July 2012
XVI, 261 pages
978-90-272-7359-8 (ISBN)
Description
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood - indeed, can only be understood - as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B.
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Persons
Content
Introduction
Time after time: Temporality in the dynamic brain
Dan Lloyd
Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
Rafael Malach
From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience
Bjorn Merker
Being in time
Shimon Edelman and Tomer Fekete
The (lack of) mental life of some machines
Tomer Fekete and Shimon Edelman
Restless minds, wandering brains
Cees van Leeuwen and Dirk J.A. Smit
Fuzzy consciousness
Stephanie Huette and Michael J. Spivey
Two dynamical themes in Husserl
Jeffrey Yoshimi
Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness
Wanja Wiese and Thomas Metzinger
The brain and ist states
Richard Brown
An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness
Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen and Christopher T. Kello
Index
Time after time: Temporality in the dynamic brain
Dan Lloyd
Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
Rafael Malach
From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience
Bjorn Merker
Being in time
Shimon Edelman and Tomer Fekete
The (lack of) mental life of some machines
Tomer Fekete and Shimon Edelman
Restless minds, wandering brains
Cees van Leeuwen and Dirk J.A. Smit
Fuzzy consciousness
Stephanie Huette and Michael J. Spivey
Two dynamical themes in Husserl
Jeffrey Yoshimi
Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness
Wanja Wiese and Thomas Metzinger
The brain and ist states
Richard Brown
An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness
Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen and Christopher T. Kello
Index
