
Self-Determination
The Ethics of Action, Volume 1
Thomas Pink(Author)
Oxford University Press
Published on 7. November 2019
Book
Paperback/Softback
320 pages
978-0-19-884307-8 (ISBN)
Description
Thomas Pink offers a new approach to the problem of free will. Do we have control of how we act, so that we are free to act in more than one way, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Pink argues that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive - a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do. This capacity might or might not take the form of a freedom to act in more than one way, and it might or might not be compatible with causal determinism. What really matters to morality is that it is we who determine what we do. What we do must not simply be a function of powers or capacities for which we are not responsible, or a matter of mere chance. At the heart of moral responsibility is a distinctive form of power that is quite unlike ordinary causation - a power by which we determine outcomes in a way quite differently from the way ordinary causes determine outcomes. Pink examines how this power is involved in action, and how the nature of action permits the operation of such a power to determine it.
Reviews / Votes
"[T]his is a very interesting book - a worthwhile read for philosophers, and maybe psychologists, working at the intersection of action theory, voluntary action, free will and ethics ... I would like to recommend Pink's book and I am looking forward to reading the second volume of Pink's project." * Ludwig Jaskolla, Metapsychology *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 17 mm
Weight
477 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-884307-8 (9780198843078)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Person
Thomas Pink, Department of Philosophy, King's College London
Content
Introduction and summary
1: Action and its place in ethics
2: Freedom and purposiveness
3: Motivation and voluntariness
4: The non-voluntariness of the will
5: The voluntariness-based model of action
6: Freedom and scepticism: incompatibilism
7: Freedom and scepticism: alternatives
8: Moral responsibility and reduction
9: The practical reason-based model and its past
10: Intention and practical reason
11: The action-constitutive exercise of reason
12: Action and its motivation
13: Voluntariness and freedom of the will
14: Freedom and causation
15: Freedom as a power
1: Action and its place in ethics
2: Freedom and purposiveness
3: Motivation and voluntariness
4: The non-voluntariness of the will
5: The voluntariness-based model of action
6: Freedom and scepticism: incompatibilism
7: Freedom and scepticism: alternatives
8: Moral responsibility and reduction
9: The practical reason-based model and its past
10: Intention and practical reason
11: The action-constitutive exercise of reason
12: Action and its motivation
13: Voluntariness and freedom of the will
14: Freedom and causation
15: Freedom as a power