
Being in Time
Dynamical models of phenomenal experience
John Benjamins Publishing Co
Published on 11. July 2012
Book
Hardback
261 pages
978-90-272-1354-9 (ISBN)
Description
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood - indeed, can only be understood - as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 245 mm
Width: 164 mm
Weight
655 gr
ISBN-13
978-90-272-1354-9 (9789027213549)
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Other editions
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E-Book
07/2012
1st Edition
John Benjamins Publishing Company
€123.99
Available for download
Persons
Editor
Cornell University
Stony Brook University
University of Pennsylvania
Content
1. Introduction; 2. Time after time: Temporality in the dynamic brain (by Lloyd, Dan); 3. Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness (by Malach, Rafael); 4. From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical "global best estimate buffer" as locus of phenomenal experience (by Merker, Bjorn); 5. Being in time (by Edelman, Shimon); 6. The (lack of) mental life of some machines (by Fekete, Tomer); 7. Restless minds, wandering brains (by Leeuwen, Cees van); 8. Fuzzy consciousness (by Huette, Stephanie); 9. Two dynamical themes in Husserl (by Yoshimi, Jeffrey); 10. Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness (by Wiese, Wanja); 11. The brain and its states (by Brown, Richard); 12. An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness (by Dale, Rick); 13. Index