Intuitions
1st Edition
Published on 10. July 2014
288 pages
978-0-19-166912-5 (ISBN)
Description
Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science--in thought experiments, for instance--as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This collection brings together leading philosophers, from early to late career, to tackle such questions. It presents the state of the art thinking on the topic.
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Anthony Robert Booth | Darrell P. Rowbottom
Intuitions
Software
09/2014
Oxford University Press, USA
€81.85
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Anthony Robert Booth | Darrell P. Rowbottom
Intuitions
Book
07/2014
Oxford University Press
€114.90
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Persons
Anthony Robert Booth is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Sussex University, UK. He is also a researcher on the NWO funded Trusting Banks project, a collaborative project between the Universities of Cambridge and Groningen. He works mainly in areas at the intersection of Ethics and Epistemology. He has published several articles in journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Synthese.
Darrell P. Rowbottom is a Professor of Philosophy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He was previously a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Oxford. He works mainly in the areas of philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics, and the foundations of probability. He is the author of forty journal articles, numerous entries in handbooks and encylopaedias, and a monograph (Popper's Critical Rationalism). He is an associate editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Content
- Introduction
- Part One: The Ontological and Epistemological Standing of Intuitions
- The Rational Roles of Intuition
- Intuitions: Their Nature and Probative Value
- Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?
- Moderate Intuitionism: A Metasemantic Account
- Intuition, 'Intuition', Concepts and the A Priori
- Part Two: Intuitions in Disciplines or Sub-Disciplines
- Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps
- Novice Thought Experiments
- Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments
- Linguistic Intuitions in Context: A Defence of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism
- Part Three: Challenges
- The Challenge of Sticking with Intuitions Through Thick and Thin
- Sceptical Intuitions
- Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques
- Grasp of Essences Versus Intuitions: An Uneven Contest
- X-Phi Without Intuitions?
- Index
