Metaphysics

Note: There actually aren't that many good metaphysics texts currently available. They tend to fall into two sorts - survey (Loux, Lowe) or nuanced presentation of a few core issues (Van Inwagen, Richards). The aim of this book, and of the series generally, will be to offer something which combines the virtues of both - viable coverage of a range of topics but in a crisp, stimulating and sophisticated way. Reviewers have responded very well to the coverage Snowdon proposes, so there may be a case for allowing him more space than other volumes in the series.Blurb:The aim of the book is to convey at an introductory level but in an interesting way what metaphysics has been and is.The general plan of the book is to have four main sections of unequal length. These will be preceded by a general introduction in which I characterise metaphysics as branch of philosophy, and outline and critically discuss some conceptions of the subject, for example Strawson's famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, and set out some central questions as I see them, including the issue whether metaphysics is possible at all. The first main section of the book concentrates on some of the basic notions of metaphysics and theories about them. The notions that seem basic are existence or being, identity, the modal notions of possibility and necessity, the general notion of a thing or an entity, and finally that of truth. The second main section considers a series of metaphysical questions which relate to our conception of the spatial world. These are; can we defend a realist view of the spatial world from the attacks on it by various more or less idealist conceptions, including old fashioned idealism, Kant's sophisticated idealism, verificationism, and anti realism?; how should we think of time and space themselves?; what is causation? are there problems with the idea of space occupying and continuing objects? Is the common sense conception of the properties of such objects consistent with a scientific understanding of them? What other entities does an understanding of nature require to be postulated?In the third main section the main metaphysical issues to do with mentally endowed subjects are raised. They are; is a physicalist understanding of such subjects defensible? Do mentally endowed objects (especially those of the sort considered to be persons) have distinctive conditions for persistence? Are persons as we conceive of them (as responsible and free) possible if we are physical natural objects?In the final and brief main section I want to consider, not the general arguments for the existence of a transcendent God, but whether, as many reflective people think, there is anything deeply puzzling about the very existence of the physical world and what sort of explanation is possible?The issues and views to be discussed will be those raised by and of interest to current or recent philosophers - for example, the views of Sellars, Quine, Goodman, Strawson, Kripke, Wiggins, Stroud and Lewis. There are, though, three general aspects of the planned treatment which I want to mention here.First, I think that it is important, where possible, to locate the anticipations of these current issues and their development in the work of great earlier metaphysicians, such as Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, the British empiricists, and Kant. The reader needs a sense of the origins of the issues but also of the continuing relevance of earlier thinkers. Part of the point of this is to stimulate an interest in the history of philosophy. Second, I think that the use of a fair amount of formal logic cannot (indeed, should not) be avoided, as well as some informal semantic discussion. The formal logic will be used to formalise claims but also to present some elementary proofs for discussion. Nothing beyond the logic conveyed in an elementary course will, however, be presupposed. Third, two central metaphysical issues that arise in many different areas a