
Learning and Coordination
Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention
Peter Vanderschraaf(Author)
Routledge (Publisher)
1st Edition
Published on 28. March 2001
Book
Hardback
244 pages
978-0-8153-4039-3 (ISBN)
Description
Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
New York
United States
Publishing group
Taylor & Francis Inc
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 240 mm
Width: 161 mm
Thickness: 18 mm
Weight
537 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-8153-4039-3 (9780815340393)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Additional editions

Book
05/2016
1st Edition
Routledge
€81.89
Shipment within 10-20 days

E-Book
01/2014
1st Edition
Routledge
€69.99
Available for download

E-Book
01/2014
1st Edition
Routledge
€69.99
Available for download
Person
Peter Vanderschraaf is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University.
Content
1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems; 1.2 Noncooperative Games; 1.3 Nash Equilibrium; 1.4 Examples Revisited; 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs; 1.6 Conclusions; 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 2.0 Introduction; 2.1 Rationalizability; 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation; 3.0 Introduction; 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule; 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation; 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World; 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory; 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation; 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States; 4. The Emergence of Social Convention; 4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions; 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium; 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions; References; Index