
The Primacy of Metaphysics
Christopher Peacocke(Author)
Oxford University Press
Published on 1. February 2021
Book
Paperback/Softback
240 pages
978-0-19-289716-9 (ISBN)
Description
This volume presents a new view of the relationship between metaphysics and the theory of meaning.
What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, on the one hand, and the ways you think about them on the other? Is the nature of the world prior to the nature of thought and meaning, or not? Christopher Peacocke argues that the nature of the world - its metaphysics - is always involved in thought and meaning. Meaning is never prior to the nature of the world.
Peacocke develops a general claim that metaphysics is always involved, either as explanatorily prior, or in a no-priority relationship, to the theory of meaning and content. Meaning and intentional content are never explanatorily prior to the metaphysics. He aims to show, in successive chapters of The Primacy of Metaphysics how the general view holds for magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects. For each of these cases, the metaphysics of the entities involved is explanatorily prior to an account of the nature of our language and thought about them. Peacocke makes original contributions to the metaphysics of these topics, and offers consequential new treatments of analogue computation and representation. In the final chapter, he argues that his approach generates a new account of the limits of intelligibility, and locates his account in relation to other treatments of this classical conundrum.
What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, on the one hand, and the ways you think about them on the other? Is the nature of the world prior to the nature of thought and meaning, or not? Christopher Peacocke argues that the nature of the world - its metaphysics - is always involved in thought and meaning. Meaning is never prior to the nature of the world.
Peacocke develops a general claim that metaphysics is always involved, either as explanatorily prior, or in a no-priority relationship, to the theory of meaning and content. Meaning and intentional content are never explanatorily prior to the metaphysics. He aims to show, in successive chapters of The Primacy of Metaphysics how the general view holds for magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects. For each of these cases, the metaphysics of the entities involved is explanatorily prior to an account of the nature of our language and thought about them. Peacocke makes original contributions to the metaphysics of these topics, and offers consequential new treatments of analogue computation and representation. In the final chapter, he argues that his approach generates a new account of the limits of intelligibility, and locates his account in relation to other treatments of this classical conundrum.
Reviews / Votes
An erudite examination of a fascinating but difficult philosophical subject, this book will primarily interest those working in epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty. * P. Jenkins, CHOICE * this book is just as remarkable for its breadth. . . . Most philosophers of mind, language, epistemology, and metaphysics are likely to find insights that bear on their research. * Jacob Beck, European Journal of Philosophy * The Primacy of Metaphysics is a rich work, handsomely repaying multiple readings. It testifies to Peacocke's creativity and philosophical seriousness. * Mark Johnston, Philosophical Studies * the book develops a distinctive and novel position, which is often plausible and always interesting. * Oystein Linnebo, Philosophical Studies *More details
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 234 mm
Width: 156 mm
Thickness: 13 mm
Weight
371 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-289716-9 (9780192897169)
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Schweitzer Classification
Person
Christopher Peacocke worked for many years in Oxford and London. He was successively a Prize Fellow of All Souls College, a Tutorial Fellow of New College, Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at Kings College London, and finally for twelve years Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford. In 2000 he became Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is currently Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University and Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy at the School of Advanced Study in the University of London.
Author
Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy / Honorary FellowJohnsonian Professor of Philosophy / Honorary Fellow, Columbia University / Institute of Philosophy, University of London
Content
Introduction
1: Metaphysics and the Theory of Content
2: Magnitudes
3: Time
4: The Self
5: Number
6: Ontology and Intelligibility
7: Avenues for Further Development
1: Metaphysics and the Theory of Content
2: Magnitudes
3: Time
4: The Self
5: Number
6: Ontology and Intelligibility
7: Avenues for Further Development