
Properties
Oxford University Press
Published on 20. March 1997
Book
Paperback/Softback
284 pages
978-0-19-875176-2 (ISBN)
Description
About the Series:
The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editors of each volume contribute an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
About this volume:
When we say a certain rose is red, we seem to be attributing a property, redness, to it. But are there really such properties? If so, what are they like, how do we know about them, and how are they related to the objects which have them and the linguistic devices which we use to talk about them? This collection presents these ancient problems in a modern light. In particular, it makes accessible for the first time the most important contributions to the contemporary controversy about the nature of properties. Those new to the subject will find the clearly-written introduction, by two experts in the field, an invaluable guide to the intricacies of this debate. The volume illustrates very well the aims and methods of modern metaphysics and shows how a thorough understanding of the metaphysics of properties is crucial to most of analytic philosophy.
The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editors of each volume contribute an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
About this volume:
When we say a certain rose is red, we seem to be attributing a property, redness, to it. But are there really such properties? If so, what are they like, how do we know about them, and how are they related to the objects which have them and the linguistic devices which we use to talk about them? This collection presents these ancient problems in a modern light. In particular, it makes accessible for the first time the most important contributions to the contemporary controversy about the nature of properties. Those new to the subject will find the clearly-written introduction, by two experts in the field, an invaluable guide to the intricacies of this debate. The volume illustrates very well the aims and methods of modern metaphysics and shows how a thorough understanding of the metaphysics of properties is crucial to most of analytic philosophy.
More details
Series
Language
English
Place of publication
Oxford
United Kingdom
Target group
College/higher education
Dimensions
Height: 203 mm
Width: 136 mm
Thickness: 16 mm
Weight
340 gr
ISBN-13
978-0-19-875176-2 (9780198751762)
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Schweitzer Classification
Persons
D. H. Mellor is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Darwin College. His books include The Facts of Causation (1995), Matters of Metaphysics (1991), and Real Time (1981).
Alex Oliver is University Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy at Cambridge University, and Fellow of and Director of Studies in Philosophy at Queens College, Cambridge. He was previously Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
Alex Oliver is University Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy at Cambridge University, and Fellow of and Director of Studies in Philosophy at Queens College, Cambridge. He was previously Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
Editor
Professor of PhilosophyProfessor of Philosophy, University of Cambridge
University Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Cambridge, and FellowUniversity Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Cambridge, and Fellow, Queens' College, Cambridge
Content
Introduction ; I. Function and Concept ; II. The World of Universals ; III. On Our Knowledge of Universals ; IV. Universals ; V, On What There Is ; VI. Statements About Universals ; VII. Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism? ; VIII. Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt ; IX. On the Elements of Being: I ; X. The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars ; XI. Tropes ; XII. Properties ; XIII. Modal Realism at Work ; XIV. New Work For a Theory of Universals ; XV. Causality and Properties ; XVI. Properties and Predicates ; NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS ; SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ; INDEX OF NAMES