
Saving the Differences
Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity
Crispin Wright(Author)
Harvard University Press
Published on 30. June 2003
Book
Hardback
560 pages
978-0-674-01077-2 (ISBN)
Description
Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity brought about a far-reaching reorientation of the metaphysical debates concerning realism and truth. The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.
The collection includes the Gareth Evans memorial lecture in which the program of Truth and Objectivity was first announced, as well as all of Wright's published reactions to the extensive commentary his study provoked; it presents substantial new developments and applications of the pluralistic outlook on the realism debates proposed in Truth and Objectivity, and further pursues its distinctive minimalist conceptions of truth and of truth-aptitude. Among the papers are important discussions of coherence conceptions of truth, of Hilary Putnam's most recent views on truth, and of the classical debate between correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, and deflationary conceptions of the notion. Others are concerned with Kripke's famous argument against physicalist conceptions of sensation; the distinction between minimal truth-aptitude and cognitive command; a novel prospectus for a philosophy of vagueness; and a new proposal about the most resilient interpretation of relativism.
The collection includes the Gareth Evans memorial lecture in which the program of Truth and Objectivity was first announced, as well as all of Wright's published reactions to the extensive commentary his study provoked; it presents substantial new developments and applications of the pluralistic outlook on the realism debates proposed in Truth and Objectivity, and further pursues its distinctive minimalist conceptions of truth and of truth-aptitude. Among the papers are important discussions of coherence conceptions of truth, of Hilary Putnam's most recent views on truth, and of the classical debate between correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, and deflationary conceptions of the notion. Others are concerned with Kripke's famous argument against physicalist conceptions of sensation; the distinction between minimal truth-aptitude and cognitive command; a novel prospectus for a philosophy of vagueness; and a new proposal about the most resilient interpretation of relativism.
Reviews / Votes
[A] thorough and subtle examination of [the] multiple criteria of realism. -- Paul Horwich * Times Literary Supplement * Truth and Objectivity is a strikingly resourceful and serious book, imbued with respect for the difficulty of philosophical problems and a readiness to probe them with all the conceptual instruments of contemporary analytic philosophy. -- Timothy Williamson * International Journal of Philosophical Studies * A milestone in the discussion of realism. -- Jim Edwards * Mind * The collection is a powerful reminder of how much there is to learn from Wright's penetrating work on Wittgenstein or of broadly Wittgensteinian inspiration... Through his stimulating combination of exegesis and philosophical exploration he helps us to a better understanding of the very idea of rails to infinity. -- Adrian Moore * Mind *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Cambridge, Mass
United States
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Illustrations
None
Dimensions
Height: 235 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 38 mm
Weight
916 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-674-01077-2 (9780674010772)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Crispin Wright is Global Professor of Philosophy at New York University, Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling, and Regius Professor of Logic Emeritus at the University of Aberdeen.
Content
Preface I. Realism Reconfigured 1. Precis of Truth and Objectivity 2. Realism, Anti-Realism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism II. Replies to Critics 3. Response to Jackson 4. Realism, Pure and Simple? A Reply to Williamson 5. Responses to Commentators: Van Cleve, Horwich, Pettit, Horgan, Sainsbury, Williamson 6. Comrades against Quietism III. Ethics 7. Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities 8. Truth in Ethics IV. Truth 9. Truth as Coherence 10. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed 11. Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam's Peregrinations 12. Minimalism and Deflationism V. Response-Dependence and Cognitive Command 13. The Conceivability of Naturalism 14. What Could Anti-Realism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be? 15. On Being in a Quandary: Relativism, Vagueness, Logical Revisionism References Additional Readings Credits Index