
Spontaneous Order
How Norms, Institutions, and Innovations Emerge from the Bottom Up
H. Peyton Young(Author)
Oxford University Press
Published on 10. October 2024
Book
Hardback
400 pages
978-0-19-889290-8 (ISBN)
Description
Spontaneous Order brings together Peyton Young's research on evolutionary game theory and its diverse applications across a wide range of academic disciplines, including economics, sociology, philosophy, biology, computer science, and engineering. Enhanced with an introductory essay and commentaries, the book pulls together the author's work thematically to provide a valuable resource for scholars of economic theory.
Young argues that equilibrium behaviors often coalesce from the interactions and experiences of many dispersed individuals acting with fragmentary knowledge of the world, rather than (as is often assumed in economics) from the actions of fully rational agents with commonly held beliefs. The author presents a unified and rigorous account of how such 'bottom-up' evolutionary processes work, using recent advances in stochastic dynamical systems theory. This analytical framework illuminates how social norms and institutions evolve, how social and technical innovations spread in society, and how these processes depend on adaptive learning behavior by human subjects.
Young argues that equilibrium behaviors often coalesce from the interactions and experiences of many dispersed individuals acting with fragmentary knowledge of the world, rather than (as is often assumed in economics) from the actions of fully rational agents with commonly held beliefs. The author presents a unified and rigorous account of how such 'bottom-up' evolutionary processes work, using recent advances in stochastic dynamical systems theory. This analytical framework illuminates how social norms and institutions evolve, how social and technical innovations spread in society, and how these processes depend on adaptive learning behavior by human subjects.
Reviews / Votes
This volume weaves the author's papers together, with new commentary and perspective, into a coherent whole that well exceeds the sum of its parts. The relevant audience is broad, as is the range of questions and techniques that appear in the volume. This is must reading, from a pioneer and leading contributor to the field, for anyone interested in the emergence of cooperation, social norms, and institutions. * Larry Samuelson, A. Douglas Melamed Professor of Economics, Yale University * The question of how meaningful patterns of collective behavior-in a word 'order'-emerges out of the mess of uncoordinated individual beliefs, preferences, and information, lies at the heart of social science; and nobody has thought about this question more deeply than Peyton Young. In this one volume he has distilled decades of insights, bending rigorous mathematical models with simulations, experiments, and field data. The result will challenge and inspire students and experts alike. * Duncan Watts, Stevens University and Penn Integrates Knowledge Professor, University of Pennsylvania * These essays are fundamental contributions to the theory of the dynamics underlying the emergence of Social Norms. They are essential for anyone in the field. * Brian Skyrms, author of The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Product notice
sewn/stitched
Cloth over boards
Dimensions
Height: 237 mm
Width: 164 mm
Thickness: 31 mm
Weight
780 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-889290-8 (9780198892908)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

E-Book
09/2024
OUP eBook
€82.99
Available for download

E-Book
09/2024
OUP eBook
€82.99
Available for download
Person
H. Peyton Young is James Meade Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at the University of Oxford and Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. He has published widely in economics, game theory, political representation, finance, and mathematics and is particularly well-known for his research on evolutionary game theory and its application to the evolution of social norms and institutions. He has also made notable contributions to the theory of distributive justice and its applications to political representation and the allocation of common resources. A Fellow of the British Academy, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Peyton Young is also a former President of the Game Theory Society.
Author
, James Meade Professor of Economics, Emeritus, University of Oxford and Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Content
Part I: The Evolution of Norms and Institutions
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
1: Spontaneous Order
Preface to Chapter 2: Evolutionary Dynamics with Persistent Perturbations
2: The Evolution of Conventions
Preface to Chapter 3: The Spontaneous Emergence of Bargaining Norms
3: An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Preface to Chapter 4: Who Sets the Rules of the Game?
4: Conventional Contracts
Preface to Chapter 5: The Role of Custom in Setting Commissions, Fees, and Shares
5: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
Part II: Learning
Preface to Chapters 6-8: Learning to Play Without Knowing the Game
6: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents
7: Learning by Trial and Error
8: Learning in a Black Box
Preface to Chapters 9-10: Spontaneous Order by Design
9: Payoff-Based Dynamics in Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
10: Achieving Pareto-Optimality Through Distributed Learning
Part III: The Diffusion of Innovations
Preface to Chapters 11-13: How Do New Ways of Doing Things Become Generally Accepted?
11: Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
12: The Dynamics of Social Innovation
13: The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks