
Economics, Organization and Management
International Edition
Pearson (Publisher)
Published on 1. February 1992
Book
Paperback/Softback
600 pages
978-0-13-223967-7 (ISBN)
Description
A systematic treatment of the economics of the modern firm, this text draws on the insights of various areas in modern economics and other disciplines, and presents the central problems in organizations of motivating people and co-ordinating their activities. After introducing the fundamental problems which organizations encounter and explaining why they occur, the text discusses a number of patterns of response, with the aim of showing students why organizations are structured as they are, why they adopt the policies they do, and how to solve organizational problems themselves. The text attempts to provide a balanced treatment of both incentive problems and problems of co-ordination. It discusses, in simple terms, key elements of economic theory - contract theory, information economics, incentive theory, theories of co-ordination, transaction costs, property rights, labour economics, corporate finance and welfare economics. Real-world examples are used throughout the text, and important concepts are highlighted.
More details
Language
English
Place of publication
United States
Publishing group
Pearson Education (US)
Target group
Professional and scholarly
Dimensions
Height: 254 mm
Width: 203 mm
Thickness: 28 mm
Weight
1134 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-13-223967-7 (9780132239677)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Classification
Other editions
Previous edition
Book
03/1992
Pearson
€89.83
Article exhausted; check for reprint
Content
I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.
1. Does Organization Matter?
2. Economic Organization and Efficiency.
II. THEORIES OF COORDINATION AND MOTIVATION.
3. Using Prices for Coordination and Motivation.
4. Coordinating Plans and Actions.
5. Incentives and Motivation.
6. Moral Hazard.
7. Risk Sharing and Incentive Contracts.
8. Rents and Efficiency.
III. COORDINATION, MOTIVATION, AND MANAGEMENT.
9. Ownership and Property Rights.
10. Employment Policy and Human-Resource Management.
11. Internal Labor Markets, Job Assignments, and Promotions.
12. Compensation and Motivation.
13. Executive and Managerial Compensation.
IV. DESIGNING AND CHOOSING ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS.
14. The Classical Theory of Investments and Finance.
15. Financial Structure, Ownership, and Corporate Control.
16. The Boundaries and Structure of the Firm.
Glossary.
Author and Subject Indexes.
1. Does Organization Matter?
2. Economic Organization and Efficiency.
II. THEORIES OF COORDINATION AND MOTIVATION.
3. Using Prices for Coordination and Motivation.
4. Coordinating Plans and Actions.
5. Incentives and Motivation.
6. Moral Hazard.
7. Risk Sharing and Incentive Contracts.
8. Rents and Efficiency.
III. COORDINATION, MOTIVATION, AND MANAGEMENT.
9. Ownership and Property Rights.
10. Employment Policy and Human-Resource Management.
11. Internal Labor Markets, Job Assignments, and Promotions.
12. Compensation and Motivation.
13. Executive and Managerial Compensation.
IV. DESIGNING AND CHOOSING ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS.
14. The Classical Theory of Investments and Finance.
15. Financial Structure, Ownership, and Corporate Control.
16. The Boundaries and Structure of the Firm.
Glossary.
Author and Subject Indexes.